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Relations between China and Japan suffer under the “history issue,” an inability 
to reconcile these nations’ relative perspectives on past wartime events. With emphasis 
on China’s construction of the history issue, this thesis analyzes when and why China 
calls particular attention to Japan’s past aggression and the degree to which China’s 
actions have impacted bilateral relations from 1972 to 2016. Using elements from 
collective memory, national identity, and balance of power theories, this thesis makes 
four main arguments. First, provocative Japanese behavior revives the collective 
memories of past trauma and provokes criticism of Japanese politics. Second, when 
China perceives threats from Japan, it highlights Japan’s past atrocities and lack of 
contrition to contain Japan’s ambitions or gain relative power. Third, when collective 
memory is the main driver in shaping relations, balance of power plays a more supporting 
role and vice versa. Last, the public’s collective memory and the volatile activation of the 
public’s genuine anti-Japanese sentiments were the strongest factors in explaining the 
downturn of relations. As the United States implements its security strategy in East Asia, 
understanding historical disputes and their implications on the security status of the 
region is crucial, as they will affect agreements with our allies. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
China harbors painful memories of invasion and occupation by foreign countries, 
and these recollections make China highly insecure and constantly on guard to challenge 
any perceived intrusions from outsiders. The Chinese government assumes that 
foreigners always have a suppressed desire to control, coerce, and threaten Chinese 
sovereignty and that this desire might break forth, as it did in China’s “century of 
humiliation.”1 China is particularly acute to Japanese actions due to Japan’s harsh 
occupations in the 19th and 20th centuries, the proximity of the two countries, and the 
perceived offensive presumptuousness of Japan, which was once a student of Chinese 
culture and a lesser tributary state in a Sino-centric world.2 Relations between China and 
Japan suffer under the “history issue,” an inability to reconcile their relative perspectives 
on events that happened in the 19th century and early 20th century, including World War 
II (WWII).3 China continually brings international attention to Japan’s brutal history in 
Asia and scrutinizes current Japanese statements and activities for evidence of renewed 
aggression. Japan rejects China’s interpretations of past events and refuses to satisfy 
     1 The Chinese century of humiliation or China’s 100 years of national humiliation refer to the time 
period of 1839 to 1949. It begins with the First Opium War and ends with the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule led by Mao Zedong. During this time, 
China was plagued with foreign invasion, various wars with the Western powers (namely the First 
and Second Opium Wars), forced “unequal treaties,” divided spheres of influence by other nations, 
domestic uprisings and rebellions, civil war, and occupation by the Japanese. This time also includes the 
first Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895 that ended with the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Second 
Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945 (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to the end of World War II). 
From 1945 to 1949, China reengaged in a brutal civil war that was finally won by the CCP as the victors 
over the Kuomintang (KMT) or Chinese Nationalist Party, whose leadership was exiled to Taiwan. The 
“century of humiliation” is quoted by Zheng on page 66. Zheng Wang, Never Forget National 
Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 49–68, 74, 84.  
2 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), 38–39, 70–71, 92.  
3 The “history issue” is a well-known statement that many authors describe as China and Japan’s 
conflict over each other’s diverging memory and interpretation of the wartime history between both 
nations. Zheng Wang, “History Education: The Source of Conflict between China and Japan: Current 
Tensions between China and Japan Have Their Roots in Different Approaches to History Education,” 
Diplomat, April 23, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/history-education-the-source-of-conflict-
between-china-and-japan/. 
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China’s demands that it acquiesce to China’s version of the facts and apologize 
accordingly. The history issue conflict stems from a discrepancy in how China and Japan 
view their shared history. China remembers a cavalcade of traumatic events and keeps 
them alive, while Japan chooses to forget, downplay, or justify its offenses. This discord 
creates significant and intractable problems in the Sino-Japanese relationship. 
China has found it difficult, and perhaps inconvenient, to move beyond 
resentment. China mistrusts Japanese ambitions, whether for stronger influence in Asia, 
greater security and projection of military capability, or economic power. Chinese rancor 
focuses on Tokyo’s reluctance to demonstrate satisfactory remorse in writing, make 
reparations, and educate the Japanese people about their shameful past. China has used 
propaganda to exacerbate the history issue, inflaming anti-Japanese fervor to gain support 
for the Communist regime, justify territorial aggression, and ratify policy decisions in the 
court of public opinion. Chinese elites have used history as a coercive tactic to persuade 
the masses, refine the collective memory, and promote nationalism. Yet sometimes the 
tool may switch hands—public demonstrations demanding the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) punish Tokyo may influence China’s domestic and international policies despite 
reluctance from Beijing.4 
Japan has no apparent wish to rehash its militaristic past. Many Japanese believe 
their country’s oppressive and hostile conduct in Asia and the Pacific was perpetrated by 
a militaristic elite who dominated events and manipulated the people into war.5 Japanese 
leaders argue that the apologies and concessions they have made in the past have been 
                                                 
4 James Reilly makes a similar argument in his book, in which he states that there is a “cyclical model 
of state-society interactions, demonstrating that the Chinese government has developed a mechanism for 
tolerating and responding to sporadic instances of public emotion while maintaining its overall foreign 
policy trajectory” (pages 4–5). James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion on 
China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 1–6; Gries, China’s New 
Nationalism, 18–20, 87–90.  
5 Akiko Hashimoto, The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Japan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 16, 58–59.  
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sufficient and condign, and that under their strict “peace constitution” and careful 
reforms, renewed Japanese aggression is impossible.6  
China interprets Japan’s reluctance to review its military history as proof of 
Japan’s inherent aspirations to escape the strictures of its peace constitution, expand its 
maritime self-defense roles, restore nationalism, contain China, and overpower Asia.7 
Hence, China uses the “history card” in the international arena to spotlight, exaggerate, or 
even fabricate past events and present terrors. Japan’s historical brutalities give China a 
claim to the moral high ground and a platform from which to coerce sympathy from 
powerful states. The quality of Sino-Japanese relations for the past 44 years has varied 
widely in correspondence with China’s deployment or withholding of the history card.  
China may withhold the history card if more pressing concerns, such as economic 
cooperation with Japan, environmental policies, and humanitarian assistance, take 
priority. At such times, Sino-Japanese relations generally improve and mutually 
beneficial outcomes may be achieved. However, this cooperation has proven temporary 
over time. The history issue has a life of its own—nurtured, trained, and unleashed at 
Beijing’s discretion. When Beijing perceives a threat to its national interests, Sino-
Japanese relations are among the first casualties.8  
This thesis focuses on China’s strategic use of the history issue from 1972 to 2016 
to examine three key questions:  
                                                 
6 Hashimoto, The Long Defeat, 57–60, 63, 99–102; 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of 
World War II in the Pacific. In a public speech that was broadcasted internationally, Japan’s prime minister 
Shinzo Abe stated that “we have created a free and democratic country, abided by the rule of law, and 
consistently upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. . . Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of 
deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. . . Such position articulated by the 
previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future. . . We must not let our children, grandchildren, 
and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.” 
Shinzo Abe, “Statement by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” August 14, 2015, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html. 
7 Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 
International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 52–58, 78–80. 
8 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 158–160, 
167–168; Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington, DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 17–31.  
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1. What is the reason China continues to play the history card, knowing that 
it degrades beneficial Sino-Japanese relations and increases regional 
conflict?  
2. What triggers China’s use of the history card?  
3. What are the policy implications for the history issue for Japanese and 
U.S. planners? 
This thesis posits two explanations as to when, why, and how China uses its 
historical grievances against Japan and to what degree these accounts have contributed to 
negative bilateral relations. The first explanation is that China’s collective remembrance 
of its traumatic history with Japan is a deeply ingrained aspect of society and culture with 
significant political implications. Provocative Japanese actions, related to history, reignite 
the public’s anti-Japanese sentiments and can force Beijing to harden its policies with 
Japan and force Japan to take actions to appease the Chinese public or acquiesce to 
Chinese government demands. The second explanation is that Chinese elites use the 
history issue cynically to justify domestic and security policies, manipulate Japanese 
actions, and mold international opinion to contain Japanese influence in the region. When 
China feels threatened by Japan’s rising influence in the region, it will use history to 
contain Japan or gain an advantage in the balance of power against its rival. 
This thesis determines that a combination of both collective remembrance and 
balance of power explanations contribute to the downturn of bilateral relations, as neither 
variable can solely explain why relations suffered. Throughout the varying periods of 
Sino-Japanese discord, both Chinese society’s bitterness regarding its history with Japan 
and Beijing’s use of the country’s historical trauma for realpolitik reasons significantly 
contributed to explaining the downturn in relations—with one sometimes playing a 
greater role than the other. However, China’s use of the history issue to gain power over 
Japan stems from its remembrance of its collective experience. Thus, further analysis 
concludes that the public’s collective memory and the volatile activation of the public’s 
genuine anti-Japanese sentiments were the strongest factors in explaining the downturn of 
relations. Sino-Japanese ties were the most discordant when the Chinese public’s anti-
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Japanese sentiments over the history issue played the more substantial role. Furthermore, 
when collective remembrance was the more apparent driver, the government was initially 
motivated to take action to appease its domestic constituency and then capitalized on the 
people’s genuine sentiments to contain Japan’s ambitions for power. When the 
government’s promulgation of history to restrain Japan’s ambitions or to justify policies 
to gain power over Japan was the more apparent driver, the public’s collective 
remembrance was less overt, but still an underlying factor. When the Chinese elites 
played a stronger role in using historical grievances to contain Japan, the government 
satiated popular public demands for a hardened policy against its rival and preemptively 
avoided national uprisings that could force Beijing’s hands in its foreign policy with 
Japan. The Chinese government cannot conveniently dismiss nor separate the deeply 
entrenched past trauma of its people from its foreign policy with Japan. Thus, Chinese 
motivations to highlight Japanese atrocities were mainly driven by the deeply embedded 
resentment of Japan’s brutal aggression in Asia. China’s use of its historical trauma to 
improve its power position was a close second.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
China and Japan are the two leading powers in East Asia, and their relationship 
colors the economics and security of the entire region. They are the second and third 
economies (respectively) in the world, based on nominal gross domestic product (GDP).9 
China absorbs over 18 percent of Japan’s exported capital goods, which have risen an 
average of 10 to 17 percent per year since 2000.10 On a global scale, China controls 
                                                 
9 Before this, Japan had been the number two economy since 1968, second to the United States. 
Japan’s economic decline due to its stagnating economy and low growth rate has plagued the country for 
the last two decades. Tomoko A. Hosaka, “China Surpasses Japan as World’s No. 2 Economy,” 
Washington Post, August 17, 2010, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081503697.html. 
10 Park Bun-Soon, “Northeast Asia’s Economic Integration into China,” SERI Quarterly 4, no. 2 
(2011): 14; “Japan Exports 1963–2016,” Trading Economics, accessed June 8, 2016, 
www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/exports. 
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nearly a fifth of the world’s GDP and has overtaken the United States as the number one 
economy in terms of purchasing-power parity (PPP).11  
The volatility of Sino-Japanese relations puts economic investment, particularly 
that of Japan and the United States, at risk. Conflicts between the powers may yield 
severe disruptions that threaten maritime trade routes and undermine economic 
cooperation.  
China is not the only wielder of history in this relationship. Japan also has 
interpreted historical events in a deliberate manner to flatter its national self-image, 
renew desired forms of nationalism, and secure public support for more hawkish 
domestic policies. The competing and irreconcilable interpretations of history promoted 
by China and Japan have injected animosity, suspicion, and unrest into territorial disputes 
and led to military posturing, failed connections, and instability in the region.12 
Because China’s resentments are useful to Beijing, they are relevant and will 
remain so indefinitely. The history issue has formalized in China through an anti-
Japanese educational program that has helped prop up the CCP rule and justify its 
policies.13 For Japan, the domestic whitewashing of its historical militarism has been 
                                                 
11 “China: Share of Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Adjusted for Purchasing-Power-Parity 
(PPP) from 2010 to 2021,” Statista, accessed June 8, 2016, www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-
share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/; Wayne Morrison, China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, 
Challenges, and Implications for the United States (CSR Report No. RL33534) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2015), 1, 9–10, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf. 
12 Yinan He, “Comparing Post-War (West) German-Polish and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation: A 
Bridge Too Far?” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 7 (2011): 1157–1165, 1177–1190 doi: 
10.1080/09668136.2011.592266; “Forty Years in Paradox: Post-Normalisation Sino-Japanese Relations,” 
China Perspectives 4, (December 2013): 7–8, 10–11, 15, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1470088567?accountid=12702; 
Yinan He, “Ripe for Cooperation or Rivalry? Commerce, Realpolitik, and War Memory in Contemporary 
Sino-Japanese Relations,” Asian Security 4, no. 2 (2008): 162, 164, 174–177, 185–188, doi: 
10.1080/14799850802006522. 
13 Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 54; Zheng Wang discusses the patriotic education 
campaign and the century of humiliation and how they are rooted in anti-Japanese rhetoric and used as 
propaganda to strengthen CCP regime legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square Incident. Wang, Never 
Forget National Humiliation, 95–117, 126–132; He, “Forty Years in Paradox,” 12; He, “Ripe for 
Cooperation,” 176–177.  
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used to secure support for collective-defense initiatives, neo-nationalism, and military 
expansion.14  
Since the end of WWII, U.S. presence in Asia has been a priority for the U.S. 
security strategy. U.S. troops and military capabilities stationed overseas have had a 
strategic mission to promote order, prevent future large-scale wars, and mitigate 
aggression. Perhaps this has helped mitigate the escalation of conflict in the region. 
Moreover, the U.S. agreement to protect Japan under its security umbrella directly ties 
Japanese domestic and international politics to America’s security strategy. Thus, it is 
advisable for the United States to encourage positive Sino-Japanese relations to promote 
regional stability and lessen the requirement for U.S. involvement in conflict mediation.15 
In 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intentions to strengthen U.S. 
involvement in the Asia-Pacific region—an agenda that has been reaffirmed by the 
current U.S. administration.16 The pivoting or rebalancing of U.S. security and economic 
policies focused on Asia, against the backdrop of a rising and more assertive China, has 
presented significant implications for the stability of the region. Disruptive Sino-Japanese 
relations could potentially hinder U.S. desires to peacefully increase U.S. influence in the 
area. China may see increased U.S. involvement under this rebalancing as a way to 
control China’s rise in power, economic growth, greater clout in the international arena, 
and increased assertiveness in the sovereignty of sea lanes—all of which China sees as 
potential threats to its regional interests. Perhaps China is more resistant to increasing 
                                                 
14  Hashimoto, The Long Defeat, 124–131. 
15 Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald 
O’Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” toward 
Asia (CRS Report No. 42448) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2; Banning 
Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehension about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Asian 
Survey 37, no. 4 (April 1997): 383–386; Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 78–80. 
16 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 1–2; Ayako Mie, “Trump Ramps Up Efforts to Reassure Japan 




333347257#.WJt_abYrLow; Reiji Yoshida, “Abe, Mattis Reaffirm Ties on Defense, Japan Times, 
February 3, 2017, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/03/national/politics-diplomacy/shinzo-abe-james-
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U.S.-Japanese influence because it perceives this alliance as threatening to its interests in 
the area. Regardless, Japan is the United States’ strongest ally in the region, and positive 
Sino-Japanese relations are pivotal to U.S. interests in East Asia.17 
This rising tension between China, Japan, and the United States has resulted in 
increased military incidents in the region. In 2015, the U.S. Navy exercised its freedom of 
navigation rights and nuclear-powered carrier operations around the South China Sea in 
response to China’s territorial claims around the Spratly Islands.18 In April 2016, the 
Defense Ministry of Japan announced that Japan’s Self-Defense Air Force had scrambled 
fighter-attack jets over 571 times to intercept Chinese and Russian air forces during fiscal 
year 2015, a record high that nearly exceeded yearly levels recorded during the Cold 
War.19 More recently, on June 7, 2016, a Chinese fighter conducted unsafe and 
provoking air intercepts on a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance plane flying over the East 
China Sea (ECS).20  
China’s increased show of air power, maritime capabilities, military training 
exercises, and outspoken territorial claims have escalated U.S. and Japanese military 
responses.21 Sovereignty claims and territorial disputes in both the South and East China 
Seas have kept Sino-Japanese security tensions high and militaries on alert in East Asia. 
                                                 
17 Manyin et al., Pivot to the Pacific? 1. 
18 According to Weitz, “U.S. Navy conducted another of its regular freedom of navigation operations 
in the region. On October 27, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Lassen sailed within 6–7 nautical miles of the 
artificial structures that China has created near the Spratly Islands over the last year.” Richard Weitz, “U.S. 
Defense Secretary Details Response to China’s Strategic Challenge,” China-US Focus, November 13, 
2015, www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/carter-details-u-s-response-to-chinas-strategic-challenge.  
19 Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan Jet Scrambles against China Planes Double in January–March,” Reuters, 
April 22, 2016, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0XJ1EB; “Japan Scrambled Fighters 
against China a Record 571 Times in Fiscal 2015,” Japan Times, April 23, 2016, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/23/national/japan-scrambled-fighters-china-record-571-times-fiscal-
2015/#.V1XPlZMrK1s; “Japan Jets Scramble at Cold-War Levels as Chinese and Russian Incursions 
Increase,” Telegraph, April 15, 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/11540903/Japan-
jets-scramble-at-Cold-War-levels-as-Chinese-and-Russian-incursions-increase.html. 
20 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Chinese Fighter Conducts ‘Unsafe’ Intercept of US Spy Plane in East China 
Sea,” Diplomat, June 8, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/chinese-fighter-conducts-unsafe-intercept-
of-us-spy-plane-in-east-china-sea/. 




An official from China’s Central Military Commission recently announced that rising 
tensions in the East and South China Seas, continuing U.S. rebalancing strategies, and the 
new U.S. administration’s posture on Chinese affairs under President Donald Trump have 
made war a plausible reality.22 Understanding the underlying tensions between China and 
Japan will better inform U.S. military planners on China’s motives and desires in the 
region. As the United States implements military surge operations, restructures military 
base plans in Asia, and prepares contingency operation plans, the Department of Defense 
must understand state motivations and the underlying origins of potential conflict. Such 
knowledge will have implications both on the security status of the region and on how it 
will affect the agreements with our allies.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the immediate years after WWII, both China and Japan had higher priority 
domestic, economic, political, and security issues to resolve than the history issue. After 
the conflicts of the first half of the 20th century, China went through a period of isolation, 
famine, domestic strife, poor economic conditions, and geopolitical threats as it struggled 
to revitalize the country under its new Communist identity. At the same time, Japan was 
recovering from the damage, destruction, and defeat of the war under U.S. occupation. It 
was not until 1972, with the signing of the joint communiqué between China and Japan, 
that the history issue emerged. Initially, both nations attempted without success to resolve  
China’s underlying bitter resentment of Japanese occupation during the war. However, 
the unsettled history issue remains a significant source of conflict in Sino-Japanese 
relations.23  
The role of history in Sino-Japanese relations can be analyzed through various 
theoretical lenses, which have both domestic and international implications. 
Domestically, the history issue can be used as a propaganda tool by elites to influence the 
                                                 
22 Liu Zhen, “China ‘Steps Up Preparedness for Possible Military Conflict with U.S.,’” January 27, 
2017, South China Morning Post, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2065799/china-
steps-preparedness-possible-military-conflict-us. 
23 Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain 
(London: Routledge, 2014), 2–6, 8–21. 
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masses and justify military expansion. The public could also use history to garner support 
to change policies at the highest levels of government. Internationally, the history issue 
has evolved to serve as a tool to challenge the international status quo or influence 
another state’s domestic policy. For these reasons, this thesis will analyze China’s 
remembrance of history and how it influences Sino-Japanese relations through the 
public’s politicization of collective remembrance and the balance of power theory. These 
concepts will be used to assess trends as to when and why China brings to light the 
history issue and how this impacts Sino-Japanese relations. 
1. Historical and Collective Remembrance in Shaping Identity, Public 
Opinion, and Nationalism 
This section reviews arguments regarding the roles of historical and collective 
remembrance in shaping a state’s identity and creating a selective national narrative that 
promotes nationalism and influences public opinion. French social scientist Maurice 
Halbwachs holds that collective memory goes beyond recollections and instead 
represents “active selections and reconstructions” of a society’s past.24 Collective 
memory serves to discriminate among discourses to retain only the most valid, important, 
or meaningful to the group, which reinforces the legitimacy of personal experiences  
within a broader context of society and history. In turn, collective memories are 
preserved and kept alive to construct and reconstruct official narratives to bring meaning 
to the present. Thus, a society is bonded by its collective memory and the shared 
experiences that provide a foundation for the construction of an individual’s identity.25  
Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz argue that historical remembrance and the act of 
selective remembering and forgetting have been increasingly politicized. Remembrance 
and memory in the political sphere evokes the public to recall its collective past, 
especially its shared traumatic experiences, to find meaning and power in the present—
the power to heal, legitimize present actions, restore justice, or even instigate the call to 
                                                 
24 Erika Apfelbaum, “Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory,” in Memory: Histories, 
Theories, Debates, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 
85. 
25 Ibid., 85–92. 
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war. They assert that personal and collective memories play a key role in the formation of 
state identities and cultural narratives in a “memory-politics nexus”26 that uses the past to 
serve present interests. Radstone and Schwarz further argue that memories are not fixed 
but are rather shaped and reshaped as a result of the socialization of remembering and 
forgetting. The politicization of memory is an unstable phenomenon as a society’s 
memory evolves over time due to the variation of public interaction and interpretation. 
Thus, memory, especially the collective memory of a society, is inherently volatile and 
emotionally charged with changing reinterpretations of the past to serve present 
interests.27 
Similarly, Eric Langenbacker discusses the role of collective experiences and 
passed-down memories in linking the past, present, and future, to evolve into a national 
identity that explains the bonds of societies. He further discusses the impact of traumatic 
collective memories, which scar the peaceful evolution of a society’s development and 
manifest into a national narrative that is resentful of its past, cautious of its present, and in 
constant need of ensuring the security of its future.28  
a. Chinese Identity 
Perhaps the traumatic collective remembrance of the Chinese people by Japanese 
imperialists has created a narrative of anti-Japanese identity. Shogo Suzuki, Zheng Wang, 
Peter Hays Gries, and James Reilly discuss a more constructivist view in regard to the 
collective memory and shared traumatic narrative of the Chinese people. These authors 
argue that the Chinese people are embodied with an anti-Japanese self-identity born into 
society at the start of the country’s sovereignty as a nation under CCP rule. They argue 
                                                 
26 The “memory-politics nexus” is the way in which memory interacts with the public and influences 
the politics of a society, culture, or state as a form of validation or acknowledgment of shared past trauma. 
It is “to a degree driven by the sufferings attendant upon the making of the modern, globalized world, 
encompassing instances where memory, as a site of social practice, has intensified.” Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid., 1–4. 
28 Eric Langenbacker, “Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International 
Relations,” in Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations, ed. Eric Langenbacher 
and Yossi Shain (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 21–26. 
 
 12
that this identity was preserved in the collective memories of the public’s experience and 
culture during and after WWII.  
Japan’s role during WWII is poignantly remembered in Chinese society and 
serves as a psychological basis for why history is an issue to begin with. After five 
generations and a somewhat peaceful interlude of nearly 70 years, anti-Japanese attitudes 
still remain significant in China—this can explain why the public gives little resistance to 
the anti-Japanese rhetoric in Beijing’s patriotic education campaign—perhaps it is a 
sentiment that is inherently felt by the society as a whole. Therefore, Chinese nationalism 
and the history issue is more than a tool that is used by ruling elites to control the masses 
and manipulate domestic and foreign gains. From this view, history is an intrinsic 
bitterness remaining within the psyche of the Chinese mind that drives policy in Beijing 
and sometimes requires the suppression of Chinese nationalists to ensure cooperation in 
Sino-Japanese relations. Hence, collective memory originates from the bottom up and 
shapes a society’s identity and a state’s nationalism, which influences decision making at 
the highest levels of government.29  
Perhaps the Chinese public has embodied an identity and contentious narrative 
that was not only created by the people but shaped and controlled by the state to serve 
national interests. Yinan He and Zheng Wang also argue that the Chinese paradoxical 
identity as both a victim of Western imperialism and Japanese aggression and a victor 
over both historical intrusions was reinforced by a state controlled national narrative.30 
Yinan He describes China’s anti-Japanese identity as a result of state-driven “national 
mythmaking” through China’s reinterpretations of history.31 She argues that this 
                                                 
29 Shogo Suzuki, “The Importance of ‘Othering,’ in China’s National Identity: Sino-Japanese 
Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,” Pacific Review 20, no. 1 (March 2007): 23–29, 31–41, doi: 
10.1080/09512740601133195; Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 20–32, 36–37, 47–69; 
Gries, China’s New Nationalism, 36–40, 69–85; James Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective 
Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 02, (March 2011): 
465–468, doi:10.1017/S0026749X11000151. 
30 He, “Comparing Post-War (West) German-Polish and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation,” 1157, 1160–
1165, 1177–1178; Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 95–141. 
31 He, “Comparing Post-War (West) German-Polish and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation,” 1157, 1176–
1187. 
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mythmaking has created a “sense of innate superiority, inflame[d] mutual hatred and fear, 
and, as a result, worsen[ed] mutual misperception and justif[ied] bellicose policy 
demands.”32 Furthermore, the globalization of China’s economy resulted in increasing 
international pressure for it to abide by Western standards and norms. Thus, adding to 
this anti-Japanese narrative has been a form of discrimination by Western democracies 
that has given rise to the sentiment that China “deserve[d] a much better fate than that 
which it ha[d] experienced in the modern world .”33 As a result, China has taken on the 
identity that it is once again a victim of Western intrusion, an identity that hinders the 
resolution of continuing historical disputes between China and the West—and chiefly 
with Japan. 
Similarly, James Reilly discusses how collective remembrance and historical 
narratives shape one’s identity, allow for societies to make sense of the world they live 
in, and are molded by the state.34 The socially constructed narrative and selective 
remembrance of war events can potentially cause “contestation over historical 
experiences [as] the use of these memories [are manipulated for] political purposes.”35 In 
addition, Reilly and Jay Winter argue that collective memories of trauma and war, 
embodied in public commemoration sites, have powerful tropes that bond generations to 
the history and struggles of the nation.36 For both China and Japan, historical narratives 
are selectively chosen to promote state agendas, and they take the form of official 
commemorations, memorials, holidays, educational media, school textbooks, popular 
literature, films, and personal beliefs. Such rituals of remembrance are aimed at allowing 
                                                 
32 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 16, no. 50 (March 2007): 3, doi:10.1080/10670560601026710.  
33 Steven I. Levine, “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: 
Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 
43. 
34 Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred,” 464–468. 
35 Ibid., 466. 
36 Jay Winter, “Sites of Memory,” in Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates, ed. Susannah Radstone 
and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 312–317, 319, 322, 324; Reilly, 
“Remember History, Not Hatred,” 465–468, 472–476. 
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the past to have a prescribed meaning in the present. Thus, collective memories become 
state-sponsored historical legacies and form the foundations of state nationalism.37   
b. Public Opinion and Nationalism 
Peter Hays Gries, James Reilly, Yinan He, Susan Shirk, and Jessica Chen Weiss 
have noted that collective memory and state endorsement of anti-Japanese sentiments 
have created a public atmosphere that has sometimes gone beyond the government’s 
control or has forced the hand of diplomacy.38 In China, popular nationalism has 
developed a life of its own, taking over state roles and anti-Japanese propaganda 
dissemination through social and cyber media venues. Public demands have been a 
“double-edged sword”39 that has promoted state goals of pride, nationalism, and 
legitimacy of CCP, while at the same time these demands have undermined CCP’s 
credibility to handle autonomously foreign policies to meet national objectives and 
brought rise to domestic unrest through public demonstrations and riots.40 The rise of 
public opinion and nationalism can force the Chinese elites to take a hardened stance 
against Japan even if they do not believe it is in the best interest for the country. In many 
cases, the Chinese authoritarian government has had to carefully balance how much it 
allows and suppresses domestic public opinion and the rise of nationalism to ensure it 
placates the desires of its people while also implementing policies that serve national 
interests. Thus, anti-Japanese public opinion can block the CCP’s attempts to garner 
                                                 
37 Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred,” 465–490.  
38 Peter Hays Gries, “Nationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and 
Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (New York: Rowman & 
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39 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism,” 22; Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred,” 468. 
40 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism,” 1–14; Shirk, Fragile Superpower, 140–146, 151–157; Suzuki, 
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positive Sino-Japanese relations and increase the chance of bilateral conflict. Mark 
Selden argues “throughout the long 20th century, nationalism has everywhere been the 
handmaiden of war: war has provided a powerful stimulus to nationalism; nationalism 
has repeatedly led nations to war; and war memory is central to framing and fueling 
nationalist historical legacies.”41 Thus, the rise of anti-Japanese public opinion, shaped 
from the collective memories of a nation’s traumatic past, can force a government’s hand 
to harden its international policies against past adversaries, even if it is not in the best 
interest for the country, and heighten the risk of conflict.42  
2. Balance of Power in East Asia 
The rapid rise of China as a world power and the slow decline of Japan’s 
international economic influence after the end of the Cold War initiated a significant shift 
in the balance of power in Asia.43 Aaron L. Friedberg, and Robert Gilpin discuss that 
when there are transitions in the balance of power between powerful states, the rising 
power has incentive to change the status quo to reflect the current reality of its newly 
found capability.44 In striving to change the status quo, rising powers may forcibly coerce 
other states to behave in ways that acknowledge the newly found status of this rising 
power. In response to the newly capable power, neighboring states may have incentives 
to singularly or collectively take actions to prevent the ascent of this new power, thus 
forcibly protecting the status quo. In using this logic, the power transition between a 
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rising China and a declining Japan could potentially create an East Asia primed for 
conflict.45 
Perhaps China is constantly trying to maximize its relative power to ensure the 
security of its interests; thus, when it feels threatened, China uses the history issue to 
justify the acquisition of security and military programs, accelerate an aggressive posture 
in pursuit of national interests, or limit or control Japan’s decisions to do the same. In a 
world of constrained resources, a state’s pursuit of security and power usually comes at 
the expense of others and thus leads to competition and conflict. John J. Mearsheimer has 
a pessimistic view of China’s rise and predicts that China will take actions to maximize 
relative power with the goal of becoming the regional hegemon to ensure its own security 
while preventing others within the region from doing the same.46 The pursuit of power 
between states in Asia ranges from territorial and political domination to coercion and 
control over another state’s actions. This power can take the form of economic 
dominance, superior military, cyber and space capabilities, projection of sea power and 
control of sea lanes, and overall high levels of influence over another state’s decision-
making ability.47 Chalmers Johnson and Hidenori Iijri have observed that China 
continuously capitalizes on Japan’s war guilt to both manipulate Japan’s actions and 
contain its pursuit of security and power.48 Japanese concessions to China’s demands 
over history are seen in its continuous obeisance to China’s demands for supplying 
official development assistance, assenting to change student textbook content, and 
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agreeing to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine as well as its resolve to solve international 
conflicts without the use of force.49 
Thomas Christensen discusses China’s heightened distrust of Japan, which stems 
from Japan’s past wartime aggression and Japan’s inability to accept China’s modern 
interpretation of its militaristic history.50 Chinese elites fear that Japan’s apparent 
amnesia in regard to its chosen narrative as a victim of the war has clouded the judgment 
among the policy makers in Tokyo. Japanese education materials, literature, media, and 
propaganda portray Japan’s war past with emphasis on two interpretations: either the 
Japanese people were coerced or tricked by a select few Japanese militarists or that Japan 
was the only country to experience the horrors of two atomic bombs.51 Neither 
interpretation gives much regard to Japan’s aggression in Asia. This clouded 
remembrance and downplaying of atrocities in the education of the next generations 
could eventually lead the public to ignore or forget the wrongdoings of its own history. 
Moreover, hawkish agendas could easily take root to support stronger nationalism, 
escalation of military power, and renewed motivations for dominance in Asia.52 
Furthermore, the Chinese fear of a repeat of the Japanese aggression displayed in 
the 1930s. Hence, China continually reminds Japan of its wartime aggression in attempts 
to reeducate and remind the Japanese people of their own history. In addition, China also 
plays the history card to prevent the seeds of military aggression from growing and to 
contain any motivations to revise Article 9 of the Japanese peace constitution. Although 
Japan boasts of a reformed government that has learned never again to fight a war of 
aggression, China is suspicious of Japan’s motivations in maintaining a robust military 
capability in Asia and having the largest military budget in Asia, second to that of the 
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United States.53 In addition, Japan has a military arsenal of advanced weapons, ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) platforms, sophisticated military technologies, and significant 
amounts of nuclear fissile materials, namely enriched uranium and reprocessed 
plutonium. Although Japan’s arsenal is directed at North Korea, China may see this as a 
potential threat to China’s rise or a block to its interests in the ECS and Taiwan. Hence, 
China may even play the history card to suppress any motivations to use or slow down 
the expansion of Japan’s offensive capability.54  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The scope of the hypotheses will focus on how China views the history issue and 
how this issue has affected Sino-Japanese relations. From China’s point of view, the 
differences in the remembrance of the history between both countries and the lingering 
bitterness of Japan’s past militaristic aggression has made historical incompatibility an 
issue. On the other hand, Japan does not believe that the differences in historical 
remembrance should be an issue between the nations and tries to avoid and downplay 
China’s demands to resolve what it perceives should be a domestic concern. The thesis 
explores two possible explanations for when, why, and how China has used and currently 
uses the history issue and how this has resulted in predominately negative Sino-Japanese 
relations: (1) China’s collective experiences and memories of its wars with Japan and (2) 
China’s coercive use of history to contain Japan’s power. This thesis does not fully 
explore the possibility of Chinese elites using the reinterpretation of its history as a basis 
for regime legitimacy and state-driven nationalism. Nor does this thesis analyze the 
influence of power transitions and the personalities of Chinese and Japanese leaders and 
their influence on the upsurge or downplay of historical grievances. Additional research 
is needed to compare all four hypotheses to better explain how the history issue is 
exploited by China and how it has affected bilateral relations. 
                                                 
53 Christensen discusses the rivalry between China and Japan creates an environment ripe for a 
possible security dilemma and escalation of tensions in East Asia and can be worsened without substantial 
U.S. military influence in the area. Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 49–58. 
54 Ibid.  
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1. Hypothesis 1: Collective Remembrance and Public Opinion 
The first hypothesis is that the history issue stems from within the Chinese public 
psyche, which harbors deep emotional resentment, and is a permanent part of the 
people’s collective memory. This goes beyond the history issue as merely a tool used by 
the elites. In this case, the history issue permeates Chinese collective remembrance, 
shapes their own identity and the identity of others, and allows their society to make 
sense of its place relative to the world it lives in. Genuine anti-Japanese sentiments are 
fueled by provocative Japanese actions, which sometimes occur in conjunction with 
periods of remembrance and commemoration of Japan’s past wartime aggression. These 
sentiments can manifest into public uprisings to demand Beijing take action against 
Japan, even if is not in the best interest of CCP policies. Chinese citizens independent of 
the CCP form nongovernmental organizations and small political groups to protest 
Japanese policies and demand Japanese reparations and apologies for its past wartime 
conduct. Protestors might try to shape and influence Japan’s domestic and international 
policies as well as Beijing’s policies regarding Japan. Depending on the people’s 
sentiments, the history issue could serve as a push for, or hindrance to, Beijing’s actions 
regarding Japan. 
2. Hypothesis 2: Government Use and Relative Power 
The second hypothesis is that China coercively uses its historical experiences of 
trauma as a balancing tool to prevent potential threats to China’s rise in East Asia: the 
rise of Japan’s nationalist ideology, military expansion, and control in Asia, namely the 
East China Sea. This hypothesis explores China’s use of history to justify China’s 
expansion of military power and influence Japan’s external behavior and internal politics. 
When testing the balance of power theory, we can expect that China will bring to the fore 
the history issue for realpolitik reasons, such as when it feels that its national security 
interests are threatened, when its economic situation is vulnerable, or when it feels the 
need to contain Japan’s nationalism and possible military and economic aggression. 
China will potentially use the history card to help justify the need for increased maritime 
security measures and associated increased budgetary policies for assertive actions in the 
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East and South China Seas. Perhaps history may not be the basis for conflict, but it may 
be used to amplify Sino-Japanese tensions to favor China’s interests. The assumption 
here is that China and Japan are the two great powers in Asia, constantly suspicious of 
one another’s intentions, and that they will each take measures either to maximize 
relative power or to inhibit the other’s power. Thus, they are constantly “searching for 
opportunities to gain power” over one another for state survival, which results in a 
competitive relationship.55 This hypothesis explores elements from the balance of power 
theory and China’s use of history to constrain Japan’s power, gain economic benefits, and 
degrade Japan’s reputation in the international arena. Therefore, this theory suggests that 
China uses the history issue for both internal and external reasons to contain and control 
Japan’s actions, and this results in competitive Sino-Japanese relations and a greater 
likelihood of both conflict and stalemate. 
This paper both explores potential answers to when, why, and how China 
amplifies the history issue and to how Sino-Japanese relations are negatively affected by 
it. In some cases, the Chinese government uses the history issue as a tool to contain 
Japanese power, justify domestic agenda policies, and encourage Chinese nationalism. In 
other cases, the history issue is not used as a tool to manipulate Japan but is a deeply 
sensitive subject within the collective memory of the people that drive actions in both 
China and Japan from the bottom up. By exploring these potential explanations, policy 
makers will have a better understanding of why China preserves the history issue and 
how the two competing Asian powers see themselves and each other. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes a 44 year period, beginning with official normalization of 
bilateral relations from 1972 through 2016. Within this time frame, times of cooperation 
and discord are broken down into the following periods; 
 1972–1989: Period of cooperation (Normalization, Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship to the Tiananmen Square Incident) 
                                                 
55 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
2001), 29, 32; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 109. 
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 1989–1999: Period of discord (Tiananmen Square incident, the end of the 
Cold War, and the Patriotic Education Campaign to 1998 Jiang Zemin’s 
visit to Tokyo) 
 1999–2003: Period of cooperation (Friendship policy and “new thinking” 
on Japan) 
 2003–2006: Period of discord (Yasukuni Shrine visits and rising public 
opinion) 
 2006–2010: Period of cooperation (Revolving door of Japanese prime 
ministers and avoidance of the Yasukuni Shrine) 
 2010–2016: Period of discord (A rising China and a falling Japan and 
increasing conflict in the East China Sea) 
Next, the conditions, key factors, and expectations highlighted in each of the two 
hypotheses are applied to the major events of Sino-Japanese conflict and discord and 
tested for relevance, validity, and degree of impact. The crux of the thesis determines the 
causal factors on when, how, and why China reminds Japan about the history issue, 
resulting in predominately negative bilateral relations. This research also attempts to 
isolate the origins of when and why China brings up, allows for, suppresses, or ignores 
the history issue. This determines whether there are any related patterns of when the 
history issue is used and how it either defends or refutes the two hypotheses proposed in 
this thesis. Furthermore, the thesis explores the origins of Chinese mythmaking, reasons 
for diverging historical memories, and explanations for the incompatible coexistence of 
nationalism.  
The research design depends heavily on sources by historians, sociologists, 
anthropologists, psychologists, and political scientists. This thesis examines research 
completed by government politics professors specializing in Sino-Japanese relations, 
collective memory, and identity concerns. Empirical information is derived from polling 
data from both Japanese and Chinese popular surveys, newspaper articles, academic 
journals, books, and media studies. In addition, popular narratives, translated newspaper 
editorials, documentaries, speeches, blogs, social media, and Internet sites that can be 
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found in America or translated into English also provide appropriate mediums for 
research analysis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is designed to answer the origins of the history issue and how it has 
affected Sino-Japanese security and political, domestic, and foreign relations from the 
beginning of official diplomatic ties in 1972 to 2016. It attempts to explain why China 
preserves and renews the history issue and highlights the likely causal factors resulting in 
China’s playing of the history card and why the history issue remains unresolved today. 
In addition, it explores Chinese nationalism and its reinterpretation of history and 
analyzes periods of when China brings attention to the history issue to the detriment of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Furthermore, this thesis also shows how historical differences 
and distrust of each other’s nationalist intentions are generally the root of all conflict and 
tension between the two nations.  
The first chapter introduced the thesis question, main findings, the significance of 
the topic, and its implications for U.S. policy in Asia. The thesis reviews the two main 
hypotheses to explain the periods of conflict brought on by the history issue in Sino-
Japanese relations: (1) deep feelings of anti-Japanese resentment inherited through a 
society’s collective memory that drive decision making and (2) China’s desire to 
maintain or gain an advantage in the relative balance of power in East Asia. 
Chapter II breaks down Sino-Japanese relations into periods of when relations 
were cooperative and when they were conflictual—a total of six periods. The period from 
1972, which marked the beginning of official Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization, to 
1989 with the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of the Cold War is considered to 
be a period of cooperation. The fall of communism in Europe and the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 until 1999 was a period of conflict when China 
became increasingly suspicious of rising Japanese nationalism. From 1999 to 2003, 
relations were relatively positive as both nations sought to ease tensions and adopt a more 
amiable foreign policy for economic benefits. From 2003 to 2006, bilateral relations 
reached one of the lowest periods of discord as Chinese public opinion reached a 
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heightened status of influence. The next time frame starts with China’s desire to amend 
Sino-Japanese relations in 2006, when anti-Japanese sentiments were suppressed by 
Beijing to quell popular nationalist riots and domestic disturbances, and end with the 
2010 territorial disputes in the East China Sea. The last time frame begins in 2010 and 
goes through to 2016; this has been predominately a period of near-conflict and near-
military engagement between both nations.  
Chapters III and IV are dedicated to each hypothesis and analyze the three periods 
of Sino-Japanese discord for validity. Chapter III is dedicated to the rise of public opinion 
and the politicization of collective memory from the bottom up. Chapter IV explores 
history’s role in the balance of power between China and Japan. Both chapters look at 
key events and trends over the periods of discord to determine how China’s historical 
trauma has shaped its Japan policy and influenced its own internal security strategy and 
Japan’s domestic and international policies.  
The last chapter offers an assessment of each hypothesis, discusses trends, and 
concludes with implications for future Sino-Japanese relations. It also attempts to explain 
the causes for bilateral discord during the three periods of conflict. Lastly, the conclusion 
offers possible solutions to mitigate the history issue and highlight policy implications for 
U.S. planners and Japanese planners. 
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II. HISTORY 
This chapter reviews changes and developments in the Sino-Japanese political 
narrative in six periods: 1972–1989, 1989–1999, 1999–2003, 2003–2006, 2006–2010, 
2010–2016. Three of the periods were mainly cooperative (1972–1989, 1999–2003, 
2006–2010), regarding the history issue, during which China suppressed historical 
grievances to ease bilateral frictions and Japan avoided or mitigated controversial actions. 
In the remaining three periods (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 2010–2016), controversial 
Japanese actions provoked China to stress historical grievances, contributing to a rise in 
Sino-Japanese tensions. Assessing major history-related events between China and Japan 
from 1972 to 2016 led to these six time periods. Each of the events had a weak, moderate, 
or strong impact on positive or negative Sino-Japanese relations as well as significant 
friction or turning points within the relationship. Table 1 provides the periods of 
cooperation and discord in Sino-Japanese relations regarding the history issue from 1972 
to 2016.  
Table 1.   Periodization and Characterization of Sino-Japanese Relations 
regarding the History Issue 
Time Period Characterization of Sino-Japanese 








This table breaks down Sino-Japanese relations regarding the history issue from 1972 to 
2016 into six time periods (three cooperative and three discordant).  
Over the past 44 years, relations that have fluctuated between cooperation and 
harmony and chronic irritants—especially unresolved disputes over history and 
sovereignty—have promoted mutual mistrust and concern over security and policy 
issues. However, to explain the periods of cooperation and discord, this chapter provides 
 26
an overview of the events in each time period to better establish when and how the 
history issue arises or is downplayed, and its impact on Sino-Japanese relations. 
A. CHINA’S CENTURY OF HUMILIATION: 1839–1949 
The national trauma China experienced during the century of humiliation is far 
from forgotten and plays a significant role in establishing a current national narrative that 
shapes China’s domestic and international policies. Mao Zedong once claimed to “use the 
past to serve the present, make the foreign serve China.”56 Mao’s aphorism should be 
applied to China’s remembrance of its past trauma. China’s resolve to “never forget 
national humiliation” reopened the scars of the past to keep the people and the 
government ready to prevent outside intrusion.57 Hence, for China, the past plays a 
significant role in shaping the future.  
For China, Japan’s wartime aggression in Asia remains an active wound. China 
harbors a bitter resentment against past intrusion that reemerges in subsequent 
generations and makes cooperation with Japan difficult. Unfortunately, Sino-Japanese 
relations continue to suffer from an underlying animosity experienced from the wartime 
conflicts in the early 19th and 20th centuries. China’s prickly historical relationship with 
Japan shapes current bilateral relations. Hence bring an understanding of the root of 
historical disputes between China and Japan, the subsequent section briefly gives an 
overview of the key events that took place during China’s century of humiliation.  
China’s century of humiliation began with the 1839 Opium Wars with Great 
Britain and ended with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under 
the leadership of the CCP in 1949. The Opium Wars ended in unequal treaties that 
shocked the Chinese system. Britain forcibly opened ports, appropriated territory to open 
trade sectors, demanded most-favored-nation status, and imposed trade tariffs that limited 
Chinese revenue. British military occupation divided China into spheres of influence,  
 
                                                 
56 Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s 
Republic, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 253. 
57 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 95–141. 
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with unequal treaty systems, and enforced drastic indemnities. It was during this time that 
China lost its autonomy and sovereignty and became a weaker nation subject to foreign 
intrusion and economic exploitation.58  
But the greatest humiliations of this century center on Japan, beginning with 
Japan’s defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), and its ascendancy 
as the dominant power in East Asia.59 In response to the Tonghak Rebellion (1894), a 
Korean uprising against Japan’s enforcement of trade through a series of unequal treaties, 
Japan deployed its army into Korea, while China mobilized troops to prevent this 
interference with a neighboring state. The rebellion began the First Sino-Japanese War, in 
which a better trained and better equipped Japan quickly defeated Chinese and Korean 
opposition. The subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 recognized Korea as an 
independent state60 and forced China to relinquish Taiwan and the surrounding 
Pescadores Islands to Japan. China’s modern fleet was destroyed and its people subjected 
to Japanese influence. Because China traditionally viewed Japan as an inferior tributary 
state, a weakened China felt its defeat with great shame. Power and dominance now 
belonged to Japan—the new center of the Asian world.61 
In the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), Japan exploited China’s 
instability, lack of cohesive leadership, and less capable military to pursue economic 
colonization in a “reign of terror” that still burns in the memories of the colonized 
                                                 
58 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 49–69; Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, 
Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 128–129.  
59 The Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1985 was also known as the First Sino-Japanese War. It 
resulted with the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1985. Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 54.  
60 “Independent state” meaning that Korea no longer enjoyed the traditional tributary-like relationship 
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61 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 54–55. 
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peoples of China.62 Japan enacted harsh rule after annexing most of northeast China and 
Manchuria in 1931, yet the true horror began in 1937 after Japan seized key seaports in 
central China and, eventually, large regions of Southeast Asia. It is estimated that by 
1945, Japan’s Imperial Army controlled over 900 Chinese cities.63 The Rape of Nanjing 
in 193764 and the brutality of the Japanese occupation in WWII united opposing parties 
in the Chinese government in fighting Japanese imperialism.65 The cruelty, violence, and 
oppression of the Imperial Army ceased only in 1945 with the devastation of the Japanese 
homeland, economy, and prospects; the debasement of the emperor’s divine status; and 
the disbandment and forced unconditional surrender of the military.66 The century of 
humiliation ended in 1949 when the Communists won the civil war and established the 
                                                 
62 It is important to mention the Mukden Incident which took place on September 18, 1931. In this 
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64 The Chinese people have documented that over 300,000 Chinese civilians were killed during the 
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experiments at Harbin, forced labor, the use of chemical and biological warfare weapons, and the use of 
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PRC.67 Although the century of humiliation began with violations from the West, the 
Japanese occupation was the most searing offense.  
After WWII, China suffered isolation, famine, domestic strife, poverty, and 
geopolitical threats as it struggled to move forward under Communist rule. China’s anger 
over Japanese atrocities and its focus on recovery distanced the countries from each 
other, as did the CCP’s pursuit of economic policies to catch China up with the 
industrialized world. Historical disputes did not resurface until the establishment of 
diplomatic relations in 1972.68 The smoldering outrage of the Chinese people, which was 
stoked in the early 1990s through the CCP’s patriotic education campaign, ensured that 
historical injuries and resentments remained prominent in Chinese foreign policy and 
diplomatic relations into the 21st century.69 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE PERIODS OF COOPERATION AND DISCORD 
The following section provides a brief overview and characterization of each of 
the six periods of cooperation and discord. 
1. Period of Cooperation (1972–1989): From Joint Communiqué and 
Forgiveness to Tiananmen Square 
Sino-Japanese relations began positively in 1972 with the dawn of what June 
Dreyer calls the “golden age of Sino-Japanese relations.”70 As depicted in Figure 1, the 
years 1972–1989 were a predominately cooperative time as both countries set aside 
historical animosities to focus on economic ties in support of Chinese industrialization 
and new markets for Japan, and to establish diplomatic ties to ally against the Soviet 
threat.71 
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China and Japan mostly cooperated during this period as historical grievances played a small to moderate 
role in affecting bilateral relations. Diplomatic and economic cooperation played a more dominant role in 
the relationship to allow for positive bilateral cooperation. History-related events are depicted as weak, 
moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese 
relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). 
The lower half of the figure depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this 
thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 1.  1972–1989: Period of Cooperation  
President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China changed U.S. policy from isolation 
to cooperation against the Soviet threat, easing relations worldwide and inviting new 
alliances between former enemies. Japan took the opportunity to normalize relations with 
China and support America’s strategy of exacerbating a growing Sino-Soviet split. 
Japan’s objectives comported well with China’s anti-Moscow sentiments and desire for 
prosperity. Beijing “pursued a China policy that separated economics from politics,”72  
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allowing prosperity to take precedence over recriminations and cultivating the benefits of  
cooperation. Thus, began two decades of a somewhat amicable relationship, in which 
Japan acquiesced to Chinese demands and China declined to mention Japan’s imperial 
rule. This arrangement allowed China and Japan to act as powerful economic and security 
allies while “strengthen[ing] China’s strategic position in the international system.”73  
Relations between China and Japan were officially normalized in a joint 
communiqué in 1972. Four economic trade agreements in the areas of trade, shipping, 
aviation, and fisheries were negotiated, and China “renounce[ed] the demand for war 
reparation[s] from Japan,” paving the way for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 
1978.74 Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were satisfied with a joint 
statement of Japanese remorse in the communiqué and did not require that Japan’s 
current generation pay for the wrongdoings of their forefathers.75 In part, as a form of 
unofficial reparation, Japan greatly subsidized China’s economic revival through low-
cost loans and foreign direct investment (FDI). In turn, China suppressed demonstrations 
of popular animosity and historical grievances toward Japan and worked through 
disagreements. Each government praised the other and minimized conflicts in the 19th 
and 20th centuries as relatively small, regrettable episodes in an otherwise fruitful shared 
history.76 On August 12, 1978, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship, in which China opened its economic and modernization efforts to cooperate 
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Chinese Premier Hu Yaobang supported the expansion of Japan’s military capabilities 
and pressed Japan’s prime minister to take a firm anti-Soviet position.78 The 
reconciliation of Beijing and Tokyo was further enhanced in December 1978 when 
Japan’s emperor expressed remorse over the occupation. Ming Wan noted that Deng 
Xiaoping “replied that the two nations should let bygones be bygones and adopt forward-
looking attitudes.”79 A peaceful and cooperative tone predominated after 1978, with 
China’s grievances taking a backseat to economic goals.80  
Despite Beijing’s efforts to shore up Sino-Japanese relations, by 1986, Chinese 
elites and political analysts began to express concerns over Japan’s increasing defense 
expenditures and hosting of U.S. nuclear ships. Despite the benefits of partnership with 
Japan, political commentators expressed suspicion of Japan’s expanding military 
capability and desire for international influence. Japan’s inability, for diplomatic reasons, 
to share its military technology with nations other than the United States excited further 
mistrust of Japanese goals and intentions. Some Chinese analysts interpreted these 
developments as a sign of ascendant Japanese militarism and aggression.81  
The history issue reemerged in 1982 when Japan’s minister of education 
authorized a “softening” of the descriptions of Japanese aggression, occupation, and 
atrocity in the nation’s textbooks—for example, downplaying the invasion and 
occupation of Asia from 1895 to 1945. Influential Chinese papers as the Zhongguo 
Qingnian Bao railed against this revisionism in published articles, fueling resentment 
nationwide.82 By 1985, protests by Chinese students, scholars, and news media 
threatened to damage Sino-Japanese relations. In 1985, at a commemoration of the end of 
 
 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 169–170, 173. 
79 M. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 89. 
80 Ibid., 84–108; Dreyer, Middle Kingdom, 156–187. 
81 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 134–140, 
147.  
82 Ibid., 46–47, 51. 
 33
WWII, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an inflammatory official visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine, where several class A war criminals, including leaders in the 
occupation of China, were buried. The same year, hundreds of students demonstrated in 
Tiananmen Square against Japanese revisionism, demanding accuracy in textbooks, 
characterizing Japanese imports and economic dominance as a “second occupation,” and 
calling for the boycott of Japanese goods.83   
To maintain peaceful relations and influence public reaction, the CCP defended 
China’s economic and political ties with Japan, arguing that most of the people, 
government, and businesses of Japan were not guilty of wartime atrocities, but only a 
small, select group of militarists. At the same time, Japan’s minister of education agreed 
to revise the textbooks and the prime minister forswore visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Both Beijing and Tokyo promoted cooperative domestic policies to preserve good Sino-
Japanese relations and supported the other’s economic priorities, with the Chinese 
government employing authoritarian suppression of dissent toward this end.84 
The televising of CCP brutalities regarding the student-led protests for better 
living conditions and more democratic government reform and the violent suppression of 
Chinese public protests during the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 did not initially 
harm Sino-Japanese relations.85 Sosuke Uno, Japan’s new prime minister, refused to  
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condemn Beijing’s actions and violations of human rights, cautious of interfering in a 
sovereign nation’s internal affairs—moreover, Japan’s own recent history contained 
worse brutalities against Chinese civilians. After a quick interruption to allow the 
Chinese government to recover from the Tiananmen Square incident, Japanese officials 
and businessmen resumed operations in China, and bilateral diplomacy continued. China 
thanked Japan for not joining the international condemnation. Nevertheless, persistent 
condemnation from the West, criticism from global media sources, and the disapproval of 
human rights organizations persuaded Japan to abandon its neutrality. Uno reluctantly 
agreed to international sanctions against China and suspended a five-year, $5.8 billion 
loan.86 Although Japan was the first G-7 power to reestablish official developmental 
assistance (ODA) to China after the Tiananmen Square incident, the incident did not 
initially prevent a downturn in bilateral relations.87  
2. Period of Discord (1989–1999): From the End of the Cold War to East 
China Sea Disputes  
The period from 1989 to 1998 was a period of discord because historical 
grievances heavily affected bilateral relations. Figure 2 depicts the main history-related 
issues that positively and negatively impacted relations. 
                                                 
86 Dreyer, Middle Kingdom, 183–185. 
87 The G-7 powers include Japan, United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Canada, and Italy. 
The G-7 economic international organization established in 1985 whose membership is made of democratic 
governments. Zachary Laub and James McBride, “The Group of Seven (G7),” Council on Foreign 
Relations, last modified June 2, 2015, www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/group-seven-
g7/p32957; Dreyer, Middle Kingdom, 182–189. 
 35
Collective memory and balance of power played a nearly equal role in explaining the downturn of bilateral 
relations during this period. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions 
(arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the 
figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure 
depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement 
(above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event.  
Figure 2.  1989–1999: Period of Discord 
This section touches on key events that shaped the Sino-Japanese relationship 
from 1989 to 1998, a period covered in detail in Chapters III and IV. Internally, China 
was recovering from the Tiananmen Square incident by preparing a “patriotic-education 
campaign” to reaffirm CCP legitimacy. Externally, the end of the Cold War and the fall 
of Communism in Eastern Europe shook the international playing field and made rivals 
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 Sino-Japanese relations took a downturn after 1989. After the globally televised 
Tiananmen crackdown, Beijing looked for ways to rescue its legitimacy, unity, and 
prestige, and valorize the CCP as Western liberal ideas infiltrated private thoughts and 
public discourse. The end of the Cold War also recast Sino-Japanese relations. With the 
demise of the Soviet Union, China no longer faced an adversary on its northern border or 
required an alliance with Japan to strengthen defenses. Thus, the end of the Cold War 
relieved China of the strategic necessity of graciousness, and the Tiananmen Square 
incident propelled Beijing to relegitimize CCP rule under nationalism and patriotism.88 
Both events, however contributed to a downturn in bilateral relations and history became 
a volatile issue as China and Japan changed from partners to competitors.89  
The CCP revitalized the narrative of Chinese victimization by foreign powers 
through a massive educational campaign to “never forget national humiliation.”90 Zheng 
Wang observes, “the current CCP leaders utilize[d] China’s past history of humiliation to 
awaken people’s historical consciousness and build cohesion” among the people, uniting 
them under the banner of CCP legitimacy and authority.91 This propaganda promoted two 
main themes: China as the victim of Western and Japanese imperial oppression, and the 
CCP as responsible for defeating Japan, ending the century of humiliation, and restoring 
Chinese sovereignty.92 This dual identity of victim and victor enabled China to both 
exploit Japan’s evils against a vulnerable China while also demonstrating the strength and 
superiority of the authoritarian party. Kindergarteners through university students learned 
of “China’s humiliating modern history and how much the country has been changed by 
the Communist revolution.”93 Beijing presented the 19th and 20th centuries as full of 
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suffering under the targeting of China by outsiders.94 Beijing erected hundreds of 
memorials and statues depicting scenes from the century of humiliation and rallied 
national bitterness over Western incursions while extolling the CCP for ousting foreign 
powers. Revised Chinese textbooks glorified the CCP’s ending of the century of 
humiliation with a successful revolution, the defeat of Western imperialism, and the 
return of sovereignty, independence, and standing among the nations. Chinese media in 
all forms, from theater to newspapers, demonized rival nations for their roles in 
victimizing China. The result of the patriotic education campaign was a retraumatized 
society subscribing to a grand narrative that glorified the party at the expense of Japan 
and the West. Thus, the history campaign fed already existing contempt for Japan 
and hindered reconciliation, creating a nadir in relations after the joint communiqué 
of 1972.95  
Meanwhile, a rise in nationalism in both countries made them increasingly 
incompatible as allies. China was a centralized, authoritarian government focused on 
preserving CCP legitimacy. Its propaganda drive stoked loyalty to the CCP but also threw 
gasoline on anti-Japanese fears. Demands by protestors that historical disputes be a 
present factor in diplomatic negotiations were occasionally successful, a positive 
outcome from China’s perspective. Japan, however, was eager to put its past behind and 
regain its standing in the world. Right-wing Japanese officials observing China’s renewed 
hostility began voicing a need for increased security and military measures. Japan desired 
a relationship between equals, in which placation was not a part. The return of the history 
issue reignited contention between Japan and China and degraded Sino-Japanese 
relations. China used history to justify its mistrust of Japanese goals and intentions, while 
Japan lost patience with the blame game.96  
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In the early and mid-1990s, anti-Japanese demonstrations peppered China despite 
Beijing’s attempts to preserve positive economic and diplomatic relations. Cultural and 
political activists increasingly called for apologies and financial compensation from 
Japan as well as for more official commemorations of wartime atrocities, a harder line on 
East China Sea (ECS) sovereignty, and tougher CCP stances in general. Despite a visit 
from and apologetic remarks by Emperor Akihito in 1992 and a prime-ministerial 
apology in 1995, the Chinese people continued to scorn Japan’s insincere contrition. In 
this context, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in July 
1996 was a resounding slap to China and instigated fervid protest. The 1990s were a time 
of major civil compensations through a highly publicized redress movement for Chinese 
victims of wartime atrocities.97 Lawsuits brought by Chinese nongovernmental agencies 
and Japanese civil groups against the Japanese government and major corporations forced 
Chinese and Japanese entities to cooperate in the legal arena.98 The accompanying 
exposure of Japanese war crimes, however, gripped Chinese society, generating demands 
for reparations and schoolbook revisions.99 In mid-1997, a series of revised history books 
was published in Japan and a new wing to the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s 
Resistance against Japanese Aggression was opened to commemorate the 60th 
anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge incident.100  
In this period, Sino-Japanese relations also suffered under sovereignty disputes in 
the ECS, the testing of nuclear weapons, the renewal of U.S.-Japanese security 
guidelines, and China’s ceaseless demands for apology. China’s increasing boldness in 
the ECS and around Taiwan triggered the deployment of U.S. aircraft carriers to the 
region and a third Taiwan Strait crisis.101 Critical of China’s growing military budget and 
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nuclear testing, Japan suspended grant aid payments.102 Japan’s adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) policy, with its recognition of 
200nm exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and Tokyo’s approval of a Japanese nationalist 
group that claimed the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands enraged the Chinese public.103 
Meanwhile, Tokyo sought closer security ties with the United States in the revised U.S.-
Japanese defense guidelines.104 Interpreting the revision as an attempt to contain China’s 
rise, Beijing defiantly increased its activity in the ECS and moved closer to Russia 
through the Shanghai Cooperative Organization.105 By the end of the decade, however, 
President Jiang Zemin’s outspoken demands for a written apology backfired on China, 
and Beijing swung to a policy of reestablishing cooperative ties and shelving historical 
disputes to promote Chinese interests.106 However, historical disputes raised bilateral 
tensions and contributed to a period of discordant Sino-Japanese relations. 
3. Period of Cooperation (1999–2003): “Smile Diplomacy” and “New
Thinking” on Sino-Japanese Relations
Although grievances over history and nationalism remained, Sino-Japanese 
cooperation from 1999 to 2003 showed a glimmer of hope. As Tokyo and Beijing sought 
avenues to mutual tolerance, differences became downplayed. Figure 3 highlights the 
102 This number was an estimate based on FY 1994 grant aid given to China the year prior. In FY 
1994, Japan provided $91.8 million to support grants for China’s education and health care, $94 million in 
grants in technical assistance, and $1.6 billion in other loans. Japan suspended the grant aid to protest 
Chinese nuclear testing as the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) was extended to ensure no new nuclear 
testing by the P5 powers and to allow the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to take over. China was 
trying to get its nuclear testing done before the CTBT was approved, which would have limited its ability to 
test its weapons. William Long, “Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance,” Asian Survey 
39, no. 2 (Mar–Apr 1999): 333–336, doi:10.2307/2645458; Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, 84–85. 
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Coercive Diplomacy,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (29 May 2009), 182–185, doi: 10.1080/14799850902886617. 
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law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/858/7PacRimLPolyJ323.pdf?sequence=1https://digital.law.washington.edu/ds
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major cooperative actions that overshadowed any historical grievances that took place 
during this time.  
Sino-Japanese relations improved during this period as Chinese leaders worked to promote positive 
relations. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) to 
either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events 
most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events most 
affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was 
determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 3.  1999–2003: Period of Cooperation 
The period began with Premier Zhu Rongji’s “smile diplomacy” to mend ties and 
focus on positive bilateral action.107 During a visit to Japan in 2000, Zhu sympathized 
with the Japanese as fellow victims of the war and promised greater appreciation for 
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Japanese ODA. President Jiang Zemin praised the relationship with Japan, observing that 
China had enjoyed over “2,000 years of friendship.”108 An invitation from Premier Zhu 
to host 170 Japanese senior officials on a goodwill visit further brightened relations. In 
early 2000, Japan announced its plan to endorse China’s membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and signed a joint statement agreeing to mutual notification before 
conducting operations in the ECS. Territorial disputes were downplayed and efforts were 
made to prevent escalation such as talks on joint research, exploration, and ECS 
operations. To an acclamation by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori of the emperor’s divinity 
and a statement glorifying Japanese history, China reacted mildly, with only a routine 
statement of disapproval from the foreign ministry.109 Although in 2001 Koizumi visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted that he had 
visited on a less-symbolic date.110 Shortly after, Beijing welcomed a visit by Koizumi to 
the Marco Polo Bridge memorial, where the prime minister offered an oral apology for 
Japan’s past wartime aggression.111  
Beijing also reacted moderately to inadequacies in Japan’s textbook revisions by 
providing a list of requested corrections. An article in the People’s Daily advised the 
Chinese public not to be over alarmed, stating, “A majority of Japanese had a good 
understanding of history and that those trying to distort history and cause confusion were 
a minority.”112 Although the advent of the Internet allowed greater dissemination of 
historical accounts and anti-Japanese views, riots and demonstrations were rarely an 
issue.113  
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Also during early 2001, a “new thinking” on Sino-Japanese relations invigorated 
popular debate in China. An article by commentator Ma Licheng in the Renmin Ribao, 
“New Thinking on Relations with Japan,” urged China to abandon its blame-mongering 
and promote a new era of positive relations, in which China would take the high ground 
by forgiving Japan and moving beyond the shame of the past.114 He proposed that China 
show sincere gratitude for ODA received and embrace Japan’s evolving military and 
peacekeeping roles for their contribution to regional stability. Ma also argued for finding 
common ground and recognizing Japan as a peaceful nation since the war. Professor Shi 
Yinhong, of Beijing’s People’s University, echoed these sentiments, exhorting China to 
act magnanimously, forego history debates, and strengthen ties with Japan to counter the 
rising influence of the United States.  
Believing that fear of Japan’s militarism was greatly exaggerated, Shi asserted 
Japan should be recognized as a world power with appropriate influence and given a 
permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The reaction among 
Chinese activists was explosive. Ma and Shi were condemned as traitors to China. 
The Chinese central authority authorized only minimal discussion on the subject, and 
debates among scholars, students, and the public were mainly consigned to newspaper 
articles, magazines, and the Internet. To avoid arousing domestic anxiety and criticism, 
Beijing elites distanced themselves from the new thinking, affirming that Chinese 
diplomacy with Japan had not changed. Nevertheless, Beijing quietly and cautiously 
dabbled in the new thinking.  
In a 2003 meeting in Saint Petersburg, the Chinese and Japanese heads of state, 
Hu and Koizumi, skirted problem areas regarding history and announced positive 
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based on the Japanese Shinkansen model, and solidarity against North Korean nuclear 
proliferation. During the 25th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship 
Treaty, a spokesman from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) praised 
Japan for aiding the Chinese economy through ODA and supported Japan’s growing 
military power as a natural development after the Cold War, not a sign of “hostile intent” 
toward China.115 Despite these developments, popular opinion frustrated a full 
expression of the new thinking and led to another downturn in relations.116 
4. Period of Discord (2003–2006): The Weight of Public Opinion  
As depicted in Figure 4, the years 2003–2006 were a period of discord—one of 
the lowest in recent Sino-Japanese history. Since historical disputes clouded relations for 
the worse with neither side willing to compromise on history-related matters, Chinese 
and Japanese heads of state did not visit each other. Meanwhile, massive anti-Japanese 
demonstrations and protests plagued both countries and undermined Beijing’s efforts to 
craft favorable policies. The Chinese public strongly reacted to perceived slights and 
demanded the status and respect owed to them.  
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The collective memories of the Chinese public heavily influenced this period of discord—expressed in 
uprisings over controversial Japanese events—all of which forced Beijing to harden its policies against 
Japan and strained Sino-Japanese relations. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong 
contributions (arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper 
half of the figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the 
figure depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow 
placement (above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 4.  2003–2006: Period of Discord 
This section provides a brief overview of key events that shaped the negative 
Sino-Japanese relationship from 2003 to 2006, a period covered in detail in Chapters III 
and IV. In 2003, the chance unearthing of a WWII Japanese chemical weapon led to a 
fatality and 37 severe injuries, spurring outrage and demands for victim compensation.117  
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In September 2003, 400 Japanese businessmen and 500 Chinese prostitutes reportedly 
engaged in an scandal in a Zhuhai hotel, attracting considerable media coverage as a 
modern example of Japan’s historical sexual humiliations.118 Sovereignty disputes in the 
ECS resurfaced with the return of a stronger Baodiao or “defend the Diaoyu Islands” 
movement, resulting in the arrest and detainment of Chinese activists by Japan’s coast 
guard.119 In the summer of 2004, anti-Japanese riots broke out after Japan bested China 
in the Asia Cup soccer tournament.120 A year later, the approval of a revisionist Japanese 
textbook, together with the offensive visits by Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine and 
Japan’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, induced a crescendo of rioting.121 These 
events, along with Chinese allegations of militarism and territorial aggression, severely 
damaged Sino-Japanese relations.122  
During this time, the politicization of the Yasukuni Shrine reached an apex that 
came to symbolize the epitome of the history issue between China and Japan and made 
the shrine infamous. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi dismissed China’s 
continual denouncement and protests against his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Such uncooperative policies by Koizumi forced Beijing to harden its policies against 
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Japan, and Chinese officials refused to engage in high-level bilateral negotiations until 
visits to the shrine were halted. Hence, the Yasukuni Shrine visits significantly increased 
tensions between the two countries as neither side was willing to give any leeway. 
Territorial disputes resurfaced as China became increasingly more assertive in the 
ECS and political and historical activists like the Baodiao movement resurfaced to 
demand Japan’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 
Meanwhile, negotiations on joint operations, research, and exploration in and around the 
disputed waters depended on Koizumi’s decisions regarding the Yasukuni Shrine. Hence, 
bilateral relations stood still because of historical differences, causing this period of 
discord to be one of the worst in recent Sino-Japanese history. 
5. Period of Cooperation (2006–2010): Mending Relations through a 
Revolving Door of Japanese Leaders  
From 2006 to 2010, China and Japan attempted to deescalate tensions to serve 
national interests, resulting in a more positive regional impact and stronger bilateral 
relations. After the mayhem of 2005, Chinese propaganda officials were directed to 
applaud the central government’s handling of Japanese relations and frown on student 
uprisings. Beijing suppressed public protest and approved a media campaign for positive 
Sino-Japanese relations. The media were to downplay Japan’s historical amnesia, remind 
the public that only a few Japanese officials promoted revisionism, acknowledge Japan as 
a great power, and emphasize positive interactions.123  
As shown in Figure 5, this period reflected positive bilateral relations despite the 
number of changes of Japanese prime ministers. With nearly every leadership change in 
Japan, each prime minister pledged to promote more positive bilateral relations, and all 
prime ministers avoided visiting the Yasukuni Shrine during their time in office. Japanese  
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leadership took precautions to avoid actions that could arouse anti-Japanese sentiments in 
China or provoke Beijing to protest. Chinese leadership reciprocated with cooperative 
actions by resuming high-level negotiations over disputes in the ECS. 
 
Few historical issues negatively affected bilateral relations during this time. This period reflected great 
cooperation despite the continual changes of prime ministers in Japan. History-related events are depicted 
as weak, moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-
Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events most affected by collective memory 
(Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events most affected by the balance of power 
(Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was determined by which hypothesis 
better represented the event.  
Figure 5.  2006–2010: Period of Cooperation 
During this time, Japan took significant steps to improve the relationship and 
accommodate China’s requests regarding sensitive history issues. In 2006, in a show of 
genuine resolve to improve relations, the incoming prime minister, Shinzo Abe, departed 
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Beijing instead.124 In February 2007, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called for the 
resolution of territorial disputes and described Beijing’s vision for the ECS as replete 
with Sino-Japanese “peace, cooperation, and friendship.”125 On a fence-mending trip in 
April 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed a five-point plan for improving relations, with 
grievance resolution playing no part.126 Fukuda Yasuo, who became prime minister after 
Abe’s resignation in 2007, announced he would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine and 
commenced a friendly military exchange program with China. The Chinese invited 
Japanese self-defense personnel to observe military exercises, and the Japanese 
government welcomed an armed Chinese destroyer to Tokyo harbor.  
In 2008, Hu Jintao visited Tokyo on what he called a “warm spring for the 
friendship between two peoples.”127 During the visit, Hu cited the two-thousand-year 
amicable history of the Chinese and Japanese peoples, interrupted briefly by the wars that 
took place from 1894 through 1945.128 In September 2008, Taro Aso vowed to avoid the 
Yasukuni Shrine as Japan’s new prime minister and highlighted the importance of sound 
Sino-Japanese relations. In 2009, the head of Japan’s air self-defense force (JASDF) was 
forced to resign, forego a month’s pay, and renounce his retirement pension for an essay 
in which he outlined a legal justification for the occupation of China and denied Japanese 
brutality. In response to Chinese clamor, Aso declared that his nation would make a 
concerted effort to understand its past.  
In 2009, the countries made progress on joint exploration and operations in the 
ECS, free-trade negotiations, and climate and health agreements. In late 2009, Aso’s 
successor as prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, pledged to promote the current trajectory 
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of affirmative Sino-Japanese relations, though financial scandals and ineffectiveness led 
to his resignation nine months later. Hatoyama was succeeded by Naoto Kan in 2010.129  
Despite Japan’s rapid political shifts, with its head of government changing five 
times in four years, every prime minister from 2006 to 2010 avoided the Yasukuni Shrine 
and sought better relations with China. In return, Chinese leaders suppressed anti-
Japanese uprisings, avoided historical disputes, and praised the benefits of cooperation. 
This determined civility was interrupted, however, by rising historical and political 
activism and aggressive military actions in the ECS. 
6. Period of Discord (2010–2016): Struggle in the East China Sea 
Sino-Japanese tensions increased in 2010–2016, creating a discordant relationship 
that—as China gained in military and diplomatic muscle during this period—alarmed its 
Asian neighbors. Japan strongly criticized China’s lack of transparency over its military 
buildup and described China’s new capabilities as a threat to regional security. 
Meanwhile, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute sparked massive protests in China. 
Beijing exponentially increased its sea and air incursions into Japanese territorial areas 
and declared a Chinese air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) that overlapped Japanese 
airspace, which caused Sino-Japanese relations to become more confrontational in the 
ECS. These moves were justified by an alleged need to counter the suspected nationalism 
and right-wing policies of the Japanese government.130 As shown in in Figure 6 and 
explained in detail in Chapters III and IV, all of these events forced Beijing to harden it 
policies against Japan, which contributed to the downfall of relations during this time. 
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 Sino-Japanese relations reached another low, beginning with events in the ECS in 2010 and escalating in 
2012 with Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and continued its trajectory of discord 
through 2016. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) 
to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts 
events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events most 
affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was 
determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 6.   2010–2016: Period of Discord 
In 2010, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute gained traction as China’s movements in the 
ECS grew increasingly bold. To break Japanese administrative control, China asserted 
rights around Japanese contiguous waters. The conflict reached a climax on September 7, 
2010, when the Japanese coast guard arrested a Chinese fishing-boat captain for 
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damage. Protests broke out in Beijing and parts of Japan as Chinese officials demanded 
the unconditional release of the captain, a public apology for the arrest, and compensation 
for damages to the fishing trawler. Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for the foreign ministry, 
charged Japan with the illegal arrest of a Chinese citizen acting lawfully in Chinese 
territory, stating that the islands “have been China’s inherent territory since ancient 
times.”131 Prime Minister Naoto Kan refused to accommodate these demands and 
authorized Japanese legal jurisdiction in the case. Beijing dispatched a law enforcement 
ship to the islands to protect Chinese fishing interests and halted rare earth–metal exports 
to Japan to pressure Kan toward a satisfactory resolution. The captain was released on 
September 25, but Kan was derided for his handling of the incident by Chinese and 
domestic opponents. Forced to apologize, Kan appealed to his constituents by defending 
Japanese sovereignty and blaming China for injuring the Sino-Japanese relationship.132  
China used the economic leverage of its monopoly on rare earth metals and the 
psychological support of protestors versed in the evils of Japan to resolve the conflict to 
its advantage and justify increased patrols in disputed waters. This affair, coupled with 
criticism over the 2011 triple disaster in Japan,133 humiliated the inexperienced Kan and 
led to his resignation.134 Hence, historical disputes in the ECS affected economic trade 
negotiations, which brought bilateral relations to another low. 
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Yoshihiko Noda took over as prime minister in 2011, and tensions only increased. 
In 2012, the purchase and nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by Japan 
precipitated bellicose Chinese actions in the ECS and ignited massive riots in China. 
Within three months of the purchase, Beijing deployed Chinese maritime surveillance 
ships, fishing-enforcement assets, and PLAN warships to actively patrol the ECS over 17 
times to break Japanese administrative control over the disputed islands.135 Since the 
2012 Japanese nationalization of the islands, China has deployed assets to patrol and 
conduct operations in the disputed waters on a continual basis, forcing Japan to respond 
more aggressively to assert its sovereignty over the islands. However, in part due to his 
administration’s debacle over the 2012 nationalization of the islands, Noda resigned and 
Shinzo Abe succeeded him.136 After 2012, historical grievances only exacerbated Sino-
Japanese tensions in the ECS, strongly contributing to the downturn of bilateral relations 
in the period. 
Historical and territorial disputes remained at the forefront during 2013–2016 
under Abe’s leadership. The prime minister’s nationalist and revisionist leanings, along 
with his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, gave new life to historical grievances. China 
renewed its demands for a heartfelt apology and grew increasingly provocative in the 
ECS. By portraying Japanese activity in the region as resurgently militaristic, China was 
able to justify its stated need to defend Chinese national interests and check Japanese 
power, all the while bruising Japanese credibility. China’s incursions into disputed waters 
kept Japan anxious and its defense forces on edge. Both sides increased their defense 
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budgets yearly to update their military and security postures, worsening the regional 
standoff.137 
C. CONCLUSION 
Since their postwar resumption of diplomacy in 1972, China and Japan have lurched from 
highs to lows of harmony and discord, with history ever present. Figure 7 shows an 
overall assessment of the information collected by calculating the average assessments of 
weak, moderate, or strong impacts on Sino-Japanese relations within six divided periods 
from 1972 to 2016. This figure plots and graphs the average of each of the time periods—
three periods of positive bilateral relations (1972–1989, 1999–2003, 2006–2010) and 
three periods negative relations (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 2010–2016)—to determine 
when history had the strongest influence on positive and negative relations. 
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This represents the average impact of history on Sino-Japanese relations from the 
beginning of official diplomatic normalization in 1972 to 2016.  
Figure 7.  The Role of History in Explaining Positive and 
Negative Sino-Japanese Relations 
From 1972 to 2016, China and Japan experienced six periods of highs and lows, 
three cooperative and three discordant. Sino-Japanese relations began with a strong 
period of cooperation from 1972 to 1989, when normalization of relations minimized 
historical grievances. This period of strategic and security alliances against the Soviet 
Union and collaborations kick-started China’s economy and opened new markets for 
Japan. Though divided by irreconcilable accounts of their shared history, both parties set 
differences aside and prioritized shared benefits over settling past wrongs.  
However, the brutal 1989 CCP repression of protestors in Tiananmen Square, the 
fall of Communist Europe, and the end of the Cold War compelled China to defend the 
legitimacy of Beijing’s Communist government and removed the restraints of 
maintaining positive relations to support security interests against the Soviet Union. This 
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resurrected anti-Japanese sentiments in China that were supported by anti-Japanese 
rhetoric against the century of humiliation, encouraging vigorous Chinese nationalism 
over goodwill and cooperation with Japan. For its part, Japan’s rising nationalism, 
inspired partly in reaction to Chinese contempt, conflicted with China’s objectives and 
self-interest. Hence, the period after the Cold War and Tiananmen Square saw greater 
conflict, diverging interests, a refusal to reconcile or ignore differences in favor 
of practical objectives, and a deliberate resurrection of the animosity between Beijing 
and Tokyo.  
In the wake of this negative period, bilateral relations briefly surged upward with 
a new thinking in Beijing that moved beyond blame and supported long-term national 
interests. Thus, bilateral relations swung back toward cooperation from 1999 to 2003 
when leaders at the highest levels on both sides set aside historical differences to support 
national interests and economic cooperation. Other than Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine 
visits, Japan compromised on actions to quell major anti-Japanese sentiments. 
Meanwhile, China’s “new thinking” gave life to the idea of fully accepting Japanese 
remorse for its past wartime aggression and removing the history blockade that prevented 
bilateral cooperation. However, this period of cooperation was short lived.  
From 2003 to 2006, Japanese controversial actions—like the visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, territorial disputes, and chemical weapons incidents—brought out anti-
Japanese fervor and a downturn of relations. Domestic uprisings overshadowed the effort 
to regain cooperative relations. Beijing was also compelled to harden its policies against 
Japan to address domestic anti-Japanese sentiments and contain any Japanese ambitions 
of increased influence or power in the region. As shown in Figure 7, Japan’s 
controversial actions and China’s historical grievances consumed bilateral relations, 
resulting in the lowest period of discord in recent Sino-Japanese history.  
However, leadership changes in Japan beginning in 2006 allowed each country to 
reset relations for the better as each successive Japanese prime minister resolved to 
promote positive Sino-Japanese relations. Meanwhile, Chinese leadership at the highest 
levels set aside historical grievances and promoted positive Sino-Japanese relations while 
anti-Japanese public opinion and collective memory rarely impeded either country. 
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Figure 7 shows that bilateral relations transitioned from the lowest period of discord 
(2003-2006) to the highest period of cooperation (2006-2010). Positive relations reached 
its highest average during this time period as a result of the strong cooperative initiatives 
on both sides to satisfactorily address historical grievances. 
However, by 2010, territorial disputes became increasingly and integrally linked 
to historical grievances. Disputes in the ECS reinvigorated historical disputes between 
China and Japan, breaking the period of cooperative Sino-Japanese relations and setting a 
trajectory of discord. From 2010–2016, historical grievances dominated bilateral 
relations, permeated high-level negotiations (or lack thereof), hampered economic trade 
agreements, exacerbated tensions in the ECS, and triggered the traumatic collective 
memories of the nation. Hence, history played a significant part explaining the downturn 
of bilateral relations that remain unresolved as of 2017.  
This thesis assumes that downplaying or setting aside historical grievances for 
national interests or refraining from actions that trigger China’s historical sensitivities 
enable cooperative bilateral relations. Hence, subsequent analysis focuses only on the 
three periods of discord: (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 2010–2016) to determine the strength 
of the two proposed hypotheses in characterizing Sino-Japanese relations: (1) activation 
of collective remembrance and public opinion and (2) the government use of history to 
gain relative power over Japan. The following two chapters will assess the strength of 
historical grievances through the eyes of the Chinese people, and China’s central 




III. COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND ANTI-JAPANESE 
PUBLIC OPINION 
This chapter confirms that the collective memories of Chinese citizens shape an 
anti-Japanese public opinion that negatively affects Sino-Japanese foreign policy and 
domestic relations. Provocative Japanese actions ignite Chinese public opinion and spur 
public uprisings that demand (1) Beijing act more aggressively in its foreign policy 
against Japan, even if such action is not in the best interest of CCP politics and that (2) 
Japan take action to quell Chinese public dissent or acquiesce to CCP demands. Anti-
Japanese sentiments in China are mostly the result of the collective memories of Japanese 
atrocities; however, China’s patriotic education campaign has further entrenched existing 
anti-Japanese sentiments and reinforced a pervasive or persistent anti-Japanese national 
identity. Hence, deeply embedded resentment of the Chinese people and mass 
mobilization of public nationalism—intensified by Beijing’s propaganda—has influenced 
politics at both national and international levels, and contributed to the downturn of Sino-
Japanese relations. As a result, debates over the history issue extend beyond state-driven 
policies or manipulation of Sino-Japanese foreign policy to serve national interests, but 
rather history is a deeply felt, genuine emotional sentiment that remains resilient within 
the psyche of the population.  
A review of specific events involving public opinion during the three periods of 
discord (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 2010–2016) reveals provocative Japanese behavior stirs 
collective memories of Chinese citizens and provokes angst and criticism of Japanese 
politics. This explains why anti-Japanese collective remembrance in China during periods 
of cooperation remain relatively latent due to Japan’s willingness to both accommodate 
China’s desires regarding history and avoid provocative actions that could reignite such 
sentiments. Although anti-Japanese collective memory emerged during all three negative 
periods, as shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10, it played a comparatively moderate role in the 
first period (1989–1999), a strong role in the second period (2003–2006), and a weak role 
in the third period (2010–2016) in explaining the downturn of bilateral relations. This 
chapter scrutinizes specific events during each of the main periods of Sino-Japanese 
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discord to assess how provocative Japanese actions reinvigorate anti-Japanese public 
opinion and further contribute to negative bilateral relations.  
A. AN ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Anti-Japanese public opinion stems from a cultural transmission of collective 
experiences passed down from previous generations and is reinforced by China’s 
patriotic education campaign, which is rich with anti-Japanese propaganda. In some 
instances, both anti-Japanese collective memory and Beijing’s propaganda have become 
mutually reinforcing to serve common interests. Current generations that have had no 
personal experience of China’s past wartime events relive these events though collective 
memories that are passed down from generation to generation. This constructivist 
paradigm of collective memories creates a unified national identity that links the past, 
present, and future, and validates the existence or evolution of a community.138 Eric 
Langenbacker notes that collective identity is based on the memories of the people and 
history the people have experienced.139 Such memories and histories have evolved over 
time “to explain who people are today and what they stand for”140 and “‘where’ [they] 
came from, and why.”141 Most notably, Langenbacker explains that wartime atrocities 
and traumatic histories disrupt the peaceful evolution of a society’s collective memory.142 
Such a disruption has a great impact on how a society remembers its history as it can 
highlight the constant need for security to prevent future trauma.143 Thus, the negative 
and traumatic collective memories that a society experiences create a specific social 
identity, which bonds a society to a traumatic narrative that is adopted by the nation.  
China’s traumatic collective memories create an identity of China as being a 
“victim” of past Japanese imperial aggression and as a “victor” led by the CCP in 
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defeating such aggression.144 This somewhat paradoxical identity results in biased anti-
Japanese sentiments that are passed down from generation to generation and pervade 
Chinese culture. Thus, anti-Japanese public opinion within the Chinese people’s 
collective memories has subconscious input at the highest level, and this opinion shapes 
China’s Japan policy. 
Although collective memory and identity establish the core of anti-Japanese 
public opinion, China’s patriotic education campaign of the 1990s planted the fateful 
seeds of long-term anti-Japanese sentiments that have reinforced deep suspicion and 
resentment of Japanese past wrongdoings for generations thereafter. In many respects, 
China’s traumatic experiences are legitimized by this campaign and vice versa. On the 
one hand, the Chinese public gains a powerful voice to reconcile, legitimize, justify, and 
support their deepest concerns regarding past trauma. On the other hand, Beijing’s 
patriotic education campaign reflects a perceived truth that is legitimized by the people’s 
remembrance of history. Zheng Wang argues that the Chinese patriotic education 
campaign used its collective memories to justify the CCP’s legitimacy of rule through 
mandatory history education for what he called “glorification of the party [and] 
consolidation of national identity . . . in the post-Tiananmen and post–Cold War eras.”145 
Hence, the Chinese public show little resistance to the campaign’s mandatory initiatives, 
laden with anti-Japanese rhetoric, and the creation of over 100 new historic patriotic 
education sites with educational field trips for students to learn about Japan’s wartime 
brutalities.146 This campaign exacerbates what Shogo Suzuki claims is an already 
embedded anti-Japanese national identity and what Allen S. Whiting describes as a 
culture sensitive to the history issue and any perceived slights by the Japanese.147 Such 
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propaganda has deepened an anti-Japanese collective national identity in China that is 
now manifested in anti-Japanese biases and seen in the Chinese public’s need to 
continually criticize Japan’s inability to “properly” remember wartime atrocities.148 Thus, 
the Chinese people’s collective memories, supplemented and strengthened by Beijing’s 
patriotic education campaign, have been contributing factors to specific history issue 
incidences during the three main periods of Sino-Japanese discord discussed in this 
chapter.  
B. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 1989–1999 
Following the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident and the fall of 
communism in Europe in 1989, Sino-Japanese relations started to gradually change for 
the worse, but such change did not become fully apparent until 1996. Both events caused 
a CCP regime legitimacy crisis that threatened to take down the central authoritarian 
government in China. In addition, China began to increase its defense spending with the 
purchase of Russian weapons systems to build a capable blue-water navy and performed 
a series of ongoing military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Straits area. 
Concurrently, Chinese elites continued to demand Japanese contrition for Japan’s past 
wartime conduct as China’s propaganda campaign began to encourage its younger 
generations to become more nationalistic. As depicted in Figure 8, this thesis reviews two 
main Sino-Japanese history issues during this time period that have stirred national anti-
Japanese sentiments and were contributing factors to negative Sino-Japanese relations: 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and the Yasukuni Shrine visit by Japanese Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. 149 Bilateral relations reached a low period of cooperation 
because of these historical disputes. 
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Collective memory had a moderate role in explaining the downturn of bilateral relations during this time. 
History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) to either 
positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events most 
affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events most affected by 
the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was determined by 
which hypothesis better represented the event.  
Figure 8.  Period of Discord: 1989–1999 (Collective Memory) 
1. Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute in 1996 
The year 1996 was tense for Sino-Japanese relations. A third Taiwan Strait crisis, 
the Chinese underground nuclear weapons test,150 volatile Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes, and the renewed U.S.-Japan bilateral security guidelines all strained Sino-
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Japanese relations. In addition, China perceived Japan’s desire for expansion of military 
roles, revised defense guidelines, and Japan’s research into BMD systems as a Chinese 
containment strategy by Japan and its strongest ally—the United States.151 However, the 
key event related to the history issue that stirred massive anti-Japanese sentiments and 
contributed to the downturn of Sino-Japanese relations was the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute of 1996. 
Actions initiated by Japanese right-wing political activists who were openly 
defended by the Japanese government became the impetus for reengaging in Sino-
Japanese territorial disputes during this period. In July 1996, a Japanese right-wing youth 
federation traveled to the disputed islands to reconstruct and repair an old Japanese 
lighthouse. Afterward, the Japanese activists petitioned to have the lighthouse as an 
official Japanese heritage site, thereby asserting that Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands be officially 
recognized as belonging to Japan. In August, another Japanese right-wing group marked 
the lighthouse with a Japanese flag. Immediately afterward, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Yukihiko Ikeda publicly claimed that the “Senkakus have always been Japan’s territory. 
Japan effectively governs the islands, so the territorial issues does not exist.”152 Pro-
Chinese activists openly protested Japan’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and 
rallies began sprouting up with demonstrations and street marches in New York, 
Vancouver, Hong Kong, and San Francisco.153 Chinese political activists called on 
Beijing to send the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and increase its maritime presence 
to enforce China’s claim to the islands.154 For China, the public has associated the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute with accusations of resurgent Japanese militarism and an 
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inherent desire to renew Japan’s East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.155 During this same 
time, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the controversial Yasukuni 
Shrine and paid homage to the Japanese war criminals responsible for Japan’s invasion 
of China. In this case, both Japanese and Chinese political activists forced each 
other’s respective governments to renew the history issue and act more aggressively in 
their claims to the disputed territory, explaining the deterioration of relations during 
this period.156 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute continued to strain bilateral relations as Chinese 
activists reinforced Chinese territorial claims, which unleashed anti-Japanese fervor. On 
September 22, 18 Chinese activists and 42 reporters traveled from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan to “reclaim” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Japanese coast guard ships intercepted 
the Chinese vessel and prevented it from landing on the islands. In a desperate attempt to 
circumvent the Japanese patrol boats, Chinese activists jumped into the ECS and 
attempted to swim to the islands. After several attempts, one Chinese activist, David 
Chan Yuk-Cheung, drowned. Thousands of people came out to Victoria Park, Hong 
Kong, and held a candlelight vigil to mourn his death.157 Inspired by the events in 
September, Chinese activists boarded another vessel and on October 6, 1996, raised the 
PRC flag, proclaiming that “The Diaoyu Islands are Chinese (zhongguo) sovereign 
territory.”158 Hence, anti-Japanese public opinion encouraged activists to go beyond 
government-sanctioned events to address related history issue controversies.159  
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Although the PLA sent two submarines to patrol the waters around the disputed 
islands, Beijing’s response to the incidents involving the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands in 1996 was more moderate and relatively restrained in its policies or demands on 
Japan. The Chinese central authority required that the media lessen its anti-Japanese 
rhetoric. Local officials held town meetings to quell anti-Japanese protests. University 
administrators and professors had to discourage student protests. The Chinese foreign 
ministry also denied a Hong Kong–based political activist group permission to organize a 
large-scale petition and protest. Evidence also suggests that Beijing’s temperate response 
to public protests was primarily due to concerns over bilateral trade relations; 1996 was 
also the year China became Japan’s largest trading partner.160 The following year, 
improved Sino-Japanese relations allowed for the approval of a new fisheries agreement 
in the contested waters. Erica Downs and Phillip Saunders noted that the “Chinese 
government proved willing to incur significant damage to its nationalist credentials by 
following restrained policies and cooperating with the Japanese government to prevent 
the territorial disputes from harming bilateral relations. When forced to choose, Chinese 
leaders pursued economic development at the expense of nationalist goals.”161 Public 
protests regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1996 moderately influenced Beijing’s 
and Tokyo’s policies toward each other. In this case, evidence supports Beijing’s desire 
to prevent both the protests from becoming critical of the central government’s handling 
of the issue and the dispute from significantly harming the current economic benefits of 
the bilateral Sino-Japanese relation. Hence, in this case, the islands disputes overall only 
contributed moderately to the dip in bilateral relations.162 
2. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s “Personal” Visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, 1996 
Another history issue event that sparked anti-Japanese public protest, which 
influenced Beijing to become more aggressive in its policies against Japan, and 
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heightened bilateral tensions was Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s visit to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. Following the volatile Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, on July 29, 
1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto further inflamed Sino-Japanese tensions by making an 
official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, the first in over 11 years since Nakasone’s 
controversial visit in 1985.163 When asked whether the shrine visit was personal or in his 
official capacity as prime minister, Hashimoto replied that asking such a question was 
“ridiculous. . . . It’s time to stop letting that sort of thing complicate our international 
relations,”164 and asked “Why should it matter anymore?”165 China took the visit more 
seriously. An article in the People’s Daily tied Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to 
renewed right-wing Japanese militarism and Japan’s inability to properly remember 
its history.166 
Anti-Japanese student protests against the Yasukuni visit broke out in China, 
obligating the CCP to play the history card against Japan.167 Beijing demanded that Japan 
take measures to own its past wartime atrocities to assure its neighbors that it would 
reject militarism.168 A spokesman from the Chinese foreign ministry stated that Prime 
Minister Hashimoto “hurt the feelings of all the people from every country, including 
China, which suffered under the hands of Japanese militarists.”169 Beijing acted in a 
relatively moderate way, and limited public protest over the Yasukuni Shrine compared 
to the response allowed over Nakasone’s visit in 1985. Such protests, however minor, 
forced Japan to respond to the demands by both the Chinese public and the CCP 
authorities, which became another irritant in Sino-Japanese relations.170 
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To quell public protests, Beijing’s top leaders continued to denounce the visit and 
openly accused Hashimoto of purposefully trying to aggravate already tense Sino-
Japanese relations. After receiving both domestic and international criticism, Hashimoto 
felt compelled to explain any misunderstandings of the incident and claimed that his visit 
was personal, made on his birthday, and should not be subject to public criticism. That 
same year, Hashimoto avoided visiting the Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary of the end 
of the Pacific War. Instead, Hashimoto attended a peace ceremony and openly conveyed 
regret and remorse for Japan’s war crimes and further explained that his visit had nothing 
to do with the enshrined class A war criminals or a desire for renewed militaristic 
aggression in Asia.171 
Beijing’s top leaders remained unsatisfied by Hashimoto’s halfhearted apology 
and continued to push the history issue against Japan to further influence Japanese 
domestic politics. By the end of August, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen and Deputy 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan expressed dissatisfaction with Hashimoto’s Yasukuni visit 
to left-wing Japanese political factions. In September, Chinese Premier Li Peng renewed 
his protest of Hashimoto’s actions to former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime 
Minister Noburu Takishita in hopes of putting domestic party pressure on Hashimoto to 
properly address the Yasukuni visit. At a UN summit in New York, Vice Premier Qian 
Qichen continued to express China’s indignation over Hashimoto’s Yasukuni visit. In this 
case, the potential rise of Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments compelled Beijing to act more 
aggressively against Japan. Chinese elites continually pressured the Japanese to refrain 
from future visits to the shrine, in part to prevent public uprisings from getting out of 
hand like they did after the shrine visit by Prime Minister Nakasone. 172 
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Consequently, on October 4, 1996, Hashimoto announced that he would refrain 
from future Yasukuni Shrine visits during his time as prime minister to avoid both 
domestic and international protests. Hashimoto decided against future visits to deescalate 
rising Sino-Japanese tensions during this time, as both the Chinese elites and public 
linked the Yasukuni Shrine visits to the ongoing Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Before 
such protests from China, Prime Minister Hashimoto had planned to visit the shrine 
during the anniversary of the end of WWII and during the Yasukuni autumn festival that 
same year. Not going was a difficult decision for Hashimoto because, as the former 
president of the Japan Society of Bereaved Families (Izokukai), he was expected to visit 
the shrine as part of his loyalties to the association.173 Evidence suggests that to quell 
initial protests from China, Hashimoto initially downplayed his visit in 1996 by claiming 
that it was a personal visit. However, in both July 1997 and April 2001, Hashimoto 
confessed to the press that his 1996 visit was not solely for personal reasons but was also 
an official visit as prime minister of Japan. In 2001, Hashimoto told the press that “I 
made an official visit, and as a result it became a big problem. . . . I’ve stopped going 
since then.”174 In hopes of amending Sino-Japanese relations, in November 1996, 
Hashimoto reinstated financial ODA to China, which had been halted to protest China’s 
1995 nuclear test. To make further amends for the Yasukuni Shine visit, on September 6, 
1997, near the time of the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto visited the Shenyang 918 History Museum to express remorse for Japan’s 
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events.175 Hence, after continual Chinese protests, to improve bilateral Sino-Japanese 
relations, Japan made concessions to China and became more apologetic toward its Asian 
neighbors regarding the history issue. Although this event increased bilateral tensions and 
contributed to the downturn of bilateral relations, both Beijing and Tokyo were able to 
work through some of the issues.176  
C. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 2003–2006 
Bilateral diplomacy suffered in 2003–2006 because of rising negative public 
opinion in reaction to controversial Japanese actions that stirred the collective memories 
of China’s past trauma. Scholars considered this period one of the most discordant in 
Sino-Japanese relations since normalization in 1972.177 This next period of discord 
witnessed several incidents involving the history issue that ignited anti-Japanese fervor 
and waves of mobilization in China. As depicted in Figure 9, the main events explored in 
this section are the Qiqihar Chemical Weapons Explosion, the Zhuhai Sex Scandal, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute of 2004, China’s veto at the UNSC, Japan’s history 
textbook controversy, and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine 
visits. 
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The collective memories of the Chinese public heavily influenced this period of discord—expressed in 
uprisings over controversial Japanese events—all of which forced Beijing to harden its policies against 
Japan and strained Sino-Japanese relations. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong 
contributions (arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper 
half of the figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the 
figure depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow 
placement (above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 9.  Period of Discord: 2003–2006 (Collective Memory) 
1. Qiqihar Chemical Weapons Explosions, 2003 
During this period, the effects of Japanese chemical weapons remaining in China 
became a main Sino-Japanese history issue that reminded the Chinese people of the 
atrocities suffered under Japanese colonization and triggered massive anti-Japanese 
protest, hurting cooperative bilateral relations. When Japan occupied China during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War and WWII, the Imperial Japanese Army exploited biological 
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than one-fourth of all Japanese artillery and more than one-third of all aircraft 
incendiaries contained chemical toxins.178 It is estimated that the Japanese used 
biological and chemical weapons and toxic gas nearly 2,900 times against the Chinese, 
which resulted in over 37,000 casualties, 2,086 of which were fatal.179 At the end of the 
war, many abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) were buried in the ground and toxic 
chemical compounds infiltrated the waterways and contaminated water supplies. The 
exact number of ACWs left by the Japanese is still debated. The Federation of American 
Scientists and the Japanese government have estimated that over 700,000 ACW 
components were left behind.180 Official Chinese statements claim that there could be 
over two million ACWs in China, as many are yet to be found.181 
Before the Qiqihar Incident in 2003, China and Japan experienced relatively 
cooperative relations regarding the cleanup of ACWs, with minimal complaints and little 
protest from either side. In the 1990s, China and Japan signed a chemical weapons 
convention (CWC) legally requiring that Japan assist in the removal of all ACWs and 
endorsing a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the ACW issue in 
China.182 Both China and Japan also created offices that appointed respective 
representatives to monitor all efforts, provide bilateral coordination, and set up budget 
and acquisition requirements. In 2002, Chinese officials publicly commended Japanese 
efforts to actively remove and destroy all ACWs. An article in the Xinhua News Agency 
declared that “both sides hailed the [ACW] joint efforts as ‘very significant’ to future 
relations, especially as the countries celebrate 30 years of diplomatic ties.”183 The 
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Chinese Foreign Ministry website dedicated a section to reassuring the public of the 
continuing government actions and even highlighted the positive and cooperative Sino-
Japanese efforts to address the cleanup of chemical toxins. The official website stated that 
Japan “was fully aware of the seriousness and urgency of the issue . . . [and] keenly 
regretted for the damages which the Chinese people have so far suffered,” and went on to 
say that “the Japanese side is committed to solving the issue.”184 During this time, 
Chinese officials did not advertise nor bring to the public’s attention the suffering of the 
victims of the abandoned ACWs in state media venues or any criticism of Japan’s 
removal efforts.185 
However, over the years, the safe removal and destruction of the massive number 
of ACWs in China suffered major delays that resulted in a continued number of victims, 
which began to test the Chinese public’s patience. Many of the weapons had decayed, 
rusted or were extremely volatile and required controlled excavation methods to avoid 
inadvertent explosions, which delayed removal efforts.186 While the slow and painful 
removal of all ACWs in China was under way, victims and families of victims of 
unexploded ordnance and chemicals repeatedly sought compensation from both the 
Chinese and Japanese governments. Chinese victims filed lawsuits against the Japanese 
government in 1996–1997: 13 demanded compensation of more than 200 million yen for 
injuries suffered, five victims demanded more than 80 million yen for reparations.187 
However, such efforts received little support from the Chinese government. At that time, 
the Chinese government did not press Japan for reparations for its victims, nor did it 
allow its victims to attend court hearings in Japan.188  
Before 2003, neither government compensated the victims or their families for 
accidental deaths that occurred since the end of the war. Local officials within the cities 
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with ACW excavations were also reluctant to allow the ACW issue to turn into a public 
protest. Before 2003, the Chinese government seemed apathetic to the demands of the 
victims and did little to pressure Japan into providing compensation for the continuing 
civilian victims of remnants from Japan’s War of Aggression.189   
However, a 2003 chemical weapons incident in Qiqihar City gained massive 
public attention that changed the cooperative nature of the bilateral ACW cleanup efforts 
and forced Japan to respond to Chinese public demands. Construction workers in the 
North China city of Qiqihar City discovered five canisters of mustard gas, one of which 
was damaged and leaking toxins. Not knowing the contents, the workers broke them up 
and delivered them to a local recycling plant for disposal. Within hours, exposed workers 
began to suffer from burns and blisters, resulting in one death and serious injuries to 37 
personnel.190 When the Alliance of Patriots NGO received word of the Qiqihar incident, 
it immediately began an online petition to demand compensation and reparations from 
Japan.191 Within one month, the NGO consolidated more than 1.2 million signatures 
across 12,518 Chinese websites, demanding Japanese apologies for its past wartime 
conduct and accusing the Japanese of deliberately leaving behind weapons to kill Chinese 
citizens to continue its wartime aggression in the present day.192 Chinese political 
activists began to publicly demand Japan put together reparation funds to compensate all 
victims of Japan’s War of Aggression in China. The incident incited public emotions 
across China in the form of Internet petitions, websites, and news articles that called for 
action from the Chinese authoritarian government and Japanese leadership.193 
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In response to Chinese public protests, Japan offered its condolences to the 
victims, sent a delegation to investigate the incident in Qiqihar, and made an initial 
offering of 100 million yen as “sympathy funds” for damages.194 However, the public 
remained unsatisfied and rejected the initial statement of condolence as disingenuous. 
Both the Global Times and the Beijing Youth News featured editorials that criticized 
Japan’s lack of the word compensation in its initial monetary offer and demanded a better 
public apology.195 Articles in the South China Morning Post criticized Japan for refusing 
to officially apologize to the “poison gas victims” and also criticized China’s central 
authority for its apathy toward ACW victims.196 
In response to public protests, Chinese leaders acted more aggressively toward 
Japan and demanded the Japanese government provide proper compensation to the ACW 
victims. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an official protest to the Japanese 
ambassador that “the chemical weapons abandoned by Japanese troops in China are 
irrefutable evidence of Japanese militaristic aggression against China” and demanded 
“the Japanese government to take immediate action, shoulder its responsibility and deal 
with problems arising from the issue.”197 President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi began negotiations in October, and shortly thereafter, Japan agreed to 
pay 300 million yen directly to the Chinese government, as compensation to the victims 
of the Qiqihar incident.198 This marked the first time the Chinese central authority 
publicly advocated public demands on behalf of Chinese victims of what was seen to be 
remnants of Japan’s brutal aggression of China. Around the same time, the courts in 
Tokyo awarded 190 million yen to the 13 Chinese victims of ACWs who lodged a 
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lawsuit in 1996 against the Government of Japan.199 Thus, evidence supports the theory 
that deeply embedded anti-Japanese resentment of the Chinese people has pressured 
Beijing to be more aggressive in its foreign policy with Japan and strained bilateral 
relations. 
Once the public actively demanded both apologies and compensation from the 
Japanese government, Japan quickly offered compensation to quiet Chinese public anger. 
Public protests propelled the Chinese government to advocate on behalf of victims by 
demanding the Japanese government resolve the issue by providing a more satisfactory 
compensation—a position that seemed to have garnered little interest before. 
Negotiations then occurred to resolve the issue to public satisfaction. Thus, evidence 
strongly supports the power of the Chinese public’s anti-Japanese sentiments regarding 
events related to the history issue and the public’s ability to influence immediate action 
from both Beijing and Tokyo and shape the nature of the bilateral relationship. 
2. Zhuhai Sex Scandal, 2003 
Another history issue event occurred in 2003 that ignited anti-Japanese sentiments 
in China. From September 16 to 18, 2003, overlapping the anniversary date of Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria, a supposed three-day sex scandal took place in a luxury hotel in a 
red district of Zhuhai, involving nearly four hundred Japanese businessmen and five 
hundred Chinese prostitutes. Initially the scandal went unnoticed; however, a Chinese 
witness went to the press to complain about what he had seen during his stay at the hotel, 
which set off a flurry of Chinese media reports that resulted in Chinese public outrage.200 
Anti-Japanese sentiments tied to the history issue infiltrated Chinese articles that spread 
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across the Internet and through the news media. The China Daily commented on how the 
sex scandal took place on the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria.201 The 
article also stated that the incident incited public protest on popular websites such as 
sohu.com, as thousands of comments linked the scandal to the Imperial Japanese use and 
rape of “comfort women” during its occupation of China.202 Outraged netizens 
commented that the Japanese deliberately tried to degrade China on what is officially 
considered their national humiliation day.203 An extreme comment suggested that “the 
Japanese and hookers should be killed” and the hotel “blown up.”204 Public complaints 
also began to criticize the Chinese government for its inaction regarding the incident. 
Thus, the Chinese public linked this event to inherent anti-Japanese sentiments regarding 
the history issue and demanded both Beijing and Tokyo respond.205 
In response to the public outrage, a spokesman from the Chinese foreign ministry 
publicly condemned the incident, ordered the immediate closure of the Zhuhai 
International Conference Center Hotel, and proclaimed that an investigation would take 
place and guilty patrons would be prosecuted.206 The spokesman also demanded that the 
Government of Japan better educate its citizens regarding Chinese laws.207 Thus, this 
publicly charged incident forced the Chinese central authorities to respond to public 
demands to quell protests. In addition, leaders in Beijing took this opportunity to 
highlight the history issue and demand that the Japanese take the incident seriously. 
Compared to the Chinese, the Japanese government responded minimally to the 
sex scandal and announced it would only make a formal inquiry since the accused firm 
was a private company. The Japanese firm denied the involvement of its businessmen and 
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stated and declared that the company’s people “were not involved in systematic 
prostitute-buying.”208 The Chinese foreign ministry was not satisfied with Japan’s 
halfhearted response and demanded greater Japanese initiative to actively pursue this 
matter. In response, the Government of Japan announced that its foreign ministry would 
further investigate by interviewing the employees of the suspected firm. A spokesperson 
from the private firm stated to the media that regardless of the results of the investigation, 
it had no intention of “apologiz[ing] to the Chinese for what happened [but would] 
cooperate if contacted.”209 The Chinese government gave Interpol a photo of three 
Japanese businessmen who were allegedly involved in the scandal with a request that the 
Japanese capture, detain, and prosecute the suspects. In response, Japanese Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda stated that “Japanese investigative authorities will deal with [the 
case] in line with domestic law.”210 For over a year, Chinese authorities actively pursued 
the investigation, which ended with the prosecution of 12 Chinese organizers of the 
hotel’s event. For Japan, this incident went no further than an interview and official 
inquiry of the suspected firm. In this case, Chinese public opinion forced Beijing to act 
more aggressively against its policies toward Japan. In contrast, Japanese authorities 
responded minimally to the protests—perhaps just enough to dissuade the public from 
further uprisings. 
This case shows strong evidence of the Chinese public’s attempts to influence 
China’s Japan policy and Japanese domestic politics. Public protests that resulted from 
this scandal were tied to the history issue and demanded that both Beijing and Tokyo 
open investigations and discipline those involved. Chinese officials responded by 
shutting down the hotel, conducting an investigation, and eventually punishing the 
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Chinese citizens involved in the scandal. Beijing also made demands for Tokyo to 
cooperate with the investigation, educate its citizens on Chinese laws, and arrest those 
suspected of misconduct. Tokyo was more reluctant to impose punishment on a private 
firm, citing the limitations of Japanese domestic laws. However, Japan reassured China 
that it would provide inquiries and conduct an investigation led by the Japanese foreign 
ministry. The Japanese firm initially denied involvement, cited Chinese media bias 
against Japan, and refused to apologize regarding the event. The following year, Chinese 
officials made public updates regarding investigation results and periodically made 
demands on Japan to take action when new information was found, keeping the issue 
alive until final prosecution on the Chinese side. The Japanese response seemed less 
satisfactory to both the Chinese public and central authority as Tokyo was not willing to 
take the matter seriously. Regardless, controversial Japanese actions sparked the 
collective memories of China’s past trauma and heightened anti-Japanese public opinion 
that spurred the Chinese government to act more aggressively in its policies against 
Japan; this action, however, failed to provoke a stronger Japanese response to satisfy 
Chinese public demands but did become an irritant on bilateral relations. 
3. The Resurgence of the Baodiao Movement and the 2004 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute 
The Chinese public links Japan’s history of brutal aggression in Asia with the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku sovereignty debate. Baodiao or “Defend the Diaoyu Islands” activists 
claim Japan wrongfully claimed sovereignty over the islands after the Sino-Japanese War 
in the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Furthermore, they argue that the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned China as part of the WWII settlement. Chinese 
historical activists, like those who are part of the Baodiao movement, continually 
associate Japan’s territorial claims with a suspected resurgence of Japanese right-wing 
nationalism. Such nationalism could lead to a revived form of militarism once seen in the 
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early 20th century. Thus, these activists continually block Japan from claiming any rights 
over Chinese territory as a way to contain Japanese nationalism.211 
In 2004, seven political activists from the Baodiao movement sparked anti-
Japanese public protests in China when they organized a voyage to the disputed islands to 
challenge Japanese claims. One Baodiao activist told James Reilly that “We kept the trip 
secret, so the Chinese government couldn’t stop us.”212 The Japanese coast guard 
intercepted the group, refused to let them return to the mainland, incarcerated them in a 
holding cell, and later arrested them for illegally trespassing on Japanese territory. The 
activists staged a hunger strike demanding to return to China. Shortly thereafter, dozens 
of protestors burned the Japanese flag in front of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and 
chanted “the Chinese people will not be insulted.”213 Protests lasted a few hours until the 
local police forced all demonstrators to disperse. However short the demonstration was, 
the Baodiao movement, coupled with anti-Japanese public protests, revived the Sino-
Japanese territorial dispute, an action which demanded responses from the highest levels 
of government.214 
In response to public protests, Beijing acted more aggressively toward Japan and 
demanded the release of the activists without condition. A Chinese vice foreign minister 
warned that failure to immediately release the activists would hurt bilateral relations and 
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“certainly will arouse the powerful indignation of the Chinese people.”215 Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo launched a formal protest against the Government of Japan 
for “seriously infring[ing] on China’s territorial sovereignty,” stating that “the Chinese 
government and the people will never accept it.”216 That same evening, Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi urged an immediate resolution to the issue from his foreign ministry 
bureaucrats. The following day, Japan released the seven activists without condition. In 
this case, public protests forced Beijing to make aggressive demands on Japan and, in 
turn, required Japan to concede to Chinese demands.217 
Although public opinion and political activists led China to demand Japan 
immediately release the activists, the Chinese government did not endorse its actions or 
continue hardened policies in the sovereignty debate. When the activists returned to 
China, they did not receive the expected warm welcome as their country’s heroes. Rather, 
they were immediately detained by Chinese security officers. In addition, a Baodiao 
organizer was forbidden to talk to the press and was warned by the authorities to refrain 
from instigating further expeditions to protest the islands dispute. Chinese officials 
reprimanded the activists and said “Don’t be too happy with yourself (bie tai deyi) . . . 
You guys have caused us a lot of trouble (mafan) with this.”218 Furthermore, both China 
and Japan cooperated to prevent excursions to the islands from either side to mitigate 
future domestic protests. The Chinese foreign ministry expressed appreciation for the 
quick and cooperative release of the activists, but it also stated that “we have an 
indisputable claim to these islands . . . [but] through peaceful negotiation we can come to 
narrow some differences.”219 Sino-Japanese bilateral cooperation and talks resumed 
normal status within a few weeks. However, the Japanese controversial action of 
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arresting and detaining historical activists spurred the Chinese public to express their 
anti-Japanese sentiments regarding history, manifested in public protests, to fight for 
Chinese sovereignty in the ECS and influence bilateral relations for the worse. 220 
This case shows how public protests regarding the islands dispute forced Beijing 
and Tokyo to calm Chinese public protests. Here, the Chinese public supported a popular 
anti-Japanese NGO for taking action to challenge Japan’s claim over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands without the permission or endorsement of the CCP. Beijing made official protests 
to the Government of Japan and demanded the immediate release of the activists without 
condition. Although the Chinese government controlled and limited protests, Chinese 
officials warned that any delay or failure to release the activists could lead to an 
escalation of public protests that could further damage bilateral relations. Japan quickly 
acquiesced to China’s demands and released the activists the following day. Thus, this 
incident strongly suggests that anti-Japanese collective memory among the Chinese 
public can be further provoked by either Chinese or Japanese actions. In turn, public 
protests trigger the Chinese central authority to become aggressive in its insistence that 
Japan accede to Chinese public demands. Furthermore, to quiet anti-Japanese protests 
and respond to official Chinese requests, Japanese officials have once again made 
concessions to the Chinese public. This incident strongly supports the hypothesis of 
collective memory and its ability to harm Sino-Japanese relations. 
4. Protests against Japan’s Bid for a Permanent Seat on the United 
Nations Security Council and the Japanese History Textbook Dispute, 
2005 
During the spring of 2005, two issues involving Sino-Japanese historical disputes 
ignited a series of massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China that threatened to harm 
bilateral relations. The first issue was the public’s protest against Japan’s bid for a 
permanent seat on the UNSC. The second issue was the approval of a controversial right-
wing Japanese textbook. Both issues activated inherent anti-Japanese sentiment and 
sparked massive protests throughout China that repeated the cycle of Beijing’s 
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aggressiveness followed by Japan’s concessions, further stressing bilateral relations and 
strongly contributing to this period of discord. 
In March 2005, the Chinese public began a massive online petition to pressure 
China to veto Japan’s bid for permanent membership on the UNSC. The Chinese people 
believed that Japan’s permanent membership could renew Japan’s militarism and unleash 
inherent Japanese aggression in Asia. Within the first few weeks, the online petition 
received over 2.5 million signatures from across the globe.221 By March 31, 2005, the 
petition had received over 22 million signatures protesting Japan’s permanent 
membership in the UN.222 Political activist Tong Zeng told reporters that “China must 
vote no and not just abstain. . . . The government may not want to take the lead, but the 
Chinese people have taken the lead.”223 Another anti-Japanese historical activist stated 
that “No one—not the United Nations nor the Chinese government—can ignore so many 
people expressing their views.”224 Although Japanese officials questioned the legitimacy 
of the signatures,225 the petition signaled the international community that the Chinese 
public’s anti-Japanese sentiments stemmed from the history issue.  
Public protests made it difficult for China to support Japan’s bid for a permanent 
seat on the UNSC. At the time of this petition, official Chinese statements remained 
vague on China’s decision regarding Japan’s bid.226 Authors have debated whether China 
was already planning to veto Japan’s seat regardless of public opinion.227 However, a 
spokesman from China’s foreign ministry stated that public protests of Japan’s bid 
symbolized Japan’s selective amnesia of its history and hinted that expansion of the 
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UNSC membership should be reserved only for developing nations.228 The Chinese 
spokesman further stated that “Japan has to take a responsible attitude toward history to 
build trust among the people of Asia, including China.”229 China did not officially 
divulge its intentions regarding its vote or veto at the UNSC until after the protests that 
would ensue due to the textbook dispute. After massive anti-Japanese demonstrations 
throughout China, the CCP had no other choice but to veto Japan’s bid.230  
During this time, public protests against Japan’s desire for greater power in the 
UN reached an apex when united with the Chinese public’s outrage against Japan’s 
approval of Japan’s latest junior high history textbook. On April 4, 2005, Japan’s 
Ministry of Education (MOE) endorsed the approval of eight new history textbooks. The 
MOE stated that over 124 corrections had been made to the newest edition of this 
textbook to properly depict Japan’s historical wartime events.231 However, the newly 
revised textbook contained controversial descriptions of Japan’s wartime history. For 
example, the terms comfort women or military comfort women had been removed from all 
eight of the approved textbooks.232 The description of the Nanjing Massacre avoided any 
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specific description of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army.233 The 
book labeled the Nanjing Massacre an “incident” with an accompanying footnote that 
stated “military and civilian population suffered many casualties due to the Japanese 
military” without mentioning the number of victims.234 The section on the Marco Polo 
Bridge incident of 1937 discussed how the Japanese installed a “friendly government” in 
Manchukuo and how Japan blamed the start of the First Sino-Japanese War on the 
Chinese for shooting at Japanese soldiers.235 Furthermore, the textbook defended Japan’s 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a policy that enabled other Asian countries to gain 
sovereignty over Western powers.236 China’s Xinhua news site published an editorial 
stating that the textbook was “more distorted than the previous one.”237 The editorial 
claimed the textbook was “packed with lies, contradictions, and even myths” and warned 
the public that “imparted with arrogance, prejudice and enthusiasm for war . . . Japan’s 
younger generations are in danger of sliding back to militarism again if given the right 
climate.”238 The article also called for Japan to “deeply reflect its past, plead guilty and 
sincerely ask for forgiveness of the victims.”239 From the Chinese point of view, this 
textbook falsified Japan’s wartime history and could foster a renewed sense of militaristic 
nationalism among the youth. 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi initially defended his MOE’s decision to 
endorse the textbook, which set off a number of official protests against Japan and 
                                                 
233 Weilu Tan, “The Forgotten History: Textbook Controversy and Sino-Japanese Relations, 
(Bachelor of Philosophy thesis, University of Pittsburg, 2009), 27, http://d-
scholarship.pitt.edu/7824/1/Tan_Weilu_BPhil.pdf. 
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid.  
236 See the translation at the following website: “Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform: New 
History Textbook 2005 Version,” World Heritage Encyclopedia Edition, Project Gutenberg Self-Publishing 
Press, accessed February 15, 2017, 
http://gutenberg.us/articles/japanese_society_for_history_textbook_reform.  
237 “Xinhua Commentary: Distorted History Textbook Unacceptable,” Xinhua, March 31, 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/31/content_2771488.htm. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid.  
 84
warnings about the possible consequences of massive Chinese public uprisings.240 
Koizumi stated that this issue was a domestic matter that should be respected by other 
nations.241 Responding to public protests, the Chinese central authority filed an official 
protest over the approval of the textbooks by Japan’s MOE. Vice Foreign Minister Qiao 
Zonghuai protested Japan’s approval of the textbook and stated that it would “be 
vehemently condemned by people from all Asian countries that have been victimized by 
Japan, including the Chinese.”242 An official statement from the Chinese foreign ministry 
demanded that the Japanese correctly “view its history of militarism and aggression”243 
and that Japan had an “irresponsible attitude” regarding its own history.”244 Additional 
statements from Beijing also demanded that the Japanese “treat Chinese people’s 
concerns over the issue correctly [and] handle historic issues closely related to Chinese 
people’s feelings properly.”245 An editorial in the People’s Daily made a more caustic 
claim that the Japanese had a “twisted psychology” and “beautifie[d] aggression.”246 It 
further stated that the “concealment and adulteration of the historical facts about Japanese 
militarist expansionism [has] . . . gone beyond the scope of Japan’s internal affairs.”247 
Although public protests compelled the Chinese elites to become more demanding of 
Japan, Japan refused to respond accordingly. 
Offended by Prime Minister Koizumi’s defense of the textbook, his controversial 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, the 
Chinese public reached a breaking point of extreme anti-Japanese outrage. Using blogs, 
websites, text messages, and e-mails, Chinese nationalists and history activists 
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encouraged public demonstrations against Japan’s amnesia of its wartime atrocities.248 In 
anticipation of Chinese public protests, the Chinese foreign ministry called for the public 
to show its resentment “in a reasonable way.”249 However, on the weekend of April 9, 
2005, over 20,000 anti-Japanese protestors took to the streets of Beijing shouting slogans 
such as “Down with Japan!” and “Boycott Japanese goods!” and “Long live China!”250 
Japanese restaurants, bars, businesses, factories, and banks became targets of vandalism 
and violence as hundreds of policemen stood by and did little to stop the violence. Rioters 
burned Japanese flags and held signs that said “Protest New Japanese Textbooks.”251 
More than 500 Chinese paramilitary police fought to control a crowd of over 3,000 angry 
protestors attacking the Japanese Embassy with stones and bottles.252 In front of the 
Japanese ambassador’s home, protestors shouted “Japanese pig come out!” and “Chinese 
people shouldn’t protect Japanese!”253 Thousands came out for marches in Shenzhen. The 
Japanese consulate became the target in Guangzhou as windows were broken and 
Japanese flags were burned. Hong Kong also had protestors with signs that said “Down 
with Japanese Militarism!”254 A Chinese protestor called for Chinese authorities to be 
more forceful toward Japan, stating, “I think China should be more firm [in its policies 
with Japan]. . . . This is a good way to pass our voice to the government and to the 
Japanese people.”255 An article in Xinhua commented on how thousands came out to 
protest Japan’s “tampering of history.”256 
In response to the violent anti-Japanese public demonstrations in China, Japan 
initially hardened its stance and refused to make concessions. The Japanese foreign 
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minister “formally demanded China’s apology and compensation” for the destruction of 
Japanese businesses, embassy, and consulate. 257 The Japanese government official also 
criticized Beijing for its failure to control the situation and called on China “to take all 
necessary measures” to ensure the safety of all Japanese citizens.258 In addition, right-
wing Japanese politicians publicly dismissed the protests. They claimed that allowing 
such protests diverted the public’s attention from China’s own domestic shortfalls and to 
“keep Japan from claiming its rightful place in the world.”259 Thus, Japan redoubled its 
initial support of the controversial textbook.  
In response to Japan’s recalcitrance, Chinese authorities hardened its stance 
toward Japan’s official protests. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing refused to 
apologize or provide compensation for the damage inflicted on Japanese residents in 
China. He further stated that “the Chinese Government has never done anything that 
wronged the Japanese people” and that the violent protests were blamed on Japanese 
actions that “have hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”260 A BBC News editorial 
stated that these public demonstrations created a “War of Words”261 between Japan and 
China. On the one hand, Japan demanded that China apologize and provide compensation 
for the damage caused by the rioters. On the other hand, China demanded that Japan 
“‘face up to history’ and admit the suffering caused by its forces before and during the 
war.”262 Sino-Japanese relations seemed to be at a stalemate, with neither side willing to 
make concessions to the other’s demands. 
After three weeks of anti-Japanese public demonstrations and vandalism, Chinese 
elites began to take stronger measures to suppress public protests and crack down on anti-
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Japanese violence. On April 19, 2005, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing issued a 
statement warning the public to not engage in “unapproved demonstrations or activities 
that may affect social stability.”263 He told Chinese citizens to “express their feelings in a 
lawful and orderly way.”264 An article from the People’s Daily discussed how “frictions 
and problems of various kinds . . . can only be settled in an orderly manner by abiding by 
the law.”265 Li also broadcast a lecture to the nation that encouraged Chinese citizens to 
focus on the positive aspects of Sino-Japanese relations and to refrain from protests that 
would harm peaceful bilateral relations.266 In addition, 42 detained protestors were forced 
to confess and apologize for their acts of vandalism as they were condemned on national 
television.267 Thus, evidence suggests that the CCP authorized public protests and mass 
demonstrations only to a certain point and then began more aggressive measures to quell 
protests via the use of threats and force. 
Meanwhile, anti-Japanese public protests in China spurred domestic protests in 
Japan. An article in the People’s Daily featured demonstrators in Japan allegedly 
sympathetic to South Korea and China’s protests marching in Tokyo’s streets calling for 
Japanese leaders to apologize to China for Japan’s wartime conduct and the approval of 
the controversial textbook.268 Thus, Japan received international and domestic pressure to 
properly address the history issue and make amends with China. 
Public protests caused a stalemate in Sino-Japanese relations. Such protests 
created an atmosphere of extreme anti-Japanese hatred that forced Beijing’s hand toward 
Japan. They also encouraged Tokyo to respond in kind toward China. Neither side 
wanted to grant concessions to achieve positive bilateral relations. An article in the 
Economist highlighted Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei’s assessment that “his 
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country’s ties with Japan were at their worst since the rivals established diplomatic 
relations in 1972.”269 
To make amends with China, on April 22, 2005, at an Asia-Africa summit in 
Jakarta, Prime Minister Koizumi began his remarks with an apology to Asian neighbors. 
Koizumi stated that  
Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. With 
feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, 
Japan has resolutely maintained . . . its principle of resolving all matters by 
peaceful means, without recourse to use of force.270  
Such contrition had been intended to pacify domestic protests in South Korea and 
China and demonstrate to the international community that Japan remained a peaceful 
nation with no intentions of reverting to past militarism. Unfortunately, hours before 
Koizumi’s apology, over 80 members of Japan’s parliament visited and made offerings to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. Thus, China had difficulty believing that Koizumi’s apology was 
sincere. The Chinese foreign ministry positively commended Koizumi’s expression of 
contrition but desired more from Japan. A Chinese spokesman stated “to express it is one 
aspect. What’s of much more importance is the action. You have to make it a reality.”271 
Thus, contradictory actions had undercut Koizumi’s words of apology. 272 
Public protests in China and Japan provoked further debate on the textbook issue 
in Japan. Over the next few months, cities and prefectures in Japan debated on whether to 
use the controversial textbook. To lessen the chance of public protest, the city of 
Otawara’s board of education conducted meetings behind closed doors to debate the use 
of the textbook.273 The Suginami Ward’s board of education delayed its decision to vote 
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on the use of the textbook due to public protests outside of its city hall.274 Eventually only 
0.4 percent of all junior high schools in Japan adopted the controversial textbook, which 
was an increase from 0.1 percent a few years earlier, but still a nominal percentage.275 
These events suggest how inherent anti-Japanese public opinion transcends 
Chinese propaganda and elite-driven agendas. Here, the Chinese central authority 
suppressed demonstrations from getting out of hand. Even then, public outrage 
sometimes occurred without the endorsement of local authorities. Such was seen in the 
second week of protests that broke out in Shanghai after the Chinese central authorities 
issued statements to discourage the public from protesting. 
These cases provide supporting evidence of the Chinese public’s ability to shape 
Beijing’s policy with Japan, and Japan’s responses to demands and how this interaction 
deteriorates bilateral relations. Beijing could not ignore the massive and violent 
demonstrations by its own public. Forced to behave more insistently, Beijing blamed the 
violent protests on the Japanese government and demanded that Tokyo address the 
history issue. China asserted that Japanese action incited anti-Japanese public protests 
and had to be resolved by the Japanese government. Following nearly three weeks of 
protests, the Chinese central government had to crack down on further public 
demonstrations. In addition, Chinese officials took a harder stance against Japan’s bid for 
a permanent seat at the UN, a position that was somewhat vague before the protests. As 
the public riots made international headlines, sympathizing protests broke out in Tokyo, 
with the protestors demanding the Japanese government apologize and correct the issue 
with China. International and domestic pressures forced the Japanese prime minister to 
issue a public apology for past Japanese wartime actions. Such an act is historically 
difficult for Japanese prime ministers because of domestic political pressures, since 
apologizing is seen as a loss of face and demeans Japan, by giving China the upper hand 
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in political morality.276 In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi avoided visiting the 
Yasukuni Shrine during the anniversary of the end of the War in the Pacific—an action 
he had taken in the past. The protests also revealed Japanese politicians as divided in their 
reaction to the protests. A large number of conservative officials visited the Yasukuni 
Shrine in defiance of Prime Minister Koizumi’s desire to repair relations through public 
apology for Japan’s wartime crimes and militarism in Asia. Furthermore, such protests 
had lingering effects in Japan as each prefecture actively debated the use of the textbook 
for their students—a debate which rarely happened before. Thus, the public Chinese 
protests that erupted over Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC and the history 
textbook issue influenced Beijing’s forceful attitude toward Japan. In turn, Japan was 
obligated to make apologies to calm Chinese public and official protests. This case 
strongly supports the hypothesis of anti-Japanese fervor that is ignited in response to 
controversial events and forces both Beijing and Tokyo to respond to its demands, 
plunging bilateral relations to one of the lowest periods in Sino-Japanese history. 
5. Renewal of Yasukuni Shrine Visits by Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro 
Immediately before and during this time period, Koizumi Junichiro officially 
visited to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine every year during his tenure as prime 
minister, which further ignited anti-Japanese protests in China. Despite knowing the 
sensitivities regarding Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japanese dignitaries and their negative 
impact on Sino-Japanese relations, Koizumi vowed to visit the shrine every year that he 
was in office. Koizumi made six official visits—the most of any Japanese prime minister 
to date. Although Koizumi visited the shrine during the years of Sino-Japanese 
cooperation from 1999 to 2003, it reached in apex during this time period that became 
intolerable to the public. 
To help deescalate Sino-Japanese tensions over the history issue and prevent the 
rise of public protest against Koizumi’s shrine visits, the Chinese government insisted 
that Koizumi reconsider every visit, especially those on the anniversary date of the end of 
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WWII in the Pacific. In 2001, Chinese foreign ministry officials warned Japan of the 
possible public protests that would result as Koizumi’s visit would be perceived as a 
display of reverence and homage to war criminals.277 Another press release by a Chinese 
official stated that “If Prime Minister Koizumi pays a visit to the shrine on August 15, it 
will draw broadsides from the Chinese people and I am worried that the visit may 
undermine the foundation of the friendly relationship between the two nations.”278 In 
2001, Chinese officials even reached out to former LDP secretary generals to discourage 
Koizumi from visiting the shrine, but such efforts were futile.279 Despite official Chinese 
warnings of public mobilization against Koizumi’s first visit, protests were fairly benign 
and limited in scope. However, sources later revealed that Koizumi changed the date of 
his visit from August 15 to August 13 as a concession in response to the pressure 
received from Beijing and the Chinese public protests against his planned visit.280 
However, Chinese historical and political activists refused to allow Koizumi to 
visit the shrine without protest. Chinese political activist Feng Jinhua infiltrated the 
Yasukuni Shrine on August 14, 2001, and painted the term Gaisi (go to hell) along the 
walls of the shrine.281 Feng was arrested shortly thereafter and deported to China. Upon 
his return, he was deemed a public hero, labeled “China’s backbone,” and voted “Man of 
the Year” by the Chinese public in the popular Southern Weekly newspaper and by 
followers on sina.com’s website.282 
In part to show support for the Chinese public’s sentiments regarding the 
Yasukuni Shrine visits, Chinese leadership conveyed “strong dissatisfaction and 
indignation” over Koizumi’s visit in 2001, and Jiang Zemin even refused to meet with 
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Koizumi during the APEC talks in Shanghai.283 However, even though Beijing was vocal 
in denouncing Koizumi’s first visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, China exerted more 
effort to restrain public opinion to keep a manageable relationship with Japan. 
Koizumi attempted to make amends with China and to quell any Chinese protest 
against his shrine visit by personally meeting with the Chinese premier and visiting one 
of China’s most well-known historical war sites. On October 9, 2001, Koizumi visited the 
Museum of the War of Chinese Resistance against Japanese Aggression and openly 
apologized for Japan’s wartime offenses in China on the Lugou Qiao or Marco Polo 
Bridge. Koizumi reaffirmed the 1995 Murayama apology to the Chinese public and 
publicly expressed remorse for Japan’s wartime crimes. Koizumi stated that “I looked at 
the various exhibits with a feeling of heartfelt apology and condolences for those Chinese 
people who were victims of aggression.”284 Like Hashimoto before him, Koizumi hoped 
a visit and an open apology would appease Chinese leaders and their public 
constituency.285 
The Chinese reacted to Koizumi’s next two visits to the Yasukuni Shrine more 
moderately and the Chinese media highlighted celebrations and friendship-building 
initiatives. The media published little of Koizumi’s visits however; the two countries 
postponed bilateral initiatives and meetings. The year 2002 became the “Year of Japan” 
in China.286 The 16th Party Congress at the end of 2002 declared that it would “treat 
neighbors as friends; treat neighbors as partners.”287 Even after Koizumi’s third visit to 
the shrine in 2003, Hu Jintao refrained from promulgating the history issue and promoted 
a more positive Sino-Japanese relationship. Even through Koizumi’s visits irritated Sino-
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Japanese relations, Hu Jintao took a more pragmatic, less emotional approach to bilateral 
relations by highlighting the positive aspects of economic cooperation. 288 
However, in 2004, the Chinese public became fed up and abandoned moderation 
over the visits. After Koizumi’s fourth visit, public sentiments became almost 
overwhelming as official Chinese statements intensified when the central government 
allowed increased media coverage of the public’s anti-Japanese rhetoric. The Chinese 
public’s anti-Japanese sentiments regarding the history issue spread like wildfire on 
China’s newfound Internet. Reilly quoted a Chinese Japan expert who stated that “as 
Koizumi kept going to Yasukuni, it became impossible for Beijing to compromise. The 
‘average people’ in China would not have understood.”289 Chinese Vice Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi stated that those enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine had “hands [that] were 
stained with blood of Chinese and Asian Peoples” and in reference to Koizumi’s visits 
said that “Chinese people absolutely cannot accept this type of betrayal.”290  
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine escalated volatile anti-Japanese 
sentiments in China. The Qiqihar chemical weapons explosions had already incited the 
public the year before. Editorials in Chinese papers and websites that hosted anti-
Japanese ideals began to rise exponentially and cause even more outrage. As public 
opinion increased on the Internet, protests in front of the Japanese Embassy in Beijing 
and the Japanese consulate General Building in Shanghai garnered massive support. 
Protestors burned photos of Koizumi and Japanese flags on the streets. That summer, 
during the Asia Cup Soccer Tournament hosted by China, Chinese attendees booed and 
threw objects at Japanese players, protested Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and 
declared Chinese sovereignty over the disputed islands.291 Hence, evidence shows that 
the 2004 Yasukuni Shrine visit added more fuel to an already volatile situation as anti-
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Japanese sentiments from the public became ignited yet again by another controversial 
event regarding the history issue. As a result, Chinese elites felt compelled to no longer 
contain public opinion and insisted that Japan respond by halting bilateral cooperation.292 
Unlike his predecessors, Koizumi defended his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
every year that he was in office and did not follow Chinese demands to stop. However, 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine did not lower his standing within his party nor his popular 
Japanese support. In 2004, a poll conducted by a Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun 
noted that Koizumi held a 50 percent support rating among the Japanese people, which 
was considered one of the highest during a prime minister’s third year.293 Chinese public 
riots did not break out in massive form as seen after Koizumi’s last two visits in 2005 and 
2006; however, anti-Japanese resentment and public condemnation of the events 
continued. Thus, negative Chinese public opinion did not discourage Koizumi from 
visiting the shrine. However, his visits instigated anti-Japanese resentment from the 
Chinese public, became a roadblock to Sino-Japanese cooperation, and contributed to 
negative bilateral relations during this time period.294  
D. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 2010–2016 
After a brief period of somewhat positive Sino-Japanese relations, anti-Japanese 
public opinion regarding the history issue began to increase in 2010 and threatened to 
harm bilateral relations in 2012. This thesis discusses one main history-issue-related 
event during this next period of discord or bilateral “coldness,” depicted in Figure 10, that 
stirred public protest and significant anti-Japanese demonstrations: the continued 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes in 2012. 
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Collective memory played a weaker role in explaining Sino-Japanese discord during this time. Only the 
2010 and 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and the more recent comfort women monument 
significantly contributed. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions 
(arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the 
figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure 
depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement 
(above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event.  
Figure 10.  Period of Discord: 2010–2016 (Collective Memory) 
1. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute, 2012 
During this period, controversial Japanese actions regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute once again stirred anti-Japanese sentiments in China, negatively shaping bilateral 
relations. In April 2012, in part to protest Prime Minister Noda’s handling of the disputed 
islands, Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara began a fundraiser to purchase three of the 
five Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese owner to officially develop them 
































Japanese patriotic group consisting of six National Diet members and 114 activists 
boarded ships bound for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In response, political Baodiao 
activists from Hong Kong aboard a Taiwanese Coast Guard ship sailed to the contested 
islands to challenge Japanese claims. Chinese fishing vessels also began to increase their 
presence in the contested waters of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which further heightened 
Sino-Japanese tensions. On the 81st anniversary of the end of WWII in the Pacific, a 
Baodiao group planted Chinese and Taiwanese flags on the islands, only to be detained 
by Okinawan authorities. Immediately following, another right-wing Japanese nationalist 
group conducted a ceremony that honored those Japanese servicemen who died in 
previous battles and raised the Japanese flag.295 
In September, DPJ Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko led his cabinet to approve a 
purchase of the islands for over 2.05 billion yen to prevent further Japanese right-wing 
attempts to develop the contested islands.296 The foreign minister of Japan, Koichiro 
Genba, stated in a New York Times article that the purchase of the islands “was to 
minimize any adverse impact on the Japan-China relationship. . . [and] was the only 
viable and best option available to the government of Japan to protect bilateral 
relations.”297 From Japan’s point of view, the purchase of the islands was necessary to 
prevent domestic factions from undermining the current administration’s authority and 
causing unnecessary political turmoil with China.298 
However, the nationalization of the islands by the Government of Japan incited 
public resentment and engulfed China in a sea of anti-Japanese protest. Jeremy L. 
Wallace and Jessica Chen Weiss reported that over 320 public protests throughout 
various cities in China occurred within 30 days of Japan’s purchase of the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.299 Shortly thereafter, on the 81st anniversary of Japan’s 
invasion of Manchuria, over 128 Chinese cities held anti-Japanese protests that further 
ignited the island dispute.300  
The Chinese public interpreted the purchase as an expansion of Japanese 
militarism and nationalism. An online poll by the Guangzhou Research Institute noted 
that over 80 percent of respondents from almost 600 cities in China denounced Japan’s 
nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and believed it “was the most serious 
challenge to China’s sovereignty since WWII.”301 Anti-Japanese reactions on various 
online websites by Chinese netizens and violent Chinese public demonstrations 
throughout China began to make international headlines. When the first announcement of 
the purchase was made, sina.com featured a protestor who rallied for supporters to 
“boycott Japanese goods . . . otherwise all the money we spend on Japanese goods will be 
used to buy bullets.”302 The author of another post on the same website stated that 
“without killing Japanese, I cannot relieve the hatred in my heart.”303 In Xian, Chinese 
activists stormed a previously Japanese-owned hotel in a rage, breaking windows and 
destroying furniture in protests against Japanese businesses.304 In Qingdao, protestors 
targeted Japanese department and grocery stores, leaving the stores in shambles and 
breaking Japanese-made electronics and appliances as well as destroying imported 
Japanese goods.305 Many Japanese factories and businesses in China were shut down to 
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avoid public vandalism.306 The Chinese deployed over 200 riot control police in Shanghai 
to control the protests in front of the Japanese consulate buildings.307 Angry 
demonstrators took to the streets burning the imperial and current Japanese flags chanting 
“Declare war!” and “Kill all Japanese.”308 The state-censored People’s Daily newspaper 
published an editorial that proclaimed “no one would doubt the pulses of patriotic fervor 
when the motherland is bullied.”309 An online message to the PLA exhorted the Chinese 
military to “start fighting! There are 1.3 billion people backing you.”310 The Beijing 
Evening News even posted on a blog site to “just serve [Japan] with the main course of 
nuclear missiles and all the troubles will be saved.”311 Although the authorities quickly 
deleted the Beijing Evening News blog, its suggestion to escalate the issue by extreme 
force became hotly debated. 
As protests became more unruly, and in some cases, more critical of the CCP’s 
policies, the central government issued more repressive measures against demonstrators. 
In September 2012, the China Digital Times published regulations for public protests. 
Such rules allowed protestors in designated areas in groups of only 100 at a time—those 
in front receiving the most media attention could not smile or talk on cell phones but 
could wave distributed Chinese flags, sing the national anthem, and chant mandatory 
anti-Japanese slogans.312 In addition, protestors could only chant slogans for 
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approximately five minutes; then, they were to disperse after handing their Chinese flags 
to the next wave of protestors.313  
Near the time of the 81st anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, Chinese 
officials warned all local authorities to maintain control of their protestors and threatened 
to prosecute Chinese citizens who violated the law. Hong Kong reporter Ming Pao 
observed that the media was restricted in its coverage of the protests as “breaking 
information from the street must be strictly controlled.’”314 To ensure control over the 
looming wave of public mass mobilization, Chinese authorities temporarily blocked the 
following words on Sina Weibo: “anti-Japan (反日 or抗日)”; “smash + car (砸+车)”; 
“smash (打砸)”; “protest (抗议)”; “take a walk (散步)”, which refers to marching 
protests; “demonstrate (游行)”; “assembly (集会)”; “demonstration (示威)”; “beating, 
smashing, and looting (打砸抢)”; and “Liangmaqiao (亮马桥), the location of the 
Japanese Embassy in Beijing.”315 Furthermore, text messages sent by state officials and 
state-run media editorials admonished Chinese citizens about protests and asked the 
public to suppress their violent anger and endorse “sensible patriotism” and 
“levelheadedness.”316 Although protestors could rally and demonstrate against Japan’s 
purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Chinese central authority limited the size 
and impact of public mobilization. 
Because of the massive anti-Japanese protests over the island purchase, Chinese 
elites needed to maintain credibility with their constituents and address public demands. 
Leadership changes at the highest level during the 18th National Party Congress did not 
allow the new Chinese elites to seem weak on Japan. From this incident to the present 
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day, Chinese armed forces have increased their maritime and air patrols around the 
disputed islands. To confirm Chinese sovereignty over the islands, the government 
authorized state-run Chinese websites to advocate for Chinese sovereignty to the 
international world. The CCP confirmed the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
as a core interest and the dispute was no longer shelved for a later time. As a result, anti-
Japanese public protests over the islands dispute contributed to the CCP’s toughened 
policies against Japan, which negatively affected bilateral relations.317 
Massive public protests in China caught the Japanese leadership off guard since 
they failed to recognize China’s perceptions and the consequences of their actions. Prime 
Minister Noda believed he was maintaining the status quo by only transferring over title 
of the islands from a private to a public owner to prevent any nationalist movements from 
developing the islands. However, Ishihara’s threat to develop the islands under Tokyo’s 
jurisdiction forced Japan to purchase the islands and ignited strong anti-Japanese 
resentment from China. This resulted in the international embarrassment and the internal 
demise of a weak Japanese administration. In a sense, Chinese public protests shaped 
domestic politics, to some degree, in Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Noda lost credibility 
and popularity among his constituents, in part, because of his mismanagement of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes. This case shows that anti-Japanese sentiments in China, which 
stem from the history issue, manifest themselves in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and 
threaten to harm relations. Furthermore, anti-Japanese protests encourage Chinese elites 
to solidify their attitudes toward Japan, escalate assertiveness in the ECS, and also shape 
internal Japanese politics. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Evidence in this chapter strongly supports that deeply embedded anti-Japanese sentiments 
of Chinese citizens stem from collective memories that are reinforced by the government, 
are triggered by controversial Japanese actions, and have considerable influence on 
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negative Sino-Japanese relations. An analysis of anti-Japanese public opinion during the 
three main periods of discord demonstrates the power of the Chinese public to shape 
bilateral relations.  
The first period of discord from 1989 to 1998 had two main events that sparked 
anti-Japanese fervor: the revival of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, and the Yasukuni 
Shrine visit by Prime Minister Hashimoto. These incidents caused the activation of anti-
Japanese sentiments that manifested into public protests that forced Beijing to harden its 
stance against Japan and encouraged Tokyo to take action to appease the Chinese public, 
which strained diplomatic relations.  
The intensity of public anti-Japanese sentiments from 2001 to 2006 qualifies this 
time as the most discordant of the three periods. The sheer number and degree of anti-
Japanese protests and mass demonstrations in China strongly supports the existence of a 
collective narrative in the Chinese people that is incited by inflammatory Japanese 
actions over historical issues. The Chinese could not forget the history issue nor allow 
any leniency to what they considered inexcusable Japanese actions of Japanese militarism 
and historical amnesia. Such public protests made international headlines and highlighted 
historical grievances throughout the globe, causing both countries to blame one another 
for instigating such sentiments and effectively stalling high-level negotiations until 
historical grievances could be resolved. Thus, collective memory was a contributor to 
Sino-Japanese setbacks during this time.  
However, after 2012, Chinese public protests and rise of anti-Japanese sentiments 
after the Japanese purchase of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands only weakly contributed to the 
downturn of bilateral relations. Although the historical island disputes are a key example 
of how anti-Japanese collective memories in China can force the Chinese elites to ossify 
their policies against Japan, the remainder of the time period showed weaker support for 
this hypothesis in explaining the downturn of bilateral relations. From 2012 to 2016, anti-
Japanese sentiments remained latent despite many controversial actions by hawkish 
Japanese leadership, as demonstrated in the following chapter.  
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Further analysis shows that anti-Japanese sentiments in China have a limited 
ability to autonomously influence bilateral relations. Ultimately, the Chinese central 
government has the final say. However, after analyzing specific events in all three 
periods of discord, a constructivist social interaction between society and the CCP 
leadership can limit or demand responses from one another, which can determine the 
degree of impact on Sino-Japanese relations. Perhaps this could be an opportunity for 
both sides to use each other to satisfy overlapping interests regarding Japan. The CCP has 
developed a system to successfully tolerate, filter, repress, or censor anti-Japanese public 
opinion while appearing both patriotic and “democratic” by addressing the demands of its 
citizens and using such demands, stemmed from the genuine collective remembrance of 
the people, as foreign policy bargaining leverage to serve national interests. Concurrently, 
Chinese citizens exercise their limited right to access the media, use the Internet, engage 
in public local elections and local town hall meetings, join NGOs, and become historical 
and political activists to promote China’s anti-Japanese national identity. In a sense, the 
citizens and the elites serve each other’s interests regarding historical disputes with 
Japan, which can determine when and how to escalate China’s inherent anti-Japanese 
sentiments that ultimately shape the nature of the relationship. Regardless of this 
dynamic, the impact of the public’s anti-Japanese sentiments that stem from its collective 
memory and its effect on Sino-Japanese relations should not be not devalued. 
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IV. BALANCE OF POWER 
This chapter confirms China’s exploitation of history as a strategic tool in foreign 
policy with Japan, which results in a competitive relationship to gain an advantage 
of relative power. This chapter concludes that while the Chinese people have valid 
historical and emotional reasons for anti-Japanese sentiment, the government’s resort to 
blame and calls to national repentance are made in pursuit of shaping and constraining 
Japan’s foreign policy behavior. When Beijing perceives threats from Japan as to national 
security, economics, or regional influence, it typically alleges that friction between 
the nations stem from Japan’s perpetual militaristic ambition and past aggression. In 
doing so, Beijing uses history to ensure that Japan is forced to be less active and 
less involved in regional and global affairs—this helps improve China’s power position. 
Hence, when China is concerned about Japan, China plays the history card and calls 
attention to Japan’s past atrocities and its present lack of contrition to gain an 
advantage in the balance of power among states in East Asia, which negatively affects 
Sino-Japanese relations.  
A review of specific events involving Beijing’s promulgation of history to 
maximize its relative power during the three periods of discord (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 
2010–2016) reveals how China magnifies Japan’s past aggression for realpolitik reasons. 
Such reasons include justifying aggressive action in the ECS to support Chinese national 
interests or containing Japanese militaristic ambitions that pose a threat to China’s power. 
In contrast, during Sino-Japanese periods of cooperation, Beijing rarely complained of 
Japan’s historic past as China did not see a threat or power challenge from Japan nor did 
it see the need to use history to contain Japanese power in the region. Although China’s 
use of its historical trauma as a strategic tool of power was evident in all three negative 
periods, as shown in Figures 11, 12, and 13, it played a comparatively moderate role in 
the first period (1989–1999), a weak to moderate role in the second period (2003–2006), 
and a strong role in the third period (2010–2016) in accounting for the downturn of 
bilateral relations. Specific events during each of the main periods of discord are 
discussed in detail to assess how threat perceptions of Japanese power has encouraged 
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China to use its historical trauma to contain Japanese ambitions in Asia and justify 
actions to maximize China’s own relative power and influence in the region. However, 
China must carefully weigh its use of history in maintaining the advantage in the balance 
of power as overuse can backfire. To illustrate this dynamic, cases of Sino-Japanese 
discord in 1989–1999, 2003–2006, and 2010–2016 are examined. 
A. BALANCE OF POWER IN EAST ASIA 
As the two largest powers in East Asia, China and Japan are constantly trying to 
maximize their relative power to ensure the security of their national interests. However, 
when China feels threatened by Japan, China uses its traumatic history to limit Japan’s 
influence in the region and justify domestic policies to support national interests to 
strengthen its power over Japan. As the balance of power theory suggests, in a self-help 
world with no overarching authority to adjudicate matters, regional states will take 
actions to maximize their own relative power to ensure sovereignty and protect 
themselves from potential threats.318 However in a world of constrained resources, 
actions that a state takes to maximize its power creates a competitive environment that 
will likely come at the expense of others and contribute to a downturn of relations. Thus, 
competitive states may find themselves unable to cooperate and driven to conflict due to 
this state of anarchy.319 As highlighted in all three periods of discord, when China feels 
that its national interests are threatened, China will use the advantageous resource of its 
moral advantage to win the upper hand of power over Japan, which comes at the expense 
of cooperative relations. 
 Robert Gilpin further notes that the disequilibrium of the international system 
caused by the changes in power distribution among rising and falling states creates a 
conflict-prone environment due to the changes to the status quo.320 Kenneth Waltz, 
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Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer, and Aaron L. Friedberg further observe that power 
transitions among states may lead to conflict.321 In applying this logic to history’s 
influence on the periods of discord in Sino-Japanese relations, we see that when a rising 
power like China is dissatisfied with its place in the hierarchy among states, it may 
attempt to upset the international status quo to seek a resolution of past injustices and 
historical disputes to accommodate its newfound higher status in the international 
system. China may also use the history card to justify forcible means to create more 
favorable conditions and coerce Japan to recognize its newfound importance and put 
Japan at a power disadvantage. Meanwhile, falling states like Japan may take forcible 
action to thwart China’s ambitious power and protect the existing state of affairs. Thus, 
unresolved historical disputes have only exacerbated the problems resulting from 
the gradual regional power transition between China and Japan, making cooperative 
relations difficult. 
Thus, when China feels threatened by Japan, it will use the history card to 
maintain the advantage in the relative balance of power. In addition, Beijing’s use of 
history has been emboldened by China’s rise in the gradual power transition between 
both countries. Both of these conditions have become significant contributing factors to 
specific history issue incidences during the three main periods of Sino-Japanese discord 
discussed in this chapter.  
B. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 1989–1999 
The year 1989 was a turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. Chinese domestic 
unrest resulting from the Tiananmen Square incident along with the end of the Cold War 
contributed to a downturn of bilateral relations. China surged a propaganda campaign to 
relegitimize the CCP’s authoritarian rule over its people and reopened emotional wounds, 
which stirred public motivation to resent Japanese past aggression. Meanwhile, the end of  
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the Cold War, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union, precipitated structural 
changes in the international order, leading China and Japan to shift from allies to rivals. 
Beijing no longer saw the need to ally with Japan to balance against its rival to the north. 
Rather, the post–Cold War order created an environment where the two largest powers in 
East Asia would take actions to maximize their own security while attempting to contain 
the military capabilities of the other. Hence, during this time, China and Japan once again 
became rivals and began a gradual spiraling security dilemma which reignited historical 
animosities in the region.322 
Although Sino-Japanese relations were characterized by sporadic cooperation 
from 1989 to 1999, several events led to an overall deterioration by decade’s end. Sino-
Japanese relations took a significant downturn starting with Japan’s protest of Chinese 
nuclear weapons testing in 1995. After China responded by criticizing Japan for 
meddling in its internal affairs, Japan exerted pressure by halting ODA to China, thus 
refusing to support China’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, China escalated the conflict by 
launching military exercises and missile tests that threatened Taiwanese sovereignty in 
the region and nearly precipitated war with the United States. As the United States and 
Japan reexamined their security alliance, China perceived the activity as a new threat to 
its regional interests and developed harsher policies toward Japan. A visit by Japan’s 
prime minister to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, memorializing Japanese war dead, 
alarmed the Chinese people of Japan’s inherent militaristic instincts. Meanwhile, the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands sovereignty disputes strained bilateral cooperation, while 
Chinese demands for a written, heartfelt apology for the Sino-Japanese wars exacerbated 
friction.323  
While all these events contributed to 10 years of discord, this chapter focuses on 
three issues, shown on Figure 11, in which China made heavy use of Japan’s historical 
sins to preserve national interests, contain Japanese power ambitions, and gain an  
 
                                                 
322 M. Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 201–211, 231–232; Waltz, “Structural Realism,” 28–30, 32–
38; Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, 96–122; Yahuda, Two Tigers, 24–26. 
323 Yahuda, Two Tigers, 24–36; Dreyer, Middle Kingdom, 188–199.  
 107
advantage of power in East Asia: the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes, the revision of the 
U.S.-Japanese security guidelines, and Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 
1998. 
 
Balance of power played a moderate role in explaining the downturn of bilateral relations during this 
period. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate, or strong (arrow sizes) and either positive 
(green) or negative (red) contributors to Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events 
more affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events more 
affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). Both collective memory and balance of power permeated 
many of the same events, but, for this thesis, arrow placement was determined by which hypothesis better 
represented the event..  
Figure 11.   Period of Discord: 1989–1999 (Balance of Power) 
1. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute, 1990s 
China and Japan’s competing claims to a chain of ECS islands known as the 




Period of Discord: 1989-1999 (Balance of Power)
1989 1990 1992 1997 1999
• Joint Statement on 
Revised U.S.-Japanese 
Defense Guidelines









• Japanese Politicians 






• Beijing Publishes 
"Guidelines for the 
Patriotic Education”





Atonement for Past 
Wartime Events











• Beijing Sends Two 
Submarines to Patrol 
Waters in ECS
• Beijing Protests the 



















1990, 1996, and 1999–2000 and strongly contributed to the downturn of bilateral 
relations. China claims that it has substantial evidence of island sovereignty, as early as 
the 14th century, and that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were illegally appropriated as a 
colonial territory by Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. Relying on the United 
Nations charter of 1945, which prohibits the use of force in acquiring land, China argues 
that Japan’s claim is illegitimate since it gained the territory as a spoil of the First Sino-
Japanese War.324 China asserts moreover that the Cairo Communiqué, the Treaty of 
Potsdam, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty dictated that Japan surrender the islands. 
Professor Ryoko Nakano of the National University of Singapore argues that China’s 
territorial claims in the ECS are rooted in the ideational matter of justice by which a 
nation’s traumatic history and violated sovereignty are appeased and requited by the 
return of any lost territory taken by force.325 Consistent with this posture, Beijing cites 
Japan’s history of conquest and grave injustice toward China as undermining any 
Japanese acquisition and interprets increased military activity and defense of the islands 
by Japan as evidence of creeping militarism.326  
Japan counters that the islands were never Chinese and were claimed as terra 
nullis (no man’s land) in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895; that the Treaty of Potsdam 
is silent on the Diaoyu/Senkaku island chain; and that China asserted sovereignty only in 
the 1960s, after rich natural resources were discovered in the surrounding waters. Japan 
asserts that international law has recognized its territorial rights to the islands since the 
end of WWII. Compounding the terrestrial disputes in the area, Japan and China also 
disagree as to the boundaries of their national EEZs and ADIZs, which overlap in the 
waters around the island chain.327 
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While neither side is willing to abandon its claims, China won some concessions 
in 1990 after characterizing Japan’s formal recognition of a lighthouse as a demonstration 
of Tokyo’s hegemonic ambitions and nascent right-wing militarism. Protests broke out all 
over China as the public expressed fears that this construction supported Japanese 
aspirations for control and invasion of Chinese territory. To mollify critics and reassure 
China as to his peaceful intentions in the ECS, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu 
agreed to open bilateral discussions to negotiate joint exploration and fishing treaties in 
the disputed waters. Kaifu also conceded that Japan would not consider the lighthouse an 
official beacon or dispatch self-defense force (SDF) troops to defend its claims. To 
further atone for arousing historical resentments and long memories, Japan ended its 
economic ban and approved a loan of 810 billion yen of ODA to boost the Chinese 
economy.328 These actions led the way for other nations to resume trade and loans and to 
lift global economic sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. 
Thus, China successfully used its baleful history with Japan to garner economic benefits 
and reinforce its interests in the ECS.329 
In July and August 1996, a tumbling sequence of Japanese actions strongly 
validated China’s allegation that Japan lacked remorse for its war crimes in WWII. 
During this time, Japanese activists constructed another lighthouse and petitioned the 
government to have it recognized as an official heritage site. At the same time, Tokyo 
ratified the UNCLOS policy, which allows Japan to defend a 200-nm EEZ that overlaps 
with China’s EEZ in the ECS. The UNCLOS policy also recognizes the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands as Japanese territory. Besides these provocations, revised U.S.–Japan 
security/defense guidelines were announced that expanded Japan’s military and security 
roles in the region. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made an  
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official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and a right-wing politician received considerable 
media attention by insisting that the Chinese government fabricated the Nanking Incident 
to embarrass Japan and provoke anti-Japanese sentiment. Shortly after, a Japanese 
nationalist group physically proclaimed Japanese sovereignty on one of the disputed 
islands, erected a Shinto shrine, planted a Japanese imperial flag, and conducted a 
ceremony to honor Japanese soldiers slain in WWII. From the Chinese perspective, this 
roster of outrages confirmed Japan’s unrepentance for its transgressions in Asia. In 
addition, Japanese official support given to nationalistic actions in the ECS were an 
indication of Tokyo’s growing militarism—a familiar historical sentiment. 330 
These and other Japanese actions prompted an aggressive Chinese military 
response and ignited severe protests and demonstrations in China. Beijing further 
escalated tensions by deploying two ballistic submarines to defend China’s claim to the 
disputed islands.331 A spokesman for the foreign ministry, Shen Guofeng, castigated 
Japanese actions and historical amnesia and threatened to suspend diplomatic relations, 
stating 
giving a green light to these actions and remarks of the Japanese right-
wing groups . . . Japan has failed to arrive at what is a right understanding 
of history. The Japanese government therefore should have a sober-
minded perspective and clear understanding as regards this issue. 
Otherwise, Sino-Japanese relations would be seriously affected.332  
The following year, Beijing denounced Japanese aggression and fueled the uproar 
by publicizing the 60th anniversary of the invasion of Manchuria and the Marco Polo 
Bridge incident. Chinese officials gave little attention to the concurrent 25th anniversary 
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of normalized Sino-Japanese relations.333 This spotlight on Japanese remorselessness and 
misdeeds was important in justifying future escalation of Chinese military activity in the 
ECS. 
From 1999 to 2000, a number of widely publicized statements by Japanese 
officials reinforced China’s fears. As governor of Tokyo in 1999, Ishihara Shintaro 
accused China of using Japanese ODA to boost its weapons program.334 Vice Minister of 
Parliament Nishimura Shingo advocated that Japanese aircraft carriers defend sea lanes 
around Taiwan and Japanese territories in the ECS and suggested that Japan develop a 
nuclear weapons program.335 The implicit support given to these outspoken politicians in 
Japan was widespread and, to China, dangerous. Tensions centered on the ECS continued 
through 2000, when Japanese activists built a shrine on another disputed island, exciting 
renewed protest from China.336 
In reaction to Japanese rhetoric in 1999 and inflammatory activism in 2000, China 
attacked Japan repeatedly for its selective memory and ineradicable militarism, while 
increasing surveillance patrols in the ECS. A memorial war garden was opened in the 
heart of Beijing, featuring sculpture groups depicting imperial war crimes. A Chinese 
petition was made to have the WWII Japanese experimental germ-warfare base in Harbin 
named a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
world-heritage site.337 China also found implicit militarism in a program of regional 
antipiracy exercises by the Japanese navy. To express indignation against Japan’s 
maritime exercises and other examples of militarism, Beijing cancelled a visit by 
Japanese transportation minister Morita Hajime because of his recent visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. In the latter part of 2000, China stepped up ECS surveillance patrols 
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around the Japanese EEZ. As before, historical narratives were invoked to justify these 
actions, providing Beijing with an excuse to drop diplomatic negotiations, flex military 
force, and assert Chinese dominance in the region. Hence, when China felt its security 
interests in the ECS were threatened, China highlighted Japan’s past and used history to 
justify more assertive actions to counter Japanese control over the islands. In addition, 
when Japan would express nationalist sentiments or convey ideas supporting the 
expansion of its power, China reopened the wounds of history by commemorating events 
related to Japan’s wartime atrocities further downgrading relations.338  
2. Chinese Reaction to U.S.–Japan Security Developments, 1996 and 
1999 
The U.S.-Japanese security alliance was long seen by China as a U.S. containment 
of Japanese military capacity; but in 1996, China shifted its view upon the release of new 
U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines that it perceived as containing Chinese capabilities and 
encouraging Japanese military expansion under U.S. auspices.339 China viewed the 
alliance as mutually coercive toward China, allowing Japan to disguise its ulterior 
militaristic motives while giving the United States a legal footing for containing Chinese 
ambition.340 With China as a new target of the revised guidelines, the alliance now 
enabled greater Japanese defense capabilities—potentially opening the door for a revival 
of Japanese militarism—and suggested a possible loosening of strictures in Japan’s 
“peace constitution.”341 Beijing also identified assertive new policies regarding U.S.-
Japanese research on a theater missile defense (TMD) program that could potentially be 
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used offensively against China.342 The new guidelines were a hot issue through the late 
1990s and were used by China to justify increasing its inventory of both defensive and 
offensive weapons and beefing up its response capabilities to meet any challenges 
presented by the revised Japanese and U.S. roles in the alliance.343  
The 1996 revised defense policies caution the international community of the 
growing threat of China, to which a senior Chinese analyst retorted that the U.S.-Japanese 
security alliance makes “China the new objective.”344 The guidelines list situations 
capable of threatening regional Asian-Pacific stability as including “unresolved territorial 
disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction,”345 all three of which apply to China. Thus, Beijing’s aggressive actions in 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and Taiwan Straits crisis and its nuclear weapons program 
are key issues in the revised alliance. The guidelines call for China to “play a positive and 
constructive role” in ensuring the political security of the region.346 But the changes in 
American troop levels, agreements to exchange and develop military technology and 
systems, and the potential development of joint military bases discussed in the plan 
served to strengthen the American presence in East Asia and improve Japanese clout. 
Ultimately, China’s vehement protests and saber rattling created a stronger security 
posture for Japan, more U.S. military presence in East Asia, and a closer U.S.-Japanese 
alliance.347 
China fears and resents Japan’s increased involvement in regional security 
problems as encouraging militarism and violating Article 9—the peace provisions of the 
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Japanese constitution. Thomas Christiansen finds that many China analysts anticipate that 
the strengthened SDF capabilities and roles within the alliance may nurse the Japanese 
tendency to nationalism, unraveling its postwar pacifistic culture and removing restraints 
against the use of force in political matters.348 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser note 
that Chinese scholars warn that allowing Japan to build up its military for collective self-
defense may open the door to increased regional aggression.349 Another Chinese analyst 
warned Garrett and Glaser of Japan’s history of claiming self-defense in justifying 
regional force and noted that “after World War I, the Japanese government invaded 
Shandong under the excuse of rescuing its citizens.”350 Chinese elites echo these 
sentiments, cautioning that the modified alliance encourages Japanese national patterns 
that have been a root cause of aggression against Chinese sovereignty in the past.351 Thus 
Sino-Japanese history is cited as a reason to oppose stronger security measures for Japan.  
Chinese elites argued that the peace provisions in Article 9 were a necessary 
control to prevent Japan from reverting to its inherent militarism.352 Chinese scholars 
have expressed concerns that the revised agreement presented an opportunity to remove 
limitations on armed conflict and empower a nationalistic agenda. An article in the 
People’s Daily warned that if Japan tried to reinterpret or revise Article 9 to strengthen its 
military, there was “reason to worry that Japan will move towards remilitarization.”353 A 
prominent Chinese scholar noted that the revised alliance no longer provided a “cork in 
the bottle” to contain Japan, but was merely an “eggshell for Japan to develop its 
conventional high-tech military strength.”354 China feared that constitutional changes 
would give Japan legal authority to back up diplomacy with military force. 
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Beijing insisted that development of a joint U.S.-Japanese TMD program, even if 
ostensibly for defense, would strengthen Japan’s offensive capabilities against China.355 
A TMD-armed Japan would be an unacceptable reality for a China with deep memories 
of Japanese abuse of power. The revised alliance might be exploited to simultaneously 
strengthen Japan’s military power and encourage policies and attitudes of militarism and 
nationalism—a cultural coalescence that swept Japanese political ideology before World 
War I and led to the invasion of China on two major occasions. Chinese analysts 
reconsidered China’s ability to counter potential military threats from the revised 
alliance. Chinese scientists also advised new weapons systems and multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to boost China’s nuclear deterrence 
capability and counter any future Japanese TMD program.356  
Chinese elites protested and challenged the ratification of the new guidelines in 
1999 by highlighting Japanese past militarism in Asia and defiant military actions in the 
ECS. The Guangming Daily called the revised agreement a “bill for general [Japanese] 
mobilization.”357 According to June Teufel Dreyer, the article identifies the alliance as a 
way to ensure U.S. support for Japan’s “old dream of becoming a great power that had 
led to World War II.”358 Krista E. Wiegand correlates China’s various attempts at 
coercive anti-Japanese diplomacy with the time line of the revised defense guidelines, as 
presented in Table 2.359 In 1996 and 1999, Beijing used diplomatic or military coercion 
on six occasions to oppose the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and Japan’s increased 
military influence.360  
 
                                                 
355 Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 64–67, 70–73, 75–76; Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese 
Apprehension,” 392–95. 
356 Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehension,” 394; Ding, “Viewpoint: China’s Concerns,” 93–100. 
357 Dreyer, “Sino-Japanese Relations,” 379. 
358 Ibid. 
359 Wiegand, “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu,” 179. 
360 Ibid. 
 116
Table 2.   Selected Reactions to Revised U.S.-Japanese Defense Guidelines, 
1996–1999  
Date Event  Known Chinese government reactions 
against Japan
*Related Chinese historical 
grievance 
July 1996 Ratification of UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea; joint statement 
on renewed defense guidelines in 
the U.S.-Japanese Security 
Alliance 
Deployment of two submarines to the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
China’s promulgation of historical 
territorial disputes in the ECS to 
protest the events. 
September 
1996 
Joint statement on renewed defense 
guidelines in the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance 
Warships dispatched to waters around 
the islands; joint air force, navy, army 
maneuvers; mock blockade of island 
chain 
China’s promulgation of historical 
territorial disputes in the ECS to 
protest the events. 
October 
1996 
Joint statement on renewed defense 
guidelines in the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance 
PLAN military surveillance around 
islands 
China’s promulgation of historical 




Joint statement on renewed defense 
guidelines in the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance 
Official claim of sovereignty before the 
UN 
China’s promulgation of historical 
territorial disputes in the ECS to 
protest event. 
May 1999 Japanese bill ratifying and 
reaffirming renewed defense 
guidelines in the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance 
Warships dispatched to waters 
surrounding islands 
China’s promulgation of historical 
territorial disputes in the ECS to 
protest event. 
July 1999 Japanese bill ratifying and 
reaffirming renewed defense 
guidelines in the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance 
Chinese naval drills conducted near 
islands 
China’s promulgation of historical 
territorial disputes in the ECS to 
protest event. 
This table correlates Chinese government and military responses in the ECS to the revised U.S.-Japan joint 
security guidelines in 1996 and 1999. *The “Related Chinese historical grievance column” and the data 
therein added by the thesis author. 361  
 
In all cases noted by Wiegand, China linked historical disputes in the ECS with 
the renewed alliance to constrain the power of its chief antagonist and reinforce Chinese 
interests.362 Beijing’s apprehension that the alliance invited resurgent militarism spurred 
aggressive military posturing and protest. China’s historically based concerns neither 
slowed down nor altered the trajectory of Japan’s military expansion. Rather, Japan 
pressed forward in fulfilling its interests. However, China’s loud rehearsal of Japan’s 
military and cultural history gave cover to its own pursuit of expanded defense programs 
and national interests while also undermining Japan’s reputation. While China’s  
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cultivation of historical grievances contributed to a rising security dilemma and Sino-
Japanese tensions in this period, it was advantageous in excusing Chinese muscle flexing 
in the region.363 
3. Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin Demands a Formal Written Apology, 
1998 
In 1998, Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin’s overplay of the history card caused a 
diplomatic offensive against Japan to backfire. Jiang demanded a formal written apology 
from Japan for wartime iniquities and a pledge to abide by China’s “three no’s” policy on 
Taiwan: “no support for two Chinas, no support for one Taiwan and one China, [and] no 
support for Taiwan’s entry into international organizations for which statehood is a 
prerequisite.”364 In early 1998, the United States officially supported the three no’s. 
Shortly thereafter, Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi presented to South Korean 
President Kim Dae Jung a formal written apology expressing deep remorse and contrition 
for Japan’s war conduct in Korea.365 This was Japan’s first written apology to any 
country, made with the hope that South Korean leaders would respond forgivingly and 
begin a new chapter with Japan.366 As the first Chinese head of state to visit Japan 
officially, Jiang was determined to receive both a similar written apology and support of 
the three no’s.367  
In contrast to their gracious exchange with South Korea, Japanese diplomats 
doubted that China sincerely desired to make amends or had motivation to shelve 
historical grievances, and were thus wary of offering a formal written apology. Agreeing 
to Beijing’s three no’s and decrying Japan’s sins would elevate China’s moral standing 
over their own, confirm Jiang’s diplomatic power in the region, and be used to ensure  
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that Japan’s reputation remains forever blackened. Jiang, a harsh critic of Japanese 
historical amnesia, routinely chided Japan for failure to repent of WWII and had designed 
China’s patriotic education campaign, which promoted strong anti-Japanese rhetoric. An 
article in the New York Times stated, “‘While President Kim made it clear that he would 
like to settle past history,’ Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura told reporters, 
‘it was not necessarily the case’ with President Jiang.”368 Hence, Japan refused the three-
no’s policy and offered only a spoken expression of remorse.369  
Jiang took offense at Japan’s unsatisfactory apology and resistance to the three 
no’s as an affront to China’s regional interests and spent the balance of the visit blistering 
Japan for its historical amnesia, attempting to browbeat a written apology from Obuchi. 
Japan refused to bend, repeating both its verbal apology and citing the 1972 Sino-
Japanese joint statement on the status of Taiwan as sound policy.370 Jiang continued his 
castigation, declaring ‘‘Some Japanese, even in high positions, have distorted history and 
tried to gloss over Japan’s invasion of China.’’371 In a dinner with the Japanese emperor, 
Jiang criticized Japan’s unwillingness to confront its guilt. In a bilateral meeting, Jiang 
railed for 25 minutes, demanding agreement to the three no’s, criticizing Japan’s 
convenient memory, and insisting that the term “apology” be included in a forthcoming 
joint Sino-Japanese communiqué.372  
Although the media reported the visit a success, diplomats on both sides 
considered the episode a failure for China.373 Japanese officials were gravely insulted and 
hardened their stance of refusing China a written apology. The Japanese public was 
disgusted by Jiang’s rudeness before the emperor and his message of bitterness versus 
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cooperation going forward.374 To avoid domestic criticism, the Chinese media barely 
covered the historic visit as Jiang’s actions had embarrassed China.375 Jiang was 
perceived by both his adversaries and constituents as having overplayed his hand through 
his obsessively punishing behavior, quashing any hope of improved Sino-Japanese 
relations that might have come from the visit. This case demonstrates an unsuccessful 
episode in which history was employed by China as a tool to coerce and control Japan, 
which strongly contributed to the downturn of relations during this period.376  
C. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 2003–2006 
During this time, China continued to use history in attempt to contain Japan’s rise 
while taking actions to maximize its own relative power to maintain a political advantage 
over Japan and secure national interests. As China became a growing exporter of 
manufactured goods with greater monetary affluence, it began to use its newfound 
economic success to increase its military capability and influence in the region. 
Meanwhile, nationalism and revisionist right-wing policies began to take root in Japanese 
politics fringing on Japan’s desire to break away from its pacifist identity. History 
became an irreconcilable dispute that permeated nearly every aspect of bilateral 
diplomacy. As depicted in figure 12, during this period, China’s use of history is seen 
mainly in its debates over sovereignty, its condemnation of Yasukuni Shrine visits 
by Japanese dignitaries, and the obstruction of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in 
the UNSC.  
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Balance of power played a weaker role in explaining the downturn of relations as Beijing seemed to merely 
react to the surge of anti-Japanese sentiments. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or 
strong contributions (arrow sizes) to either positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The 
upper half of the figure depicts events most affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half 
of the figure depicts events most affected by the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow 
placement (above or below) was determined by which hypothesis better represented the event. 
Figure 12.  Period of Discord: 2003–2006 (Balance of Power) 
1. Renewed Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Disputes in 2004–2005 and 
Yasukuni Shrine Visits 
In March 2004, after somewhat cooperative negotiations, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute reemerged as a volatile issue, exacerbated by China’s linkage of the 
dispute with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Hostilities arose after China threatened to withdraw cooperation because a group of  
Chinese activists had been detained by Japanese officials for landing on a disputed island. 
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without condition, declaring that failure to do so would damage relations. Koizumi 
released the activists without delay; but China insisted on using the occasion to denounce 
Japan’s pretensions to the islands. A spokesman from the vice foreign ministry asserted 
China’s historical claims, stating, “the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory from 
ancient times over which China has indisputable sovereignty” and Japan has “illegally 
detained seven Chinese citizens who landed on China’s own Diaoyu Island.”377 From the 
Chinese viewpoint, Japan’s claim to the islands symbolized a past humiliation of 
conquest and aggression in East Asia that had yet to be corrected.378 To signal further 
resentment, Beijing cancelled negotiations concerning UNCLOS joint maritime 
exploration around the islands.379  
China took pains to ensure that the island dispute was increasingly associated with 
the Yasukuni Shrine visits and Japanese nationalism. In a high-level meeting with 
Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi after the arrest and release of the Chinese 
citizens, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao protested Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, 
while referencing territorial disputes in the ECS.380 He had condemned the visits on 
previous occasions, identifying them as causing “the main problems in China-Japan 
relations.”381 At a meeting with Kawaguchi, Wen warned that right-wing nationalism and 
failure to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the islands threatened the future of bilateral 
engagements.382 An editorial in the Daily Yomiuri accused China of using the Yasukuni 
Shrine controversy as a “bargaining chip in its dealings with Japan.”383 In asserting that 
the shrine visits jeopardized bilateral negotiations, China sought leverage in the 
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Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. Positive high-level diplomacy became predicated on a 
symbolic factor: avoidance of the Yasukuni Shrine.384 
Responding in part to the escalating disputes in the ECS, Japanese SDF military 
exercises targeted at China, and another renewal of the U.S.-Japanese security defense 
guidelines in 2004, both China and Japan took military action that heightened bilateral 
tensions. China deployed a nuclear Han-class submarine to patrol disputed waters in the 
ECS and around Japan’s EEZ to project China’s resolve toward possible threats. China 
also warned Japan to temper any contemplated display of power or militaristic stance. In 
response, the Japanese launched P-3 aircraft, two destroyers, and antisubmarine 
helicopter units to intercept the submarine, and Tokyo accused Beijing of provocation. 
China dismissed Japan’s alarm and denounced the accusations as “full of imagination” 
and merely an excuse to challenge Chinese “sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and 
territory in the East China Sea.”385 In this case, China used the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
augmented by the symbolism associated with the Yasukuni Shrine, to thumb its nose at 
the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and justify its deployment of the military to contain Japan’s 
ambitions.386 
In 2005, China suspended top-level bilateral negotiations on the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Island dispute and arranged shows of military force, in part to protest Koizumi’s visits to 
the Yasukuni Shrine. In the fall of 2005, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
sent five armed reconnaissance ships to patrol island waters just weeks before 
negotiations on joint exploration in the ECS were to take place. Beijing also announced 
the establishment of a special PLAN fleet charged specifically with protecting Chinese 
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dominance over the islands. Krista Wiegand and Reinhard Drifte argue that, among other 
objectives, China’s flaunting of its military was to protest Koizumi’s frequenting of the 
shrine.387 Unswayed by China’s performance, Koizumi visited the shrine a week later, 
whereupon Beijing cancelled all negotiations until such time as Koizumi agreed to quit 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi refused, and his subsequent visits precipitated a 
high-level diplomatic stalemate. China had used the shrine as leverage to set the terms of 
Sino-Japanese negotiation and define the nature of the conflict in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute, pushing bilateral relations to another low.388  
2. China Vetoes Japan’s Bid for a Permanent Seat at the United Nations, 
2005 
Chinese elites composed an historical narrative in 2005 to support China’s veto of 
a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC and curb Japanese ambitions for greater 
influence at the regional and international level. After its brutal conduct in Asia, crushing 
defeat, and economic depression following WWII, Japan had worked to regain global 
trust and status. Its acceptance into the United Nations (UN) in 1956 allowed Japan to 
bolster its standing and benefit from Western-led institutions and international 
organizations.389  
Japan used membership in the UNSC to reestablish national legitimacy after 
WWII, building support, prestige, and influence. In the 1980s, Japan became the second-
largest contributor to the UNSC.390 By 2000, Japan was funding over 20 percent of the 
UN budget and had become a major donor of aid to developing countries.391  
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Nevertheless, Japan enjoyed only minor political power due to its limited membership 
status. In addition, as early as the 1990s, some countries began characterizing the 
membership of the UNSC as elitist and called for reforms to make the body more 
representative of all world regions, not just those of the P5.392 However, in 2005, 
Secretary General Kofi Annan indirectly alluded to Japan393 in advocating that the UNSC 
“increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United 
Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically.”394 At that time, China contributed 
only 3 percent of the UN budget.395 On a diplomatic visit to Tokyo in March 2005, 
secretary of state Condoleezza Rice affirmed U.S. support for Japan as a permanent 
UNSC member.396 To increase international support, Japan allied with Germany, India, 
and Brazil to reinforce one another’s bid for a permanent seat.397  
These reform proposals were an opportunity for Japan to gain a diplomatic 
vantage point from which to challenge China’s regional dominance. As a Japanese 
spokesman observed, “In the 21st Century, China will be such a big country that it can 
threaten Japan’s security. For Japan’s tool-less diplomacy, there is only the Security 
Council to check China.”398 With a permanent seat, Japan would be well positioned to 
dampen China’s influence on Asian security and politics—a reality that would not be  
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well taken by Beijing. China had long been suspicious of Japan’s ties with the United 
States, and a permanent UNSC seat alongside its closest security ally might lead to the 
engagement of Japanese troops in UN-led operations worldwide—an intolerable 
advantage that could violate the Japanese constitution and jumpstart militarism.399  
In its approach to this diplomatic problem, China first demurred from endorsing 
Japan’s request for a seat, then, to build opposition, publicized Japan’s atrocity denials 
and unrepentance. Beijing’s initial arguments were that new permanent membership 
should be reserved for developing nations, decisions should not be rushed, and candidates 
should be thoroughly vetted.400 China’s intention of playing the history card was 
foreshadowed, however, in a response to Koizumi’s UN address of September 2004. The 
Chinese foreign minister stated, “If a country wishes to play a responsible role in 
international affairs, it must have a clear understanding of the historical questions 
concerning itself.”401 Japan’s failure to examine its past and apologize properly was 
clearly what China was referring to.402 
China’s official position was unveiled in the spring of 2005, when a petition 
against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat reached 22.2 million signatures403 and ignited 
massive anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China. These public demonstrations  
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were motivated primarily by Sino-Japanese history.404 An official with the Chinese 
foreign ministry, Liu Jianchao, stated, “Japan has to take a responsible attitude toward 
history to build trust among the people of Asia, including China.”405 The uproar in China 
gained international attention as Japan was condemned for its historical amnesia and 
inherent desires for militarism. Japan accused China, in return, of overreaction and the 
cynical wielding of history as a bludgeon. By April 15, 2005, Wen declared that allowing 
Japan a permanent UNSC seat would be internationally irresponsible, and he further 
stated that “only a country that respects its history, takes responsibility for history, and 
wins over the trust of the peoples in Asia and the world at large can take greater 
responsibilities in the international community.”406 Foreign ministry representative Qin 
Gang also criticized “Japan’s erroneous attitude and actions on issues such as its history 
of aggression.”407 A China Daily interview of the China ambassador to the UN, Wang 
Guanya, confirmed Beijing’s determination to checkmate Japan.408 Implying that Japan 
was morally unfit, Wang stated that the granting of a permanent seat would be a 
“dangerous move and certainly China will oppose it.”409 In a show of indignation and 
protest against Japan’s seared conscience, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi cancelled a 
meeting with Koizumi in Tokyo. Chinese foreign-relations scholar Shi Yinhong, of the 
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maintained to ensure its political dominance in Asia.410 Shi declared that “the moral issue 
is China’s trump card over Japan. . . . China is now playing that card.”411 Historical 
grievances drove Beijing’s arguments as its opposition to a permanent seat became 
explicit. Once again, Chinese outrage over Japan’s past actions gave shape and weight to 
China’s otherwise weak objections to a seat for Japan and discouraged criticism of its 
intended veto.412 
Japan struggled to maintain face under China’s blistering contempt. Responding 
to Chinese protests and threats, Koizumi apologized for Japan’s wartime conduct and 
pledged that his country would continue to promote international peace.413 Diplomat 
Yochi Funibashi complained that China’s promulgation of history is something than can 
never be forgotten and “leaves China looking like it has moral superiority over 
Japan”414—a key advantage in the game of political dominance in Asia. 
Japan’s defense made little difference, however, and support dwindled. UN Chief 
of Staff Malloch Brown averred that all nations seeking a permanent seat on the UNSC 
“need to listen to their regions and give their regions assurance that they are not going to 
use their membership to settle scores within the region.”415 Owing in part to international 
criticism based on China’s invocation of Sino-Japanese history and disputes, the United 
States withdrew its support for Japan’s bid.416 On July 14, 2005, the U.S. ambassador to 
the UN, Tahir-Kheli, announced that “the U.S. does not think any proposal to expand the  
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Security Council—including one based on our own ideas—should be voted upon at this 
stage.”417 By August 2005, the United States and China opposed any additional reforms 
to UNSC membership, thus sealing Japan’s future in the UNSC.418 Kent Calder observed 
that “China is emerging as a skilled diplomatic player that can use the history card more 
effectively to marginalize Japan than previously due to its growing political and  
economic clout.”419 China’s exploitation of historical grievances and fears, coupled with 
its implicit support of rampant domestic anti-Japanese protests, humiliated Japan and 
blocked access to greater power and prestige—a clear realpolitik victory that contained 
Japan’s power but came at the expense of cooperative bilateral relations. 
D. PERIOD OF DISCORD: 2010– 2016 
While China’s power has been climbing since the normalization of bilateral 
relations in 1972, this period of conflict reflects a more dramatic Sino-Japanese power 
transition in the region and brings relations between Beijing and Tokyo to another 
significant low. During this time, China’s growing economic and military power, coupled 
with its aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas, has alarmed neighboring 
countries. By 2015, China was the number one exporter of manufactured goods, 
controlled over 20 percent of the world’s GDP, and surpassed Japan as the second-largest 
economy (based on nominal GDP) in the world.420 Meanwhile, China increased its 
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of fishing-enforcement ships, modern surveillance and patrol ships, and China’s first 
aircraft carrier, the Liaoning.421 Advanced air assets were acquired, including the latest 
Chengdu J-20 supersonic fighter jet,422 Russian-designed Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-E jet 
fighters,423 and the Gyrfalcon FC-31 stealth fighter.424 In 2016, the New York Times  
reported China’s testing of a new small-yield nuclear weapon, or “hypersonic glide 
vehicle,” that could potentially defeat any existing missile defense.425 Not coincidentally, 
tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands skyrocketed, with massive public protests in 
China, daily incursions of Chinese ships and planes into disputed Japanese territorial 
waters, and the declaration of a Chinese ADIZ. With a more advanced and capable 
military to back up its plans for the ECS, China threatened Japan’s security in the region. 
Since 2010, as shown in Figure 13, disputes in the ECS have become a focal point 
in Sino-Japanese relations.426 The three key phenomena discussed in this section are (1) 
Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012, (2) China’s reaction to 
the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013, and (3) continuing issues in 2014–
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2016: the Yasukuni Shrine, international recognition of China’s historical grievances, and 
military escalation in the ECS.  
 
Sino-Japanese relations reached another low beginning with events in the ECS in 2010 and escalating in 
2012 with Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and continued its trajectory of discord. 
Balance of power played a very strong role in explaining the downturn of bilateral relations during this 
time. History-related events are depicted as weak, moderate or strong contributions (arrow sizes) to either 
positive (green) or negative (red) Sino-Japanese relations. The upper half of the figure depicts events most 
affected by collective memory (Hypothesis 1). The lower half of the figure depicts events most affected by 
the balance of power (Hypothesis 2). For this thesis, arrow placement (above or below) was determined by 
which hypothesis better represented the event.  
Figure 13.  Period of Discord: 2010–2016 (Balance of Power) 
1. Japan’s Nationalization of the Disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, 
2012 
In 2012, Japan’s nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands hastened 
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11, 2012, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that his government had purchased 
three of the five Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for 2.05 billion yen.427 This news was met with 
massive anti-Japanese protests in China, accusations of Japanese remilitarism in Asia, 
and escalated Chinese maritime activity in the ECS.428 The purchase was meant to ease 
hostilities over the disputed territory by preventing Tokyo governor Ishihara from 
purchasing the islands for development—which would have upset the status quo of 
Japanese governmental control and bilateralism vis-a-vis China.429 The plan backfired, 
however; China vociferously objected to the purchase and rallied domestic criticism, 
precipitating a critical deterioration in bilateral relations and contributing to the downfall 
of Noda’s government.430 
On the domestic front, the CCP acquiesced to massive protests and riots that 
began almost immediately following the announcement that Japan had nationalized the 
islands. On September 18, the anniversary of the Mukden Incident marking Japan’s 
invasion of China, hundreds of demonstrations broke out and a call to boycott Japanese 
goods gained traction on the Internet. The tumult drew international headlines and 
criticism to Noda’s administration as Chinese officials blamed the unrest on Japan’s 
illegal assertions and invalid claims and its determined inability to face history. 
Rehearsing a familiar refrain, the CCP capitalized on widespread public reaction to 
condemn historical offenses allegedly repeated in the present.431 
In concert with the riots, Beijing officials dramatized Japan’s hidden right-wing 
nationalistic agenda and aggressive military deception of the international community. At 
a UN general assembly meeting, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi protested the purchase by 
reciting China’s ancient claim to the islands and its wrongful seizure after the First Sino-
Japanese War in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. A spokesman from the Chinese foreign 
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ministry, Qin Gang, identified Japanese claims to the islands as evidence of revived 
nationalism and right-wing militaristic ambitions of controlling Chinese territory as in the 
early 20th century. Qin warned Japan to “stop all acts that undermine China’s territorial 
sovereignty instead of making repeated mistakes and deceiving the whole world.”432 Qin 
referred to Japan’s infringements on other Asian countries and its militaristic agenda, 
cloaked by its so-called commitment to peace. Noda clarified his intentions and called for 
a cooperative resolution to the dispute. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang rejected Noda’s 
explanation, reasserted Chinese sovereignty, and lambasted Japan for failing to return the 
islands after WWII. Yang, further accused Japan of overthrowing the postwar status quo 
and once again disrupting regional peace. Noda argued that since the end of the war, 
Japan had been a peaceable nation with no militaristic agenda. However, Noda inflamed 
hostilities by reasserting that no dispute existed because Japanese sovereignty over the 
islands rested on the UNCLOS policies of terra nullis and international law. China 
accused Japan of resurrecting its past militarism under the deceit of international law to 
strengthen its argument, denounced Japan’s claims in the ECS, and forced Japan to 
submit to the existence of a territorial disputes between the countries. However, Japan 
only hardened its position, forcing China to escalate its presence in the ECS to strengthen 
its claims. 433 
To challenge Japan’s claim to unilateral administrative control in the surrounding 
waters, China stood by its version of history and reinforced its posture by raising its 
military presence in the area. Maritime patrols and Chinese marine surveillance (CMS) 
aircraft, government fishery ships, and PLAN warships conducting exercises or loitering 
around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands became a norm in the region. Within three months of 
the purchase, Chinese ships had entered Japanese territorial waters 17 times.434 On 
December 13, 2012, as China commemorated the 75th anniversary of the Nanjing 
Massacre, a maritime surveillance aircraft entered Japanese airspace over the islands, the 
                                                 




first direct intrusion over the islands.435 The JASDF “scrambled eight F-15 fighter jets” to 
intercept the Chinese craft.436 In reply, Beijing decried Japanese incursions into Chinese 
territorial waters and airspace and asserted that routine patrols by CMS aircraft were 
“completely normal.”437 In this case, to support national interests and diminish Japanese 
influence in the ECS, China used the history issue to break Japanese administrative 
control over the islands and justify increased maritime activity.438 
Adding to the diplomatic chaos was a political transition viewed as disturbing by 
China. On Japan’s domestic home front, the public had grown weary of Japan’s 
stagnating economy along with Noda’s crippling taxation legislation, the government’s 
handling of the triple disaster, and Noda’s party’s inability to productively unite divided 
political factions.439 In addition, the people of Japan held Noda largely to blame for 
mishandling the territorial disputes of 2012 and doubted his government’s competency to 
manage diplomacy with China.440 Election polls predicted a win for Shinzo Abe—a right-
wing nationalist and ardent supporter of the Yasukuni Shrine—as prime minister. Noda’s 
fall in popularity and eventual resignation reflected the degree to which Japanese 
domestic politics are heavily influenced by China’s use of history and the islands 
disputes.  
In response to the change in prime ministers, on election day China dispatched its 
largest and newly updated fisheries law enforcement command ship to conduct 
operations within Japanese waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, signaling 
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readiness to confront Abe’s government.441 A spokesman from the Chinese foreign 
ministry characterized increased maritime and air patrols around the islands as necessary 
to “defend national territorial sovereignty as well as [China’s] maritime rights and 
interests.”442 He also stated that the islands “have been China’s inherent territory since 
ancient times.”443 Thus, the ECS became the battlefield where the Chinese government 
used history to challenge the right-wing policies of the new Japanese administration.444 
In this period, China invoked historical injustices to neutralize Japanese actions in 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, support advantageous public protests, and justify increased 
military aggression in the ECS. To a degree, the Chinese elites hardened their rhetoric 
against Japan and took more aggressive actions in the ECS to show support for their 
domestic constituents. The Chinese elites also used the rise of anti-Japanese public 
opinion to strengthen their own protests against Japan and justify an accelerated military 
agenda to challenge Japanese sovereignty in the ECS. However, this strategy did little to 
gain concessions from Japan or influence Japanese policies to China’s advantage. Rather, 
it locked down Japan’s position, escalated tensions, increased the risk of military 
confrontation, and garnered Japanese domestic support for hawkish leadership. China’s 
deployment of history led only to increased conflict and a downward spiral of action and 
reaction.  
2. China versus Abe in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute, 2013 
In 2013, China’s fears of an emergent nationalistic, militaristic Japan seemed 
fulfilled with the election of Shinzo Abe, an ardent supporter of the War-Bereaved 
                                                 





Families Association445 and an outspoken nationalist. China immediately took the 
offensive through rhetoric and military activity. Within his first month of office, Abe 
increased Japan’s defense budget to over 4.6804 trillion yen to support defense measures 
in the ECS—the first increase in 11 years.446 In February 2013, Abe told the Washington 
Post that China’s patriotic education campaign had biased the Chinese public by 
mischaracterizing Japanese actions in WWII and had become a primary cause of bilateral 
tensions.447 In March, Abe denounced the Tokyo War Tribunals of 1945 as unfair and an 
example of “victor’s justice.”448 In April, Abe defended the Yasukuni Shrine, 
encouraging the largest attendance in eight years of Japanese officials at the shrine’s 
spring festival. The same month, Abe announced that his administration would no longer 
honor the 1995 Murayama apology for Japan’s wartime conduct in Asia and proclaimed 
that a new statement would be finalized for the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. 
Intentionally or not, Abe deeply affronted the Chinese when a photo was released 
of him posing with a smile and thumbs-up in a Japanese military jet with “731” 
emblazoned on the side—the number of an Imperial Japanese unit guilty of horrendous  
biological and chemical experimentation on thousands of Chinese civilians during the 
war.449 In addition, Abe called for the legal reinterpretation or revision of Japan’s peace 
constitution to allow collective self-defense roles for Japan’s military. Abe confirmed 
Japan’s unwavering defense of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and EEZ in the ECS under 
the rubric of “proactive pacifism” and accused China of using force to disrupt the settled 
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issue of Japanese administrative control.450 By the end of the year, Abe formally visited 
the Yasukuni Shrine—the first prime-ministerial visit since Koizumi’s in 2006. All these 
actions played to China’s fears.451 
Abe’s aggressive right-wing agenda in his first year led to sharp retaliatory 
criticism of Japan’s delusional understanding of its past. Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Hong Lei criticized Abe’s remarks on history, stating, “it is rare that a 
country’s leader brazenly distorts facts, attacks its neighbor, and instigates antagonism 
between regional countries.”452 Responding to Abe’s statement condemning Chinese use 
of force in the ECS, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying challenged Abe to 
“give up . . . [the] illusion” and “face squarely history and reality.”453 China defended the 
findings of the postwar military tribunal and accused Japan of revisionism: “There is 
always a force in Japan that is unwilling to accept its defeat” and desires to “challenge the 
postwar international order.”454 In response to alarming content in Japan’s National 
Institute for Defense Studies East Asian Strategic Review,455 China called for Japan to  
stop deceiving the world about why it was expanding its military and “come clean about 
its own defense policy.”456  
On the anniversary of the Mukden incident, Beijing denounced Japan’s presumed 
nationalist agenda and accused Japan of “creating and exaggerating conflicts deliberately 
as an excuse to arms expansion and modification of its military strategy . . . to find an 
excuse to amend its constitution, build up its military strength and adjust its military 
                                                 
450 Przystup, “Can We Talk?”  
451 Przystup, “Treading Troubled Waters”; Przystup, “Can We Talk?”  
452 Przystup, “Treading Troubled Waters.”  
453 Ibid.  
454 Ibid.  
455 National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2013, (Tokyo, Japan: Japan 
Times, 2013), www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2013.html; Przystup, “Treading 
Troubled Waters.” 
456 Przystup, “Treading Troubled Waters.” 
 137
policies.”457 A foreign ministry official warned, “given all negative moves taken by Japan 
on historical issues, Asian countries and the international community, including China, 
cannot but pay high attention and stay on high alert.”458 China again denounced the 
Yasukuni Shrine and stated that “only when the Japanese government faces history with 
the right attitude and can profoundly reflect on history will it march towards the future 
and develop a friendly and cooperative relationship with its neighboring countries and 
China.”459 At a G-20 summit in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Xinping called for 
Abe to abandon his revisionist agenda and correct Japan’s view of wartime and island 
history.460 As Abe refused to recant, the Chinese increased pressure, alleging nationalistic 
policies, historical amnesia, and a Japan’s hidden agenda of imperialism in East Asia. 
Hence both sides hardened their stances and neither side seemed willing to compromise. 
The more China challenged Japan’s historical amnesia, the more Abe and his 
administration retaliated with nationalistic and revisionist policies. China’s fears of rising 
Japanese power and regional influence with the Abe administration prompted Beijing to 
highlight historical grievances at nearly every opportunity in an attempt to contain 
Japanese ambitions for power. However, during Abe’s first year, China’s use of history 
was less effective in manipulating Japanese policies. Nonetheless, during this time China 
was able to capitalize on Japan’s historical amnesia to justify its own defense increases to 
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During Abe’s inaugural year, China strengthened its security measures and surged 
sea and air incursions into Japanese waters and airspace to flout Japan’s territorial claims 
in the ECS. China also announced a 10.7 percent increase in its defense budget—the third 
consecutive year the budget was increased by double digits.462 In January 2013, China 
announced plans for a fleet of ships to patrol ECS waters and effectively attrite Japanese 
administrative control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku area.463 The Japanese foreign ministry 
reported that Chinese incursions into Japanese airspace doubled from 156 in 2011 to 306 
in 2012.464 By April 2013, Chinese maritime or air incursions in primary or contiguous 
Japanese waters and airspace in the ECS were nearly continuous. On one occasion, a 
Japanese destroyer reported that a Chinese PLAN frigate had locked its radar on a 
JMSDF helicopter and destroyer on patrol. Although a Chinese officer admitted to the 
lock-ons, Beijing accused Japan of fabricating the incident as a ploy to divert attention 
from its own militaristic agenda. Again, China used the familiar refrain of historical 
disputes and claims of Japan’s reversion to military aggression and historical amnesia to 
justify defense modernization projects for amplified incursions in the ECS and to break 
Japanese control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.465  
Tensions in the ECS reached an apex in November 2013 when China declared an 
active ADIZ that overlapped Japanese-controlled areas, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
chain. Figure 14 depicts the overlapping EEZ boundaries in the ECS. Japan instantly 
objected and urged all Japanese commercial aircraft to continue normal navigation 






                                                 





ministry retorted by asserting China’s right to the ADIZ and accusing Japan of frustrating 
bilateral cooperation by “not fac[ing] up to history and reality and fail[ing] to adopt 
correct approaches on relevant issues.”466 After a month of tension, potential conflict, and 
international uproar over the safety of transiting aircraft,467 the parties signed an 
agreement to allow the safe passage of all aircraft. Despite the barrage of complaints 
regarding wartime atrocities, rewriting of history, illegal takings, and increasing 
aggression, Japan did not budge on its sovereignty claims in the ECS. Rather, China’s 
accusations and insistence on drawing equivalencies between past and present actions 
nearly led to open military conflict and international criticism. In this instance, China 
overplayed its history card, and instead of garnering support for its historical claims in 
the ECS, it brought international criticism and forced Beijing to back down from its 
aggressive stance to compromise with Japan. In addition, Japan’s strong response in 
challenging the ADIZ also garnered domestic support for Abe’s nationalistic policies 
against China. A December 2013 survey from the Sankei Shimbum reported that 87 
percent of the respondents perceived China’s actions in the ECS as “threatening” to 
Japan.468 In this case, China’s coercive use of history to justify an ADIZ to defend 
national interests in the ECS failed to break Japan’s control in the ECS and obviously 
contributed to bilateral tensions during this period. 469  
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This figure shows the disputed ADIZs and EEZs and the location of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
in the ECS. China still proclaims this ADIZ; however, as of January 2017, it has not actively enforced it. 
Figure 14.  China’s and Japan’s Overlapping ADIZs and EEZs in the ECS.470 
3. Yasukuni, Historical Promulgation at the International Level, and 
Engagements in the ECS, 2014–2016 
Historical differences continued with little resolve under the leadership of both 
Shinzo Abe and Xi Xinping in similar patterns in the years following 2013. The next 
section explores the main history-related flashpoints that contributed to the downturn of 
bilateral relations from 2014 to 2016: China’s continual protest of the Yasukuni Shrine, 
China’s promulgation of Japan’s historical aggression to the international community, 
and the escalation of maritime and air conflicts in the ECS. 
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a. Yasukuni Shrine Continued, 2014-2016 
The Chinese government’s reaction to Abe’s shrine visit in 2013 continued to 
overshadow bilateral relations. The foreign ministry claimed that Abe’s actions 
represented a “blatant whitewash and denial of Japan’s history of aggression and colonial 
rule [that] indicate[s] that Japan attempts to negate the outcome of World War II and the 
postwar international order.”471 A spokesman from the Chinese foreign ministry 
encouraged Abe to refrain from further pilgrimages and claimed that Abe had “severely 
damaged the political foundations of China-Japan relations.”472 A January 2014 editorial 
in the Telegraph by the Chinese ambassador to Great Britain alluded to Harry Potter, 
claiming that the revival of Japan’s militaristic nature was like the return of Voldemort to 
Asia and the shrine a dark and sacred horcrux, a source of evil power to revive Japan’s 
militaristic past.473 Japan’s ambassador to Great Britain responded by denying any 
evidence of militarism and called China the Voldemort for refusing talks and inciting 
tensions in the region.474 Cooperative relations were suffering from China’s belaboring 
of the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Partly in punishment for his visits, Beijing refused Abe’s requests to meet with Xi 
Xinping for discussions. Bilateral negotiations over ECS disputes resumed intermittently 
only after Abe stopped visiting the shrine. After a period of diplomatic isolation, Xi and 
Abe met briefly to exchange an awkward and reluctant handshake at the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 2014,475 the first high-level 
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meeting in two and a half years.476 The leaders agreed to recognize each other’s position 
and open discussions regarding their differences over history. In this case, China 
successfully used history to control high-level diplomacy and prevent Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe from honoring an alleged monument of oppression.477  
While Abe may have stopped attending the shrine, other right-wing officials and 
cabinet members did not. Over 146 diet members attended the Yasukuni Shrine spring 
festival in April 2014, while Abe only sent an official sakaki offering.478 On August 15, 
2014, the anniversary of the end of WWII, 84 diet members visited the shrine and Abe 
again sent a sakaki offering.479 In October 2015, 70 officials attended the fall festival; 
again, Abe sent an offering.480 In May and December 2015, Japan’s first lady, Akie Abe, 
visited the shrine, partly as a gesture to appease Abe’s conservative constituents.481 On 
October 18, 2016, China protested a visit by 85 Japanese officials during the fall festival 
and denounced Abe’s recent sakaki offerings.482 Although the Chinese made it impolitic 
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for Abe to visit the shrine and they won his lip service, the sakaki offerings and unabated 
visits of other officials continued to provoke Beijing. 
b. Justifying Historical Disputes at the International Level, 2014–2016 
China sought the help of other nations to corroborate its memories of Japan’s 
atrocities and justify its interpretation of history. Peter Hays Gries argues that a Chinese 
goal is to aggrandize China’s suffering and century of humiliation, “presenting the 
Chinese case to the world.”483 From 2014 to 2016, China reached out to rival states and 
the global community for moral support, including overtures to South Korea. The CCP 
also used international venues to pressure Abe for an apology in his 70th anniversary 
statement and solidified world recognition of Beijing’s account of the Nanjing Massacre. 
Although South Korea and China are rivals in nearly every regard, they share a 
deep resentment of Japanese aggression in Asia. In January 2014, less than a month after 
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shine, China opened a Chinese-Korean memorial hall at 
Harbin railroad station to commemorate the history of Korean resistance against Japanese 
aggression.484 Harbin Station is the site where Korean Anh Jung Geun shot Ito Hirobumi, 
a Japanese Imperial Army general and governor to Korea, after he stepped off a train 
from Korea in 1909. Executed by the Imperial Army, Anh Jung-Guen became a South 
Korean martyr and hero. Japanese officials protested the Harbin memorial and called Anh 
a terrorist, accusing China and Korea of “spreading groundless assertions” about Japan’s 
past.485 Defending the memorial, the Chinese foreign ministry described Anh as “an 
upholder of justice who fought against Japan’s aggression” and accused Japan of 
memorializing terrorists buried at the Yasukuni Shrine.486 In a July 2014 summit with 
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South Korean President Park Geun-hye, Xi spoke of the countries’ common traumatic 
experiences and denounced the Japanese ravaging of Korea and China.487  
In 2016, a monument was erected in Shanghai to honor Korean and Chinese 
women used as sex slaves by the Japanese army.488 Chinese territorial disputes in the 
ECS emboldened similar Korean contentions in the Dokdo/Takashima Islands 
disputes.489 Like China, South Korea maintains that these islands are historically Korean 
and Japanese control is an illegitimate artifact of Japan’s colonial and military 
aggression.490 China’s strategy of corroboration and collaboration has resulted in regional 
leverage and endorsement of its ongoing suspicion and hostility toward Japan.491  
The Chinese government sought international condemnation of Japan’s wartime 
aggression to pressure Abe to recognize a deplorable past and apologize in his WWII 
70th anniversary statement. In a March 2014 speech in Berlin, Xi fingered the Japanese 
for atrocities, recounting the Imperial Army’s brutality in Nanjing and the death of 
300,000 civilians whom China still mourns.492 In 2015, Beijing sent invitations to 
“leaders of all relevant countries and international organizations” to commemorate the 
end of WWII, or the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” 
and the “World Anti-Fascist War.”493 China fielded massive military parades, 
government-sanctioned television documentaries, and special exhibitions at war 
memorials and museums; presented the brutalities of Japan’s occupation of Asia; and 
warned that the world would be watching Abe’s 70th anniversary statement.494 A 
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spokesman from the Chinese foreign ministry pressed Japan to “adopt a correct attitude, 
deeply reflect on its history of aggression . . . [and] win the trust of China and other Asian 
neighbors and the international community.” 495 Despite the official words of remorse 
and atonement in Abe’s anniversary remarks, China maintained its moral power by 
remaining dissatisfied due to a perceived lack of “heartfelt” remorse.496 An article in the 
Global Times criticized Abe’s apology as meeting only the “minimum demands of 
China” and lacking sincere contrition.497 Thus, China highlighted Japan’s historical past 
and lack of contrition in attempt to gain international validation of its historical 
grievances and pressure Abe into making an apology. 
In October 2015, China triumphed in the debate over the Nanjing Massacre by 
gaining international credibility for China’s version of events. Despite Japanese protests, 
China pushed an initiative to add Chinese documents, including its official count of 
victims in the Nanjing Massacre, to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register. 
Japanese officials were outraged at the use of wartime history as a political tool to 
demean and embarrass present-day Japan. Tokyo threatened to withdraw financial 
support for UNESCO and petitioned to have the Nanjing Massacre removed from the 
historical registry, but these efforts failed. To capitalize on the occasion, the Chinese  
staged an exhibition at the Nanjing war-history museum and a grand ceremony on the 
78th anniversary of the massacre on December 13, 2015. At the ceremony, the vice 
chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) clearly 
alluded to Japan in stating, “We have to resolutely oppose anyone who beautifies the war 
of aggression and any action that attempts to drive history backward.”498 These events 
constituted another coup in demeaning and embarrassing China’s rival, promoting 
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worldwide acceptance of the Chinese historical narrative, and nullifying Japan’s moral 
credibility.499   
c. Chinese Assertiveness to “Contain” Japanese Militarism, 2014–2016 
Meanwhile, to exonerate maritime incursions in the ECS, Beijing continued to 
meld Chinese historical claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with accusations of present 
Japanese remilitarization. At an NPC session in March 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s hard stance on sovereignty and history debates with 
Japan.500 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang stated that China stood firm in its position on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and announced another double-digit defense budget expenditure 
of 12.2 percent, equivalent to $132 billion U.S. dollars, to strengthen maritime assets.501 
China began to increase its maritime capabilities to assert sovereignty and to challenge 
Japanese assets in the ECS. Older armed frigates were modified to support coast guard  
law enforcement activities and three ship models, ranging from 2,300 tons to 4,500 tons, 
were refitted to provide a considerable edge over Japanese patrol ships, as depicted in 
Figure 15.502 In 2015, a U.S. Department of Defense report on the Asian-Pacific 
Maritime Security Strategy identified PLAN capability as the strongest in the region, 
with over 300 combatant vessels and 200 law enforcement ships.503 The 2016 
comparisons of Chinese and Japanese patrol assets in Figures 16 and 17 show China’s 
advantage in maritime patrol assets capable of challenging Japan in the ECS.504 Figure 
17 demonstrates a distinct Chinese advantage in the number of maritime assets available 
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for patrols in the South and East China Seas, depicting the types and size of Chinese 
ships.505 As depicted in Figure 15, The Kanjie WPS, Tuzhang WPS, and Jiang Wei I 
were recently modified as assets for maritime patrols.506 China continued to use historical 
narratives and sovereignty claims to justify its ramping up of maritime capabilities, break 
Japan’s control of the disputed islands, and support Chinese national interests in the ECS.  
 
This figure shows the rise in types and size of Chinese ships that reflect increasing maritime assets for 
deployment. Note that the Kanjie WPS, Tuzhang WPS, and Jiang Wei I were all recently modified as 
added assets for maritime patrols in the ECS.  
 
Figure 15.  China’s Coast Guard Assets and Modified Assets 
Patrolling Disputed Waters in the ECS507 
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This is a comparison of coast guard ship inventories as of April 2016. China has a great advantage in terms 
of the size of patrol ships operating around the disputed islands, and is planning larger capabilities once the 
Haijing 2901 is operational. 
Figure 16.  Comparison of Chinese to Japanese Naval Assets Patrolling the Disputed 
Waters in the ECS508 
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This figure compares the naval combatant and maritime law enforcement inventories of 
Japan and China. As of April 2016, China enjoyed a significant maritime advantage over 
Japan in terms of number of assets available for deployment.  
Figure 17.  Comparative Representation of Regional Naval Combatant Vessels and 
Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Vessels509 
From 2014 to 2016, routine Chinese maritime incursions in Japanese contiguous 
waters continued, and historical disputes were a perpetual friction. As presented in Figure 
18, Chinese patrols began to venture farther into Japanese waters around the disputed 
islands.510 A 2014 Japanese coast guard report noted that over 200 Chinese fishing boats 
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were trespassing in territorial waters.511 The report showed a 130 percent increase in 
illegal fishing, up from 88 in 2013—a steady rise since Japan nationalized the islands in 
2012.512 From 2015 to 2016, Chinese maritime patrols averaged 10 to 12 vessels per 
month.513  
China’s protests against Japan’s amnesia also coincided with its increased 
maritime presence in the ECS. In August 2016, Beijing criticized Abe’s newly appointed 
nationalistic defense minister, Inada Tomomi, after her inaugural speech denying Japan’s 
past “invasion” of China.514 China’s ministry of defense accused Inada of “cover[ing] up 
Japan’s history of aggression and challeng[ing] the international order by reviving 
militarism.”515 Shortly thereafter, and days from the commemoration of the end of 
WWII, there were 230–300 Chinese fishing trawlers, accompanied by 15 Chinese Coast 
Guard ships, operating near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.516 Despite Japanese 
denouncement, the Chinese ambassador defended the flotilla as operating in Chinese 
waters. Near-daily incursions into Japanese contiguous waters became a norm for 
Chinese patrols that continues to this day. On occasion, increased Chinese maritime 
patrols in the ECS coincided with historical protests against Japan. As charted in Figure 
18, incursions peaked after Japanese nationalization of the islands in 2012 and during 
Abe’s first year in office.517 Within two months of Abe’s election, the CCG moved from 
peripheral waters to direct encirclement of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.518 China clearly 
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used history as a coercive tactic to justify the continuing arc of increased Chinese 
maritime presence and aggression in the ECS. 
 
This figure shows the monthly average number of Chinese government and nongovernment vessels 
patrolling the ECS from 2008 to 2015. The average increasing after the Japanese nationalization of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012. It peaks in 2013 after Prime Minister Abe is elected and tapers down to a 
steady average of between 5 and 10 ships per month from 2014 to 2016. The lower part of the figure shows 
an example of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrol paths around the disputed Islands. Note that after 
January 2013, CCG paths changed from just outside the islands to encircling them.  
Figure 18.  Average Chinese Vessels per Month, 2008–2015, and Patrol Courses519  
From 2014 to 2016, Chinese air incursions significantly increased as both China 
and Japan refused to yield over air boundaries above the ECS. In May 2014, a near 
midair occurred over the ECS when two Chinese SU-27 fighter jets had a dangerously 
close encounter with two JASDF aircraft observing a joint Sino-Russian maritime 
exercise.520 Another near midair crisis occurred in June 2014, when two Chinese and two 
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JASDF aircraft flew within two meters of each other.521 Both countries blamed the other 
for the close intercept and claimed obstruction of airspace.522 Figure 19 shows a rise in 
Japanese scrambles, from 98 in 2010 to 571 in 2015.523 A March 5, 2015, article in the 
National Post highlighted Japan’s daily attempts to intercept Chinese planes.524 A 
September 2015 article in the Diplomat reported that the JASDF scrambled its aircraft 
117 times during the third quarter of 2015.525 In the first three months of 2016, the 
Japanese air force reported 198 flights to intercept Chinese planes—twice the tally at the 
same time the previous year.526 In September 2016, days after the Japanese minister of 
defense announced a policy of possible engagement in the South China Sea, the People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) deployed massive airpower through the Miyako 
Strait near Okinawa and China’s claimed ADIZ in the ECS. Although the Japanese 
fighter jets intercepted only eight Chinese aircraft, China asserted that over 40 PLAAF 
aircraft, including H-6K bombers, SU-30 fighters, and tanker aircraft, were involved. 527 
Beijing further asserted that squadrons would continue to conduct patrols, airborne 
reconnaissance, and practice attacks on surface targets to “safeguard national sovereignty, 
the country’s security, and [to] maintain peaceful development.”528 Similar to the 
maritime incursions, these policies demonstrated Chinese resolve against Japanese air 
power in the ECS and reassertion of its historical claims to the disputed waters. 
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This depicts an increasing number of JASDF air scrambles against Chinese and Russian 
assets in 2014. Shown in red on the map, over half these flights were concentrated in the 
ECS around the disputed islands. Japan’s Southwestern Composite Air Division handled 
50 percent of the overall scrambles, a five-fold increase from 2010–2015. With the 
exception of 2014, Japanese air scrambles against Russia have remained mostly flat.  
Figure 19.  JASDF Scrambles against Chinese and Russian Air Assets529 
By 2015, the Beijing’s persistent complaints over Tokyo’s amnesia and militarism 
began to wear thin, as shown by China’s failure to contain Japan’s right-wing nationalist 
ambitions and reinterpretation of the peace constitution. In May 2014, a spokesman from 
the Chinese foreign ministry accused Abe of “taking perverse action on historical issues 
and pressing ahead with constitutional amendment and military expansion under the 
cloak of proactive pacifism.”530 But perversely, the relentless browbeating, along with 
China’s own military expansion and aggression in the ECS, encouraged Japan to embrace 
nationalism to counter China’s rise. In 2015, over Chinese denunciation, Abe won 
approval from the diet to reinterpret Article 9 as allowing Japan to legally engage in 
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“collective self-defense,” or a limited use of arms to support allies.531 China’s 
exploitation of historical grievances did little to gain concessions from Japan or contain 
Japan’s nationalistic policies and alleged revival of militarism. However, China’s 
coercive use of history was rather aimed at justifying China’s own military rise and 
aggression in the ECS leading to an inflamed security dilemma in the region, at the 
expense of deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Evidence in this chapter strongly supports that Chinese elites use historical 
grievances as a strategic tool of foreign policy to justify assertive actions to contain 
Japan’s power and have considerable influence on negative Sino-Japanese relations. An 
analysis of China’s promulgation of history at the highest levels of government during 
the three periods of discord proves that Chinese elites use China’s anti-Japanese 
sentiments and the country’s historic trauma, and sometimes Japanese guilt of its past, to 
their advantage to support or maintain its power advantage over Japan, gain concessions 
from Japanese leaders, or justify actions that support national interests. When China feels 
less threatened by Japanese hawkish ambitions, history is rarely ever an issue and 
bilateral cooperation easily transpires.  
The first period of discord from 1989 to 1998 had three main occasions where the 
Chinese central authority used history in an attempt to gain the relative balance of power 
over Japan: the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Disputes in the 1990s, the protest of changing 
U.S.-Japan security guidelines in 1996 and 1999, and Jiang Zemin’s demands for an 
official apology during his visit to Tokyo in 1998. The Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes 
garnered concessions of ODA from Japan and allowed the CCP to use the public’s 
demands to strengthen sovereignty claims in the ECS. Although China protested the 
strengthening U.S.-Japan security alliance after the third Taiwan Strait missile crisis, 
Japan refused to change its security policies to address China’s objections. However, 
China reacted strongly and used history to justify its increasing patrols and military 
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excursions in the ECS to demonstrate its resolve to challenge Japan’s rising military 
power under the U.S. security umbrella. When used, China’s exploitation of historical 
grievances seemed to play to China’s advantage against Japan until Jiang Zemin’s visit in 
1998, which confirmed Japanese suspicions of the CCP’s use of history as a tool of 
coercion to gain a moral upper hand against Japan. All of these events during this time 
demonstrate that Beijing’s use of history to contain Japanese power ambitions had a 
moderate contribution to explaining the negative Sino-Japanese relations. 
In the second period from 2003 to 2006, Chinese elites played a less aggressive 
role in initiating historical grievances but instead reacted to historical and political 
activists and the anger that resulted from anti-Japanese public opinion. Hence, Beijing’s 
use of history in the balance of power was a relatively weak explanation of the downturn 
of bilateral relations. Implicit endorsement of massive demonstrations allowed Beijing to 
use the public’s demands to garner concessions from Japan. This was seen in Beijing’s 
promulgation of Japan’s past history and historical amnesia and its endorsement of the 
violent anti-Japanese demonstrations to justify its veto against Japan’s bid for a 
permanent seat at the UNSC. However, China’s public demanded that Beijing act more 
aggressively against Japan. Beijing seemed to tolerate Koizumi’s initial visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine and continually warned Japan that the Chinese public had little tolerance 
for such insults. Beijing also aggressively linked the Yasukuni Shrine to the disputed 
islands as historical issues that demonstrate revisionist policies and a rise of Japanese 
militarism. As a result, Beijing began to increasingly justify its escalated actions and 
strengthen its claims in the ECS as a way to challenge Japanese militarism.  
In the third period from 2010 to 2012, aside from the 2010 and 2012 public 
demonstrations over the ongoing Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the Chinese central 
authority had a significantly aggressive policy in using historical grievances against 
Japan. Hence during this time, the use of history to gain the advantage in the balance of 
power strongly contributed to the downturn of bilateral relations. Although China’s 
historical complaints did little to garner Japanese concessions, they provided justification 
for China to expand it military agenda and aggressively challenge Japan’s administrative 
control in the ECS. Japan and China would continually challenge each other in the ECS, 
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staying near the brink of conflict with daily air and maritime intercepts. China even went 
as far as to claim an ADIZ over the disputed waters, causing international concern over 
the safety of international aircraft. During this time, China solicited the support of and 
acknowledgment by the court of international opinion regarding China’s interpretation of 
history in exaggerating Japan’s cruel past. Hence, the CCP played a central role in using 
historical grievances to support national objectives to gain the upper hand in the balance 




V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzed two hypotheses to explain how history has affected Sino-
Japanese relations since the beginning of normalization of diplomatic relations from 1972 
to 2016. The first hypothesis explored China’s deeply embedded resentment and 
collective memories of past trauma with Japan in shaping bilateral relations.  Evidence 
strongly supported the notion that provocative Japanese actions reignite anti-Japanese 
sentiments that demand (1) Beijing act more aggressively in its foreign policy with Japan 
and (2) Japan take actions to pacify domestic unrest or acquiesce to CCP demands, which 
contribute negatively to bilateral relations. The second hypothesis explored China’s use 
of history to maximize relative power, suppress or contain rival Japan, or secure state 
interests, and how this use has impacted the nature of the countries’ relations. Evidence 
also strongly supported when China feels threatened by Japanese aspirations to gain 
influence in the region or challenge China’s national security interests, China highlights 
Japan’s past aggression and present lack of remorse to contain Japanese ambitions and 
gain a power advantage over Japan.  
While both hypotheses can explain the characterization of the relationship, they 
did so in varying degrees within each period of discord. However, collective memory had 
the overall stronger contribution to negative Sino-Japanese relations than the balance of 
power as it accounted for the most discordant Sino-Japanese period. In the first period 
(1989–1999), both collective remembrance and public opinion and balance of power 
played a near equal, yet moderate, role in explaining the downturn of Sino-Japanese 
relations. In the second period (2003–2006), collective remembrance played a much 
stronger role than the balance of power as Beijing’s use of history was mainly in reaction 
to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiments in China. Sino-Japanese relations were at their 
lowest during this second period when collective memory and public opinion played the 
stronger role in shaping bilateral ties. However, things were reversed in the third period 
(2010–2016), when the balance of power overwhelmingly played a more significant role 
in explaining negative relations making this the second lowest period of bilateral ties. 
Thus, when collective memory was the driver of ties, Beijing’s use of history to gain an 
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advantage in the balance of power was weak. When the balance of power was the 
primary driver of bilateral relations, collective memory played a more supporting role.  
One might ask why then is collective memory at its weakest influence during the 
third period (2010-2016), especially after 2012, when Japanese provocations were at their 
highest levels and further exacerbated by one of Japan’s most nationalistic and offensive 
prime ministers to date—Shinzo Abe? Hence at face value, the events after 2012 refute 
the explanation proposed by the hypothesis that collective memories are spurred and 
instigated by controversial Japanese actions that drive foreign policy. However, perhaps 
collective memory’s influence on shaping bilateral relations was more discreet and not so 
visible during this time as anti-Japanese sentiments did not disappear but played a more 
inconspicuous role. In part to satiate the public’s demands for a hardened foreign policy 
against Japan, Beijing escalated its assertion in challenging Japan, restoring or 
maintaining the public’s faith in the CCP’s ability to contain supposed Japanese 
militarism. Hence quelling any desires for the public to resurrect its traumatic collective 
memories or force the hand of the CCP to react. In proactively satiating the public’s need 
to escalate historical disputes, the CCP was also able to avoid any potential costly action 
of suppressing its public if sentiments got out of hand as it did in 2005 and 2012. In part, 
the government proactively confronted Japan on behalf of the people. Hence supporting 
the argument that collective memory still played a significant role in shaping bilateral 
relations even when the balance of power seemed like the dominant factor.   
This chapter summarizes the findings from both hypotheses explored in chapters 
III and IV in explaining how history has played a role in Sino-Japanese relations and 
offers policy implications and recommendations for both Japan and the United States. 
This chapter concludes that a combination of both explanations of collective memory and 
balance of power explain the nature of bilateral relations, but, to varying degrees within 
each divided time period discussed in Chapter II (1972–1989, 1989–1999, 1999–2003, 
2003–2006, 2006–2010, 2010–2016). During periods of cooperation (1972–1989, 1999–
2003, 2006–2010) historical issues were rarely a problem as Japan took precautions to 
avoid offensive actions or stir anti-Japanese hatred. Thus, the Chinese public found no 
stimulus to activate anti-Japanese sentiments, nor did Beijing feel threatened by Japan 
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enough to call attention to history to contain Japanese power ambitions in Asia. However, 
during periods of discord (1989–1999, 2003–2006, 2010–2016) provocative Japanese 
actions resurrected traumatic collective memories and put historical grievances at the 
forefront of foreign policy, which threatened to rip apart bilateral relations. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The following section analyzes the findings from both hypotheses within each 
period of discord. The findings reveal several keys points. First, both collective 
remembrance and public opinion and balance of power explain the periods of Sino-
Japanese discord. Neither variable should be independently studied to explain the nature 
of the relationship. Second, when collective remembrance was the greater driving factor, 
balance of power played a less significant role in explaining the downturn in relations. 
The opposite was observed when balance of power was the driving factor, collective 
memory played a more supporting role. Last, collective remembrance played the overall 
stronger role in shaping bilateral relations and accounted for the worst period of Sino-
Japanese discord.  
1. Hypothesis I: Collective Remembrance and Public Opinion 
Although collective remembrance and anti-Japanese public opinion remained, to a 
varying degree, throughout all three periods of discord, it contributed only moderately to 
the downturn of relations in the first period, contributed greatly in the second period, and 
contributed little to moderately in the third period. Chapter III explored the power of 
China’s collective remembrance of national trauma and how it contributed to a downturn 
in Sino-Japanese relations during three main periods of discord (1989–2000, 2003–2006, 
2010–2016). This chapter focused on the influence of Chinese public opinion on both 
Chinese and Japanese domestic and foreign policy. Ironically, government propaganda 
fueled anti-Japanese sentiments and an education campaign drove Beijing to take action 
to harden its foreign policy measures even if it was not in the best interest of CCP 
policies. In some cases, Beijing had actively suppressed public uprisings to maintain CCP 
control over its public. Chinese public opinion can also influence Japan’s domestic and 
foreign policies by encouraging Japan to address historical grievances or make 
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concessions to quell Chinese domestic uprisings. The rise of public opinion and anti-
Japanese sentiments both hindered and supported Beijing’s diplomacy with Japan. 
Although anti-Japanese opinion has been a major force since Japan’s invasion of China in 
the 19th century, the three periods of discord restored its prominence, ranging from a 
weak to a heavy role in affecting negative Sino-Japanese relations. 
a. Period of Discord: 1989–1999 
Collective remembrance and public opinion was a moderately strong variable in 
driving the downturn of bilateral relations during the first period of discord. International 
structural changes resulting from the end of the Cold War along with China’s need to 
relegitimize the CCP through a massive education campaign after the Tiananmen Square 
incident drove Beijing’s policies. Anti-Japanese sentiments were not as prevalent as in 
the second period, partly because the CCP was still sensitive to the rise of public opinion 
during the Tiananmen Square incident and its threat to regime legitimacy and also 
because the education campaign was in still its infancy and the Chinese elites still favored 
the preservation of economic and monetary policies with Japan to boost China’s 
economy. However, the public continued to demand justice and correct past wrongs, as 
seen in the initiatives taken by historical and political activists to claim sovereignty over 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in 1996 exemplified Chinese 
nationalists’ taking action with Beijing’s coercion or endorsement. In the same period, 
the student uprisings forced the Chinese elites to ask Hashimoto to take action to quell 
Chinese protests and deescalate bilateral tensions. However, Chinese public opinion was 
still muted by the CCP’s policies and desires to be continuing beneficiaries of Japan’s 
ODA. Hence, Chinese public opinion played only a moderate role in explaining bilateral 
conflicts during this first period of discord. 
b. Period of Discord: 2003–2006 
Collective remembrance played an even more significant role in the downturn of 
bilateral relations during the second period. By 2003, the patriotic education campaign 
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was in its eighth year and no longer a campaign, as the teachings and revisions of “red” 
propaganda532 became fully adopted as everyday societal norms. Meanwhile, the 
introduction of the Internet in 2003 boosted anti-Japanese sentiments in the Chinese 
public. Because of the increased number of public protests and public uprisings over 
perceived Japanese slights, collective memory and public opinion were very strong 
variables in driving the downturn of bilateral relations by forcing the Chinese elites to ask 
Japan to take action to satisfy its public. In addition, Chinese elites had to take even more 
aggressive action against Japan to suppress China’s public. The 2005 domestic protests 
represented the climax of Chinese public opinion in that the Chinese public took the law 
into their own hands and conducted violent protests, demanding action by both the 
Japanese and Chinese governments. Riot after riot and protest after protest were all 
highlighted in the international community as Beijing continually warned Japan against 
taking action that might rile the public. Hence, this time period saw the greatest influence 
of Chinese public opinion on the Chinese and Japanese governments and played a heavy 
hand in dictating foreign policy and contributing to the downturn of bilateral relations. 
c. Period of Discord: 2010–2016 
Other than the 2010 and 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Disputes, anti-Japanese public 
opinion was relatively calm during this period, despite controversial Japanese actions 
under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Abe has been one of the most nationalistic Japanese 
prime ministers to date; his right-wing controversial nationalist actions rival that of 
former Prime Minister Koiuzmi. Although Abe has only visited the Yasukuni Shrine 
once, compared to Koizumi who visited the shrine every year he was in office, Abe has 
led Japan to the brink of open conflict in the ECS and pushed one of the most militaristic, 
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nationalistic, and right-wing agendas to date. It does help that Abe has only visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine once, as it is a major flashpoint in bilateral relations and the most 
obvious trigger of Chinese resentment over past Japanese aggression. However, mass 
demonstrations as seen before 2012 were either absent or not reported since, despite 
continuing controversial actions by Japan—especially under Abe. Surprisingly, the 
Chinese public was relatively quiet despite Abe’s offenses, which doesn’t support the 
argument that provocative actions spur anti-Japanese sentiments and contribute to 
negative relations. It is not that the Chinese people have forgotten their national narrative 
or suppressed their collective memory during this time; it is quite the contrary as the 
Chinese people still harbor strong resentment over Japanese aggression in Asia, which 
remains as a stinging memory for the Chinese public. The Chinese people still conduct 
their own forms of protest and it has become a common norm for them to show their 
continuing resentment. Perhaps Internet sites have given the public a satisfying outlet to 
vent their anti-Japanese sentiments without having to resort to costly and time consuming 
riots or public demonstrations. However, as discussed in Chapter IV, the Chinese elites 
have taken a more aggressive role in challenging Japan’s rising militarism and right-wing 
agenda. Perhaps a more assertive Japan policy by the government has been more 
effective in showing the public that the CCP—not the people—is the competent and 
legitimate authority to handle the rise of Japanese militarism. Thus, Beijing’s hardened 
stance has satisfied political and historical activists and satiated any potential hunger for 
anti-Japanese rioting among the public. Regardless, Chinese public opinion played only 
weak to moderate contribution to explaining negative bilateral relations during this time, 
as the CCP has increased its aggression in challenging Japan.  
2. Hypothesis II: Government Use and Relative Power 
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, the government has taken advantage of China’s 
historical trauma with Japan to serve realpolitik objectives at home and abroad. However, 
Beijing’s use of historical grievances only contributed moderately to the downturn of 
bilateral relations in the first period, was weak to moderate in the second period, and was 
strong in the third period. Domestic unrest from the Tiananmen Square incident along 
with the structural changes in the international balance of power after the Cold War only 
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encouraged China and Japan to renew competition in East Asia despite their economic 
interdependency. Hence to maintain a relative balance of power over Japan and to contain 
Japan’s ability challenge China, the CCP awakened historical grievances to serve national 
interests, justify military expansion, and gain the upper moral hand.  
a. Period of Discord: 1989–1999  
During this time, China’s use of history against Japan was moderate—mainly to 
support domestic public protest against Japanese nationalistic rhetoric and, on occasion, 
to justify deployment of military assets to defend national interests. This was seen in the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes in the 1990s, which were instigated by the Chinese public (as 
discussed in chapter III) allowing Beijing to justify sending two ballistic submarines to 
defend its national interests in the ECS. Beijing also minimally increased its patrols in the 
ECS to protest the revised U.S.-Japanese security guidelines and Japan’s adoption of the 
UNCLOS-endorsed EEZ. During this time, China began to use the ECS as a form of 
protest against its historical disputes with Japan. In later periods, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands became synonymous with and forever linked with Japanese militarism and 
nationalism. For China, the islands are a symbol of injustice and bitter resentment of 
Japan’s wartime aggression in China—an unresolved part of China’s century of 
humiliation. However, Beijing overplayed its history card when Jiang Zemin tried to 
force a formal apology from Tokyo. This allowed Japan to call China’s bluff to sincerely 
forgive Japan’s past and verified China’s perpetual resentments and use of history as a 
bludgeon to continually gain concessions. Hence Jiang’s actions to garner an apology 
revealed a weakness in overusing history as a tool of diplomacy against Japan. A 
comparison of both hypotheses discussed in this thesis reveals that both public opinion 
and the Chinese government equally contributed to the downturn of bilateral relations 
during this first period.  
b. Period of Discord: 2003–2006 
The rise of public opinion during this time overshadowed Beijing’s use of history as a 
tool of power to further national interests. On several occasions, Beijing just reacted to 
the anti-Japanese riots and domestic uprisings by acting more aggressively against Japan. 
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As mentioned, the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes were synonymous with historical 
grievances—namely Koizumi’s continual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. However, 
historical and political Chinese activists initiated these disputes, not the Chinese central 
authority, which merely reacted to the demands of the Chinese public. Even Beijing’s 
eventual veto of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC was only fully revealed 
after millions of protestors demanded it. On occasion, Beijing’s use of history augmented 
the demands of the public, which the CCP used to support national interests. However, 
during this time, public opinion mainly drove Beijing’s policies against Japan and 
contributed more to the downturn of bilateral relations, while the balance of power played 
a weaker role.  
c. Period of Discord: 2010–2016 
Since 2012, Beijing’s use of history has played a significantly greater role in 
contributing to the downturn of bilateral relations than the collective memory of its 
citizens. Public opinion only played a significant factor during the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes in 2010 and 2012, when it amplified Beijing’s justification for maritime 
escalation in the ECS. However, Beijing has become more proactive in using its 
historical grievances to blunt any anticipated power gains by Japan. Even during the first 
period of cooperation, Beijing had the foresight to keep its guard against a relatively 
subtle rise of Japanese ambitions to regain influence and power in the region. A rearmed 
Japan that is capable of challenging China has become more of a reality during this 
time—especially under Prime Minister Abe.  
After Japan nationalized the islands in 2012, and to challenge the leadership of 
Shinzo Abe, China has increasingly used history to justify significant escalation in 
defending territorial disputes in the ECS. Beijing has used history to justify yearly 
double-digit defense spending increases to support military modernization programs to 
counter supposed Japanese militarism and sovereignty claims in the ECS. As noted in 
Chapter IV, Chinese maritime presence has been continual in recent years as Japanese air 
scrambles have occurred on a near-daily basis, reaching record Cold War levels. Both 
countries have escalated military actions and reactions in the ECS, causing a significant 
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security dilemma in the region. Meanwhile, Beijing has petitioned the international 
community to garner support for its interpretation of historical wartime events with 
Japan. Beijing’s success in entering the Nanjing Massacre in the UNESCO world registry 
and joint historical ventures with rivals like South Korea gave international legitimization 
of its historical grievances and world sympathy for its past. Even the United States 
lectured Shinzo Abe for visiting the shrine in 2012 and unnecessarily causing a rise of 
Sino-Japanese tensions—an action never taken before by Japan’s strongest ally.533  
For the last few decades, the Chinese government has called attention to past evils 
to gain concessions from Tokyo, contain Japanese ambitions for power, dampen Japan’s 
efforts to restore its reputation, and justify the pursuit of Chinese self-interests. However, 
in recent years, this strategy has failed to contain Japan’s agenda. Although China’s use 
of history has been successful in justifying the expansion of its domestic policies in the 
name of national interests, it has failed to contain supposed Japanese militarism. Rather, 
China’s use of history has provoked a backlash from Japan, especially under Abe, to 
challenge China’s rise and ambitions in Asia. Both China and Japan have taken hardened 
positions against one another, constantly showing the use of military assets and alliances 
to defend national interests. Perhaps this backlash is a sign that Beijing’s promulgation of 
history is losing its effectiveness to garner concessions from or contain Japanese 
ambitions for power. Japan has retaliated against China’s “beating” by strengthening its 
nationalistic posture and military and exacerbating the security dilemma in the region. 
Under Abe, Japan is on a rising nationalistic trajectory that rejects China’s historical 
narratives, and Japan is increasingly willing to use force to settle disputes with China. In 
claiming a right to the redress of historical injustices, China has rationalized increases in 
its own defense spending and aggression in the ECS. While Chinese finger-pointing 
remains a powerful tool in guaranteeing the upper hand in Sino-Japanese relations, 
increasingly there is a price to pay in terms of cooperative bilateral relations, conflict 
resolution, and the risk of overplaying—and thus voiding—the history card. Regardless, 
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China will still use warnings of Japanese militarism and renewed assertiveness in the 
ECS as justification to expand its own power to challenge Japan.  
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN  
This section provides four main policy implications and/or recommendations for 
U.S. and Japanese planners: (1) to recognize the power of historical grievances, (2) to 
understand the CCP and the Chinese public’s responses to the Japanese can be mutually 
reinforcing or limited depending on the CCP’s goals, (3) to consider making foreign 
policy moves quietly to avoid overreactions by the Chinese, and (4) to address grievances 
to blunt China’s political use of history as leverage.  
1. Recognize the Power of Historical Grievances 
Policy makers must understand the origins of China’s history and its historical 
grievances from its century of humiliation. Chinese foreign policy is rooted in its 
domestic policies and paradoxical national narrative as both “victim” and “victor,” and 
the desire to never again be in such a state of weakness that other nations can threaten its 
sovereignty. Hence, emotional grievances must be addressed to honor the remembrance 
of history while ensuring that the government saves face before its people. The United 
States’ and Japan’s acknowledgment of historical grievances will make China more 
willing to conduct further negotiations. History will continue to play a role in Chinese 
foreign policy, which was seen in pressuring Japanese prime ministers to refrain from 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine before high-level diplomacy can continue, or immediately 
addressing the people’s demands to release historical and political activists from Japanese 
incarceration to prevent further complications to arise. Nevertheless, the people influence 
both domestic and foreign policy by pressuring Beijing to address historical grievances in 
a more aggressive way or to encourage Japanese leaders to apologize and change their 
domestic policies to recognize Chinese history. Unsurprising, the first order of business 
between China and the United States under the new Trump administration was U.S. 
recognition of the “one China” policy regarding Taiwan, which is still seen as a part of 
China’s century of humiliation and in which China still seeks to reunite Taiwan under 
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PRC rule to fully restore what was wrongfully taken from its sovereignty by imperialist 
powers.534 Hence China’s historical traumatic narrative will be a major driver of its 
foreign policy.  
2. Understand the CCP and the Chinese Public’s Responses to the 
Japanese Can Be Mutually Reinforcing or Limited, Depending on 
CCP’s Goals 
When events regarding the history issue arises, the CCP and the Chinese public 
usually respond to both the Japanese and each other. Thus, anti-Japanese sentiments and 
periods of negative Sino-Japanese relations are influenced by a combination of elite-
driven objectives and domestic collective memories and sentiments. However, in many 
cases, I would caution that the public’s influence on the CCP is limited because the 
central authoritarian government has the final say and dictates what and how far public 
opinion will be ultimately tolerated—especially if those public interests threaten, 
criticize, or embarrass the CCP or lead to uncontrollable chaos. This was seen in the 
CCP’s suppression of the public at the end of the 2005 riots or Beijing’s more strict 
control over the protests during the 2012 riots. However, more importantly, the CCP’s 
control over and repression of its public and the media did more to quell Chinese 
mobilization and escalation of protests than Japanese concessions did. Unless the Chinese 
central government permitted the outbreak of domestic protests and anti-Japanese 
sentiments, most public protests were either never advertised or were suppressed in favor 
of national interests. Thus, the Chinese central authority permits a larger escalation of 
protest and mobilization only when it serves its interests. In this case, The Chinese 
government can limit the impact that Chinese public opinion has on both the CCP and the 
Japanese elites in shaping foreign policy. Chinese elites can use the public to shape 
foreign policy, as seen during the protests of 2005 when the CCP blamed the Japanese for 
causing Chinese uprisings and encouraged the Japanese elites to take action to quell the 
protests while also using the excuse of the public uprisings to justify their veto of Japan’s 
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request at the United Nations. Hence, Chinese lawmakers allow the public to vent or 
cause disorder in their country as long as the public response does not exceed a certain 
threshold that would weaken the regime’s legitimacy or significantly hurt the CCP’s 
foreign policy objectives. Although the rise of Chinese public opinion can, in itself, shape 
China’s or Japan’s foreign policy, U.S. and Japanese policymakers must not dismiss the 
potential for the CCP to use public opinion to further its own agenda by shaping another 
country’s policy under the cloak of uncontrollable or volatile public opinion.  
3. Consider Making Foreign Policy Moves Quietly to Avoid 
Overreactions by the Chinese 
The United States and Japan should consider being less overt in their policies 
toward China, even though China will undoubtedly continue to use history as a tool of 
leverage. The announcement of the U.S pivot or rebalance of the Pacific only exacerbated 
tensions with China and strengthened China’s suspicion of the U.S.-Japan alliance. China 
remains sensitive of any perceived slights by Western powers, and it could interpret this 
rebalance and increased presence of the United States as a familiar encroachment on its 
sovereignty as once seen during its century of humiliation—a genuine sentiment resulting 
from China’s traumatic collective memories. Thus, China could turn its historical 
grievances against the United States as well. China is already suspicious of the U.S.-
Japan security alliance and is annoyed with United States’ resolve to support Japan in the 
defense of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.535 Hence, China will continue to use its historical 
grievances in any way it can, either to garner international support to weaken or lessen 
the moral aptitude of Japan and the United States or to defend illegal remnants of past 
imperialism and colonization in the ECS. As China increases its military and defense 
capabilities commensurate to its economic status, it will become more emboldened to 
challenge any perceived slights that could potentially threaten its sovereignty. Thus, the 
United States and Japan should be prepared for China’s continual use of history to justify 
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both its domestic and foreign policies—China is far from giving up using its history card 
to gain the moral upper hand or as leverage to justify the defense of national interests.  
4. Address Grievances to Blunt China’s Political Use as Leverage 
Instead of criticizing China’s complaints against Japan, Japan can take actions to 
lessen China’s historical leverage by addressing all issues immediately to restore bilateral 
positive relations. For example, if China unearths another Japanese chemical weapon that 
causes harm or if Japanese businesses are accused of behaving indecently while visiting 
China, Japan should not be predisposed to dismiss Chinese concerns but should 
immediately take a conciliatory attitude and redress the issues to minimize predicted 
Chinese criticisms. In regard to the Yasukuni Shrine, China will use this as moral 
leverage as proof of supposed Japanese militarism. The Japanese prime minister should 
avoid visits to the Yasukuni Shrine as it has now become a political tool used by China. 
By not visiting the shrine, Japan’s prime ministers take away China’s ability to use or 
demean the sacred shrine for political gain, and Japan can preserve the shrine as sacred 
place of worship for the bereaved Japanese families who lost loved ones during the war—
not as a place of hate and revisionism. As seen in China’s “new thinking,” Japan could 
take the moral high ground and adopt a “new thinking” on China to help improve 
relations. Government endorsement of cultural exchange programs and a campaign of 
positive Sino-Japanese relations could cut through some of the bitterness of history in the 
public sector. Abe could also approach China, South Korea, and other Asian countries for 
another look at the possibility of having regional joint historical textbooks, as previously 
done in 2006. In any case, Japan and China can explore ways to improve bilateral 
relations, while saving face in the international community without seeming weak to their 
domestic constituents.  
In conclusion, Sino-Japanese relations are challenged by both opportunities and 
obstructions. The return of friendly and cooperative Sino-Japanese relations will be 
difficult to achieve if both sides cannot come to agreement with the interpretation of 
history and its use in dictating domestic policies of nationalism, self-identity, and 
legitimacy of government. Although the history issue is not at the center of all Sino-
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Japanese conflict, it is usually an underlying or related factor. Thus, seeking resolution 
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